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ABSTRACT 
 
In 2010, the discovery of a wreck identified as HMS Solebay off Nevis’ 
southwest seacoast prompted an investigation by a graduate student from Texas A&M 
University and the Institute of Nautical Archaeology, in collaboration with local and 
international partners. Team members documented the site with standard, low-tech, 
nonintrusive, archaeological recording methods. Nautical archaeology in Nevis is still a 
nascent discipline, one that should be pursued for the importance of seaborne commerce 
and warfare to the island’s historical evolution within the British Empire. The island is 
amongst the oldest English Caribbean colonies and in the 17th century was the richest of 
the Leeward Islands through slave-labored sugar plantations. 
Solebay’s story reveals the British naval experience during the American 
Revolution from the perspective of a crew manning a lower echelon warship. Built in 
1763, deployed to America in 1776, and lost in the 1782 Battle of Frigate Bay, it 
transcended a vigorous period in British naval architecture, and technological 
innovations including coppered hulls and the introduction of carronades. Solebay 
exposes the challenges and rewards of studying this maritime heritage in Nevis. 
Solebay’s violent destruction and subsequent site formation, onto a volcanic 
seafloor in dynamic tropical waters, has largely precluded the survival of ship timbers or 
other organic materials. However, metal artifacts and six iron guns have been 
documented and the microenvironment has afforded unforeseen positive benefits. 
Shallow deposition and natural exposure permitted the recovery of 72 artifacts for full 
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conservation and diagnostic analysis, complementing the archival evidence. 
Interpretations support the wreck’s identity and suggest resourceful adaptive wartime 
behaviors on the part of her crew. 
While Solebay remains British crown property under international sovereign 
immunity laws, the Nevis Historical and Conservation Society has been entrusted as the 
cultural steward. Conserved artifacts exhibited in the Alexander Hamilton Museum, 
Charlestown, Nevis, educate the public about Solebay, its story, and more importantly, 
the value of protecting and studying shipwrecks. This project serves Nevisians and the 
Federal government in St. Kitts as a case study for advancing underwater cultural 
heritage policy on this site and future discoveries. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Within the West Indies, a string of islands dots a map for more than 500 miles 
between the South American seacoast of Venezuela and Puerto Rico. Collectively 
known as the Lesser Antilles, these islands define the eastern boundary of the Caribbean 
Sea. Toward the northern end are two tiny dormant volcanoes protruding from the 
seafloor. Together they form the Federation of Saint Christopher (St. Kitts) and Nevis, 
separated by two nautical miles of seas called The Narrows. There, Atlantic Ocean 
currents push from east to west, between the islands, where they transition into the other 
side as the Caribbean Sea. In 1624, settlers established England’s first permanent 
Caribbean colony on St. Kitts. Four years later some of these colonists sailed southeast 
across The Narrows and landed on Nevis. 
Seafarers from Europe began exploring these islands as early as Christopher 
Columbus’s second voyage to the New World, in 1493. Folklore claims Columbus 
named Nevis after the Spanish Nuestra Señora de las Nieves, meaning “Our Lady of the 
Snows.”1 Supposedly, the clouds that almost perpetually ring Nevis Peak reminded him 
of a snow-capped, Iberian mountain. Depending on whom one asks, the story may be 
apocryphal. However, it was the English and not the Iberians that ultimately settled and 
                                                
 
1. There is no evidence to support the romantic version of Columbus giving the 
island the name Nieves, and much to refute it. For further discussion on the naming of 
Nevis read Lucius Hubbard, "Did Columbus Discover the Islands Antigua and St. 
Martin?" Geographical Review 21, no. 4 (Oct. 1931): 584-597.  
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developed Nevis as part of its imperial maritime periphery, in the process anglicizing the 
name to Nevis. English pioneering directed the Nevisian historical trajectory toward an 
important position in what would become the British Empire. 
In contrasting the past to present times, Nevis gathers little attention in global 
politics. Today, the people depend for their survival largely on tourism. A modern, 
relaxing, sleepy image of the two islands hides a fascinating and sometimes darker past. 
Digging through archival records exposes stories of battles involving thousands of 
soldiers and dozens of warships just off the coast, and a history scarred by the horrors of 
slavery. To Americans, Nevis is the birthplace of an American Founding Father, 
Alexander Hamilton, and the location where the U.S. Navy won its first ship-to-ship 
victory. The islands are littered with ruined fortifications that beguile their embattled 
historical purposes. Archaeology reveals abandoned sugar plantations with their stone-
walled buildings, crumbling windmills, and shipwrecks resting on the seafloor waiting to 
be discovered. 
To study Nevis’ past is to study a microcosm of British imperialism through the 
centuries. Nevis’ history includes economic contributions to the British Empire driven 
by slave-labored sugar plantations, genocidal displacement of indigenous Amerindians, 
economic and military competition with other European nation-states, biological 
transformations through the Columbian Exchange, and the cultural consequences of 
seasonal storms and hurricanes. For these reasons, Nevis is an engrossing place for 
historians, archaeologists, and other scientists to study. 
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Until this dissertation, archaeological research projects focused on collecting data 
on the island. This is where I began my research in 2008—2009 as a project manager for 
Dr. Marco Meniketti, San Jose State University, by assisting him with his summer field 
schools. Since the 1990s, he has been researching the role of Nevis’ historic sugar 
economy in the context of the greater world system, through terrestrial archaeological 
excavations of abandoned plantations. Our discussions led to the possibility of 
expanding archaeological research to the sea. 
The ocean offers great opportunities to enhance Nevis’ history through nautical 
archaeology. Nevis’ shipwrecks have not been studied, despite being an essential 
component in settling the island from prehistory forward, and serving as an economic 
waterway connecting the English colony to the rest of the world. The importance of sea 
travel to Nevis cannot be understated. In modern times, the ocean remains an essential 
lifeline, with cargo vessels delivering food, building materials, and other supplies on a 
weekly basis. Only people and limited supplies arrive by air. Nevis’ dependence on 
maritime commerce coupled with a captivating and rich history offers a compelling 
argument for studying the submerged resources. 
This dissertation began with a plan to survey the seafloor and then turned into a 
case study of a single wreck. The original intention was to use remote sensing followed 
by scientific scuba divers assessing promising targets. This effort would have initiated 
the process of inventorying underwater cultural resources, with an emphasis on locating 
historic shipwrecks. Warships lost in battles, merchant vessels lost in storms, and 
potential slave wrecks are untapped cultural resources with the power to inform about 
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Nevis’ history, and contribute to understanding its colonial role within the British 
Empire. 
In 2010 the survey was postponed after a group of history and archaeology 
advocates from the Nevis Historical and Conservation Society located a shipwreck off 
Nevis’ southwest seacoast. This discovery developed into a full season investigation in 
2011. The resulting evidence supports identification of the shipwreck as that of HMS2 
Solebay, lost during the Battle of Frigate Bay. In January 1782, thousands of French 
soldiers had laid siege to Brimstone Hill Fortress on the sister island of St. Kitts. The 
Royal Navy was attempting to relieve the defending British garrison when Solebay 
grounded during the fighting. Her crew subsequently scuttled Solebay with a fire that 
triggered a violent explosion from the ship’s gunpowder kegs. This engagement was an 
extension of the American Revolutionary War, an imperial fight for control of the West 
Indian sugar islands. 
While the archival research and fieldwork substantiates this interpretation, there 
is a possibility that some of the archaeological material may be from an earlier wreck 
named Companion. In 1667 during the Second Anglo-Dutch War, this armed English 
merchantman exploded while fighting off Nevis. The similar final circumstances and 
locations of both vessels make it possible that the remains not of one, but of two vessels 
                                                
2. The prefix HMS may also be written as H.M.S. and is an abbreviation for ‘His 
/ Her Majesty’s Ship’ in reference to being property of the British monarch. Before the 
1790s, the abbreviation was not commonly used, but the term ‘His Majesty’s Ship’ was 
used in the official court-martial records concerning Solebay, for example. The 
preference for using HMS in this dissertation reflects an academic preference to 
emphasize Solebay’s identity as a Royal Navy warship to readers, particularly in the 
dissertation title. 
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exist as one overlapping or contiguous archaeological complex. To make a better 
determination would require significantly more archaeology beyond the scope of this 
dissertation. The best diagnostic approach would require excavating and conserving 
particular cannons for their maker’s marks. These have the potential to more confidently 
date the associated wreckage. Either historical hypothesis, as a single wreck or two 
wrecks, signifies the island’s importance to English history. English leaders were willing 
to send naval forces during the Second Anglo-Dutch War or later American Revolution, 
to defend St. Kitts and Nevis. 
Solebay is important for the history it represents. The French were willing to risk 
thousands of troops and significant naval resources to attack St. Kitts and Nevis. 
Similarly, the British were willing to commit relief forces to defend Brimstone Fortress, 
upon which the defense of the island stood. Once Solebay wrecked, the site recorded a 
moment in history by becoming an archaeological site. 
Moreover, as a case study, Solebay is not just a shipwreck story. The research 
process contributed to the ongoing dialogue on best practices for managing and 
protecting underwater cultural resources in Nevis, and by extension St Kitts. In 
December 2009, the Federation of St. Kitts and Nevis ratified the United Nations 
Convention on the Protection of the Underwater Cultural Heritage (UCH). At multiple 
levels – international, national, and local – Solebay serves as a real test, pushing the 
UCH Convention principles beyond theory and into practice. Authorities are faced with 
a shipwreck site in Nevis that warrants protection, if for no other reason than by being a 
Royal Navy vessel it is afforded treatment under international sovereign immunity laws. 
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This dissertation proves the value of investing in nautical archaeology in Nevis 
by briefly reviewing its broad history in Chapter Two. In Chapter Three, the research 
then focuses on Solebay, for its own fascinating history. Solebay also offers a bottom-up 
perspective of Royal Navy experiences during the American Revolution, illustrating a 
variety of missions a typical frigate fulfilled. Beyond history, the dissertation offers 
archaeological interpretations of the material culture in Chapter Four. The arguments 
focus on key artifacts supporting the shipwreck’s identity. In doing this, the chapter 
hypothesizes anthropological questions suggesting adaptive human behavior, 
specifically resourcefulness during wartime. While these are only plausible speculations, 
they suggest numerous avenues for future research. Finally, in Chapter Five, Solebay 
serves as an example for maritime archaeological heritage preservation. This discussion 
addresses what has been done and can be done to best manage and protect shipwrecks in 
Nevis and by extension the Federation. 
During almost two decades of service Solebay transitioned a period of naval 
architecture that began to flourish through new designs and a continually maturing navy. 
Technological introductions during Solebay’s life in copper sheathing and carronades 
add to this complexity. The ship became a tool of the growing eighteenth-century British 
Empire, defending an economy transitioning from mercantilism to capitalism. Solebay is 
also a human story of famous British, French, and American figures. This is also the 
story of common sailors aboard a sixth-rate frigate fighting in a war 4,000 miles from 
their homeport. 
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As Solebay served the Royal Navy in the eighteenth century, she continues in the 
twenty-first century to serve modern cultures. Solebay provides a physical connection to 
the historic past, a recreational tourist attraction for both scuba divers and museum 
visitors, and an archaeological site to answer historical and anthropological questions 
that lead toward understanding human behavior in wars. This case study demonstrates 
the island’s significance in English history, its value for expanding future nautical 
archaeology in Nevis, and accelerates the urgency to enact site protection plans for all 
underwater cultural heritage around the islands of St. Kitts and Nevis. This research 
should serve as a precedent for future nautical archaeology in Nevis. 
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CHAPTER II 
NAUTICAL ARCHAEOLOGY IN NEVIS 
 
 
Figure 1 Location of Nevis within the Caribbean Sea. (Satellite image from 
Google Earth) 
 
On 25 January 1782, as the sun was setting off the idyllic, tropical coast of 
Nevis, West Indies, a violent battle was raging just offshore between dozens of British 
and French warships (Figure 1). They fought in the seas as hundreds of soldiers 
exchanged shots on nearby Saint Kitts to control Brimstone Hill Fortress, key to control 
the two islands. While the fleets battled, the fate of one vessel became forever sealed 
when HMS Solebay grounded on a shallow near the coast. With little hope of rescue and 
French warships closing in, the crew set the ship afire. The blaze consumed the frigate 
and reached its hold, which contained 160 barrels of gunpowder. This triggered a 
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thunderous explosion, sending the ship to the bottom of the ocean. Despite the loss of 
Solebay, the Royal Navy held the anchorage against multiple French counterattacks. On 
26 January, after another day of fighting, the French navy withdrew to deeper waters as 
the French army continued the siege on Brimstone. In the end, the English were not 
capable of defending the fortress, and Brimstone fell to the French army on 13 February. 
A century later, in 1890, the famous naval officer and theoretical historian Alfred 
Thayer Mahan, in his seminal work The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 
commented on British Rear-Admiral Sir Samuel Hood’s leadership during what became 
known as the Battle of Frigate Bay. In evaluating British naval performance in the 
American Revolution, Mahan argues that Hood’s actions to try to relieve the besieged 
Brimstone Hill Fortress on St. Kitts were “the most brilliant military effort of the whole 
war.”1 
In 2010, Solebay’s discovery reignited memory of it as an archaeological 
signature of this “brilliant military effort.” Studying this wreck and retelling Solebay’s 
history highlights a conflict between thousands of sailors and soldiers to influence the 
destiny of empires fighting over the contested West Indian Sugar Islands. Solebay was a 
                                                
1. Alfred T. Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1783 
(Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1890), See Chapter 8 on the fight for St. Kitts and 
Nevis. 
2. Vincent K. Hubbard, Swords, Ships, and Sugar: A History of Nevis (Corvallis, 
Ore.: Premiere Editions, 2002). 
3. Aaron Arrowsmith, Chart of the Caribbee Islands from the Spanish Survey 
with a sketch of the Anchorage at Nevis, &c. (London: A. Arrowsmith, 24 February 
1808). 
4. ADM 1/5319 pt 3 ff 463-469, Solebay/Everitt Court Martial, 21 February 
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tool and her crewmen agents in shaping the fate of an empire driven by plantation 
slavery. This dissertation reveals Solebay’s history, discusses the results of her 
archaeological investigation, provides guidance for protecting the site as a submerged 
cultural resource, recommends future nautical research in Nevis, and brings these themes 
together through the fate of a single warship. 
Despite these valuable scholarly efforts, no major work has been promoted to 
study the shipwrecks that may surround the island, and uniquely encapsulate 
undocumented material culture. For an island dependent entirely on maritime trade and 
communication for existence, and that was one of the wealthiest territories in the British 
Empire in the eighteenth century from the sugar trade, studying such shipwrecks should 
be pursued, to contribute to a richer understanding of Nevisian, Atlantic World, and 
nautical history. That has been the focus of this dissertation. Nautical archaeology is a 
sub-discipline of archaeology since the last half century. Its maturity as a discipline 
informed by scientific methods in the twenty-first century allowed it to spread to smaller 
and less studied locations. In Nevis this is especially important to fully understanding the 
island’s past. Its maritime links with Europe, Africa, and the Americas, rest on the 
seafloor as archaeological records waiting to be uncovered. 
This dissertation tested the following hypothesis: given Nevis’ history and 
dynamic ecosystem, its waters harbor shipwrecks that are both easily accessible and 
archaeologically valuable. In doing so, the short-term objective of this research has been 
to locate, non-intrusively document, and present preliminary interpretations regarding 
the remains of an historic shipwreck. This first stage tested both the validity and value of 
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exploring underwater archaeological resources in Nevisian waters. The parallel long-
term objective has been to establish a sustained nautical research program in Nevis. This 
objective has been evaluated through measurable developmental goals associated with 
the first objective to tease out greater patterns. Accomplishing these goals includes A) 
evaluating logistics and operations, B) building capacity and Nevisian support, and 
establish an international research network, and C) promoting ethical, scientific methods 
that produce public results and include the Nevisians as engaged beneficiaries and 
cultural stewards. Solebay serves as a case study in accomplishing these goals. 
Moreover, Solebay is a site that can contribute to the development and expansion of 
historical archaeology as means to understand its related past. 
As the discipline of underwater archaeology has come to maturity in the last half-
century as an historical social science, professional underwater archaeologists have 
pushed research into new locations. One growing trend is a desire and need to 
investigate deep-water shipwrecks. These have become increasingly subject to 
destruction from fishing trawlers. Also, treasure hunters are gaining resources to access 
deeply submerged wrecks. While deep-water wrecks warrant continued attention, these 
projects require sophisticated and expensive technologies. Commercial salvors continued 
work has been largely due to their ability to secure financing, in a race against 
archaeologists. Furthermore, trawlers continue to damage deep-water wrecks. In this 
context, significantly less costly projects from more easily accessible shallow-water 
wrecks beg discovering and archaeological study. In Nevis this assumption has yet to be 
scientifically tested, as the initial challenge is not depth, but accessibility. 
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At just under 36 square miles, with a population of c. 12,000 people, the appeal 
of Nevis as a tourist destination comes from its remote location. Nevis is 1,100 nautical 
miles from Florida in the continental United States. It is a further 1,200 nautical miles 
east of Honduras in Central America, and 400 nautical miles north of Venezuela, the 
closest continental land in South America. Though remote, Nevis is fully integrated into 
the modern world, easily accessible by air or sea travelers who regularly arrive for 
vacations with suitcases in hand. Conducting underwater archaeology as a foreign visitor 
in Nevis, with a limited budget, has been more challenging than planning a simple 
vacation. Funding is the biggest obstacle inhibiting underwater archaeology projects. 
Relative to terrestrial excavations, nautical research has very high costs from the special 
equipment and research vessel time. The Solebay project’s funding was ensured by 
generous sponsors and adequate, but finances were tight.  
This project used underwater cameras and special writing slates, a metal detector, 
materials for establishing site baselines and tagging artifacts, float bags for lifting and 
recovering heavier artifacts, large crates full of remote sensing equipment, and lots of 
scuba gear. Purchasing some items from local hardware stores helped reduce some 
shipping costs and time. Still, much of the specialized hardware had to be brought to 
Nevis. This involved careful logistical planning of both land and sea shipping, to send 
crates of gear to Nevis. Once there, orchestrating marine archaeological research, like 
any underwater archaeology project, required an adequate research vessel and access to a 
scuba shop for air tanks and fills, and a team of people. 
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The island’s relative geographic isolation, small population, and insufficient 
facilities have limited both past and current salvage efforts. To date, no marina exists, 
though one being built nears completion. There is one government-operated harbor deep 
enough for large commercial cargo vessels. They arrive weekly with the bulk of wares 
and food to Nevis. Otherwise, mariners must anchor offshore at designated moorings. In 
Nevis, limited mooring options reduces the number of vessels available. This makes 
recreational diving, treasure hunting, and academic research more difficult. At the same 
time, these conditions of limited activity help protect the submerged resources from 
illicit exploitation. This contrasts with notoriously active, multi-decade, looting in waters 
of places such as Bermuda or Florida. These locations have greater populations and 
better marina facilities. This makes for more vessels with easier environments to operate, 
and therefore more vulnerable to opportunistic looters. In contrast, sending needed 
underwater archaeology equipment and operating in Nevis required a strenuous effort. 
Nevis’ lack of a sheltered marina exposed vessels to disaster during seasonal 
storms and hurricanes, as suggested by historic records. Shipwrecks were deposited 
along the seafloor, scattered across an area of potential anchorages. Additionally, 
European imperial competition led to a number of naval battles off Nevis and St. Kitts. 
The surrounding ocean potentially contains centuries of wrecked merchant and naval 
vessels. A remote sensing survey using a side-scan sonar and magnetometer employing 
accepted archaeological practices remains the most effective method for rapidly 
surveying large ocean swaths. A magnetometer detects ferrous materials such as cannon, 
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anchors, and steam machinery. Sonar data provides a visual record to complement the 
magnetometer, and assists with locating non-ferrous materials and debris fields. 
For this dissertation, the project survey was limited to the use of a magnetometer. 
This choice reflected budget limitations in shipping costs and available survey time. 
Moreover, this effort served three useful purposes. The magnetometer survey followed a 
search area immediately surrounding the known Solebay shipwreck site. The 
magnetometer offered the opportunity to help delineate the wreck by identifying any 
previously unknown anchors or guns in the immediate vicinity. Secondly, recording the 
known guns provided magnetic signatures in known depths and environment that can be 
contrasted against magnetic signatures of unidentified origin in future Nevis surveys. 
This may potentially help locate and identify guns from other shipwreck sites. 
Lastly, the process of assembling, shipping, clearing customs, and deploying the 
magnetometer has provided an educational test for future surveys. Access to an adequate 
vessel was a significant challenge for a survey in Nevis. With this comes the problem of 
powering the equipment with batteries, a generator, or other onboard power. All surveys 
face such obstacles. A two-day magnetometer survey around Solebay offered the 
opportunity to solve potential complications before committing resources to an entire 
survey season. With or without the survey data, the Solebay project can still be 
considered a success. The scientific divers were not dependent on the magnetometer for 
accomplishing in situ recording with writing slates, reel tapes, and cameras. 
A future comprehensive survey in areas limited to recreational diving depths 
reflects the most vulnerable cultural areas given their accessibility. This choice has the 
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added benefit of allowing diver tow-boarding surveys and snorkeling for more rapid 
initial searches. Shallower depths additionally allow archaeologists to more easily 
research discovered wrecks. Promising targets can be dived using standard recreational 
scuba to assess cultural significance. This reinforces one of the arguments for this 
research and highlights the importance of Solebay as an easily accessible site with both 
risks to looting and benefits to archaeology. The magnetometer survey over Solebay did 
not help discover new materials. However, this effort proved beneficial for the logistical 
and methodological reasons mentioned to a future survey. Explaining this interest in a 
greater survey helps clarify the limited magnetometer test. Moreover, Solebay’s 
discovery in 2010, subsequent archaeological investigation, and evolution of helping St. 
Kitts and Nevis develop their maritime heritage plans stems from the initial survey idea. 
Planning for a remote sensing survey began in 2008 with initial contacts between 
several interested parties. Foremost, meeting with the Nevis Historical and Conservation 
Society (NHCS) leadership proved essential. The NHCS is a nonprofit, non-
governmental organization that in 2012 began transitioning from its original non-
governmental status into the Nevis Historical and Conservation Trust (NHCT), branch of 
the national government. Since its founding in 1980, NHCS members have included a 
mix of local Nevisians and expats who share a vision for securing the natural and 
cultural resources of Nevis. A small paid staff supported by volunteers have 
accomplished a lot. They have worked to establish heritage trails and posted signage for 
tourists, promoted efforts to preserve historic buildings, and developed and managed the 
island’s museums and archives. Furthermore, the NHCS members have advised the 
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government on legislation to mitigate negative effects of development on the natural 
environment, while also promoting new construction sympathetic to existing styles of 
historic colonial architecture. These efforts have benefited Nevisians while enriching the 
appeal of their tourism industry. Understanding the role of the NHCS is critical to 
understanding the management of archaeological resources in Nevis. 
During the winter of 2009-2010, while moving closer toward executing a survey, 
a question arose: “in anticipation of finding undocumented shipwrecks around Nevis, 
what legislation existed that would protect such finds from immediate looting or 
exploitation by treasure hunters?” This pertinent question appeared in the 
correspondence between the author and then NHCS members, and sparked a renewed 
interest in locating shipwrecks by the interested parties, and providing the country with a 
legal framework that will effectively protect its submerged cultural heritage.  
The inspiration for locating Solebay came from retired American attorney 
Vincent Hubbard, who split his time between homes in Virginia and Nevis. He served as 
the NHCS president for six years and developed a passion for studying the island’s 
ruined fortifications. His avocational research expanded into the publication of Swords, 
Ships & Sugar: A History of Nevis.2 This book covers topics from pre-Columbian 
Amerindian settlement, through the British colonial period, and ends in 1992, the date of 
its first publication. Hubbard never intended his book to be a definitive monograph such 
as might be written by a professional historian. He simply wanted to share what he had 
                                                
2. Vincent K. Hubbard, Swords, Ships, and Sugar: A History of Nevis (Corvallis, 
Ore.: Premiere Editions, 2002). 
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learned. Surprisingly, to date, this 60,000-word book remains the only broad historical 
survey of Nevis. It is widely sold in the island’s tourist stores and museum gift shops. 
While a solid introduction to Nevisian history, and written to appeal to tourists, the book 
leaves room for additional publications on Nevis. 
In his extensive historical research, Hubbard identified the events surrounding 
Solebay and her loss on a reef off Nevis. He shared his hopes of finding the wreck with 
other NHCS members: Paul Diamond, Bob and Judy Foster-Smith, and Roy Arthur 
“Brother” Anslyn. The early 2010 discussions of potential archaeological shipwreck 
surveys rekindled interest in the possibility of locating Solebay’s remains. This small 
team of local history enthusiasts from mixed professions and backgrounds came together 
and took a chance on testing an historic map that purportedly identified the shipwreck 
location. They recalled a discussion with archaeologist Lilli Azevedo, then a PhD 
student from England researching on nearby Anguilla. While doing archival research, 
she had observed the word “Solabay” clearly written next to a black dot on a Spanish 
survey chart published in 1808: “Chart of the Caribbee Islands from the Spanish Survey, 
with a Sketch of the Anchorage at Nevis &c.,” hereafter referred to as the Arrowsmith 
chart after its publisher, English cartographer Aaron Arrowsmith (Figure 2).3  
 
                                                
3. Aaron Arrowsmith, Chart of the Caribbee Islands from the Spanish Survey 
with a sketch of the Anchorage at Nevis, &c. (London: A. Arrowsmith, 24 February 
1808). 
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Figure 2 Close-up section of 1808 Arrowhead chart showing HMS Solebay 
wreck on western side of Nevis. 
 
Although the spelling did not match exactly, the location supported official 
accounts from Captain Charles Holmes Everitt, Solebay’s commander at the time of the 
frigate’s loss.4 Using the chart as a starting point, the team compared the historic map 
with a modern chart to formulate a plausible position. The coordinates obtained were 
then entered into a GPS navigation system. This allowed them to test the map by 
surveying an area surrounding the Arrowsmith Solabay position. With a position ready, 
key team members planned the fieldwork. 
NHCS advisor Arthur “Brother” Anslyn serves the government directly as an 
expert Marine Consultant to the Prime Minister in the Nevis Island Administration. Well 
respected on the island, and through his additional advisory connection with the Nevis 
Air and Sea Ports Authority (NASPA), Anslyn spoke with NASPA’s General Manager, 
                                                
4. ADM 1/5319 pt 3 ff 463-469, Solebay/Everitt Court Martial, 21 February 
1782. 
  19 
Spencer Hanley. This discussion secured the use of NASPA’s Police Launch, under 
Captain Grenville Boddie and First Mate Javon Bissette, for an initial search. This 
relationship with Hanley and the NASPA Police provided a boat for the initial scuba 
dives in 2010, and during the magnetometer survey in 2011. Paul Diamond, a key 
member of the NHCS, came to assist as did Bob Foster-Smith, a British expat who 
donated the use of a side-scan sonar and supporting equipment from his professional 
survey company to conduct a survey. 
 
 
Figure 3 Vince Hubbard, Brother Anslyn, and Bob Foster-Smith discuss plans for 
HMS Solebay search. (Photograph courtesy of Paul Diamond) 
 
Team members surveyed the area they believed to encompass the position 
indicated on the Arrowsmith chart (Figure 3). On the first day they experienced 
significant technical difficulties in getting the side- scan to work properly. They went 
ashore to troubleshoot and returned the next day, 25 March 2010. When trouble 
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continued to plague the sonar, they observed the shallowness of the water at 15–25 feet. 
They decided to attempt diver tow boarding. Anslyn and Diamond donned mask, fins, 
and snorkels, and the NASPA crew towed them behind the police launch using a rope. 
To their delight, they observed cannons within fifteen minutes. By the end of the day, 
they believed they had observed six cannon, including what appeared to be three 9-
pounders and three smaller guns, possibly carronades. This discovery proved sufficient 
to warrant further investigation; whether Solebay or otherwise, historic cultural material 
had been discovered. The events that have since transpired became the focus of this 
research, a shift away from the survey initially planned. 
From 16 to 22 July 2010, just under four months after this discovery, as a 
doctoral student in the Nautical Archaeology Program at Texas A&M University, I 
visited Nevis for one week to assess the environment, the logistics and plan my future 
project. Working around days of inclement whether, I managed to dive four times. While 
there, I developed a working relationship with Professor James Hewlett of Finger Lakes 
Community College, New York. He was teaching a marine biology field school to a 
dozen undergraduate students. In what proved fortunate to the Solebay research, Hewlett 
had budgeted extra time for inclement weather and got ahead of schedule with fair 
conditions. Having the flexibility and desiring to expand their educational horizons, 
Hewlett and his students volunteered to help with some basic documentation. After I 
instructed them in I taught them the basics of trilateration, measurement, and site 
recording they recorded the needed information. Their excellent work, along with my 
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notes and photographs, provided enough information for a preliminary report to plan a 
more extensive field project. 
A year later, from 17 June to 20 July 2011, I directed a more detailed survey and 
documentation of the site, and recovered 72 artifacts for conservation and further 
analysis. While no irrefutable diagnostic artifact has been observed, such as a ship’s bell 
etched with Solebay 1763, the results support a best-fit conclusion as the wreck of 
Solebay. This evidence includes the wreck’s location supported by historic records, and 
a sampling of diagnostic artifacts that collectively fit the hypothesis. This wreck has 
contributed to the archaeological record of this particular site, generated new questions, 
and has been the basis for the development of nautical archaeology off Nevis. In doing 
so, the research has helped address questions regarding logistics and underwater cultural 
heritage policy. 
This dissertation integrates theoretical perspectives within the history and 
analysis of the site. Nautical archaeologists are afforded latitude within their research 
interests that allows them to employ a hard science approach or to choose a research path 
that lies closer to the humanities. The discipline’s literature reflects and summarizes a 
wide variety of approaches and examples.5 Modern anthropological scholarship 
                                                
5. For a range of examples discussing maritime archaeological theory, read 
James Delgado, "Gold Rush Entrepôt: The Maritime Archaeology of the Rise of the Port 
of San Francisco," (Dissertation, Simon Fraser University, 2006); Joe Flatman, "Cultural 
Biographies, Cognitive Landscapes and Dirty Old Bits of Boat: Theory in Maritime 
Archaeology," International Journal of Nautical Archaeology 32, no. 2 (2003): 143-157; 
Richard A. Gould, Shipwreck Anthropology (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico, 
1983); Richard A. Gould, Archaeology and the Social History of Ships (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2000); Charles E. Orser, A Historical Archaeology of the 
Modern World (New York: Plenum Press, 1996); and Mark Staniforth, Material Culture 
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encompasses a wide spectrum of approaches, from historical narrative to nomothetic 
anthropological questions. The answers within each theoretical frame are not right or 
wrong, but rather an epistemological negotiation that enriches the discipline with 
multiple scholars employing their expertise to expand knowledge. This research added to 
knowledge of Nevisian and British nautical history by employing both scientific 
methodology and historic research. It delivered historic narratives and asked questions 
regarding human behavior in war. Therefore, this nautical archaeology research moved 
toward an archaeologically-informed maritime history of Nevis, as opposed to historical 
archaeology. 
The research objectives for the Solebay fieldwork were concise: 1) to delineate 
the extent of the site and create a detailed site plan, documenting all observable artifacts 
with field notes and underwater imaging; 2) to affirm or deny, to the greatest possible 
extent, the identity of the site as HMS Solebay; and 3) to establish a precedent for high 
quality scientific investigations of underwater archaeological sites in Nevis. Through 
these objectives, a baseline site plan and report provides Nevis the means to strategize on 
site mitigation and future underwater archaeology research, and contribute to Nevis' 
economic potential through enhancing heritage tourism resources. These resources are 
both an educational museum exhibit, created from the excavated Solebay artifacts, and 
the site itself, which can appeal to recreational snorkelers and scuba divers. As much as 
                                                                                                                                           
and Consumer Society: Dependent Colonies in Colonial Australia (New York: Kluwer 
Academic/Plenum Publishers, 2003). 
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possible, interpretations regarding the site formation process, historical technology, and 
related cultural behaviors have been analyzed. 
The interpretation of the research results placed the material culture within the 
greater historical context, as an archaeological signature of eighteenth-century imperial 
conflict. The wreck, if it is determined to be HMS Solebay, sank in the Battle of Frigate 
Bay. The story of Solebay is in many ways the story of the British naval experience 
during the American Revolution. Constructed in 1763, Solebay became one of the first 
warships deployed along the American seacoast in 1775, serving nearly the entire 
duration of the war, before being lost in 1782. This action occurred within a period of 
intense competition for control of a number of Caribbean islands, primarily between 
Great Britain and France, but also involving Spain and the Netherlands. Solebay serves 
to propel an intricate history involving Europeans, colonial Americans, and enslaved 
Africans. 
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CHAPTER III 
NEVIS IN THE BRITISH EMPIRE 
 
By 1900, one-quarter of Earth’s entire human population, 400,000,000 people, 
lived under the flag of the British Empire. The British achieved this amazing global 
influence despite having lost some colonial possessions, including the American 
Colonies, which became independent in 1776. This expansion and control of colonial 
territories was possible through the administrative maturation, professionalization, and 
technological improvements of the British military and especially in the Royal Navy 
defending a political economy that focused on securing and controlling trade. Other 
important factors to imperial growth included cultural changes occurring from the 
Enlightenment and Scientific Revolutions, which provided technological advances, 
population growth, a boom in consumer-oriented commerce, and a general increase in 
education and knowledge. Adding to this was the enormous geographical advantage of 
not having continental borders, which bogged down European powers with costly 
defenses. British culture evolved in a way that today seems inevitable, but was not 
predetermined. Success required these factors working complementary to each other, 
together with a bit of luck, and in contrast to other cultures choosing to emphasize 
different paths, which exaggerated British success in comparison. No single factor can 
be isolated to explain the British imperial success, but control of territories that provided 
the resources to fuel the manufacturing and industrialized economy as it shifted from 
mercantilism to capitalism is clearly among the most important. 
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To gain a broad contextual understanding of Nevis in English, Caribbean, and 
world history requires reviewing multiple treatments. There are many well-written books 
on the broad history of the West Indies, the history of the sugar industry, and the history 
of the English in the Caribbean.1 There are also sound historical archaeology books on 
Nevis, as well as the availability of very site-specific reports.2 The history of Nevis 
appears in such texts, but often in limited references, or overshadowed by the larger 
islands’ histories. Jamaica, Barbados, or the most prosperous English sugar island, 
Antigua, with its strategic naval base at English Harbor, starting in the 1720s, or St. 
Kitts, which tends to steal some of the attention from Nevis due to its proximity and 
tightly related history. Each book offers a slightly different approach to the subjects, but 
collectively they provide an understanding of Nevis’ historical place, particularly in the 
                                                
1. Key examples of good secondary sources include Carl Bridenbaugh and 
Roberta Bridenbaugh, No Peace Beyond the Line; The English in the Caribbean, 1624-
1690 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1972); Ralph Davis, The Rise of the English 
Shipping Industry in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries (New York: St. Martin's 
Press, 1962); Richard S. Dunn, Sugar and Slaves: The Rise of the Planter Class in the 
English West Indies, 1624-1713 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1972); 
Brian Dyde, Out of the Crowded Vagueness: A History of the Islands of St Kitts, Nevis & 
Anguilla (Oxford: Macmillan Caribbean, 2005); David Hancock, Citizens of the World: 
London Merchants and the Integration of the British Atlantic Community, 1735-1785 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995); Sidney W. Mintz, Sweetness and 
Power: The Place of Sugar in Modern History (New York: Penguin Books, 1986); 
Richard B. Sheridan, Sugar and Slavery; An Economic History of the British West 
Indies, 1623-1775 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1974); and David Watts, 
The West Indies: Patterns of Development, Culture, and Environmental Change Since 
1492 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987). 
 
2. For two good historical archaeology books on Nevis, read Tessa Machling, 
The Fortifications of Nevis, West Indies, From the 17th Century to the Present Day: 
Protected Interests? (Oxford: Archaeopress, 2012); and Michelle Terrell, The Jewish 
Community of Early Colonial Nevis: A Historical Archaeological Study (Gainesville: 
University Press of Florida, 2005). 
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seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, with details and comparisons of other West Indian 
islands. 
Nevertheless, a broad history of Nevis can be ascertained through the readings, 
and is important to briefly review. The two islands of St. Kitts and Nevis were 
significant enough for France and Great Britain to commit thousands of soldiers and 
sailors to the capture and defense of the two islands. Therefore, understanding Nevis’ 
history adds a piece to the larger puzzle of British imperial history. Key Nevis topics 
include the history of plantation capitalism, slavery, imperial competition, the 
Columbian exchange, ethnocide, and global trade. 
Historical scholarship solely of Nevis is limited. Hubbard’s monograph covers 
the total history but with a cursory fashion and limited footnoting.3 Studying Nevis 
through secondary sources is possible as previously mentioned, but often through 
snippets in books covering a greater context or theme such as histories of sugar 
production or histories of the West Indies. Since colonial Nevis was heavily dependent 
on England, primary sources available are often from external sources. For these 
reasons, understanding the European past in Nevis is challenging. Moreover, given the 
quick displacement and destruction of indigenous peoples, pre-European history is even 
more scant. This prehistory can only be filled by archaeological sources and small clues 
from few contact-period historical records. Most of these records document Europeans 
on Nevis’ sister island, St. Kitts and do not contain any direct discussion of Nevis. The 
few that exist provide at best a limited understanding of Native Nevisian-European 
                                                
3. Hubbard, Swords, Ships, and Sugar. 
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interactions. Even using the term “Native” is only relative to Europeans, to imply pre-
European inhabitants or peoples of origins outside Europe. More accurately, all people 
on Nevis and the surrounding Caribbean islands were imported either from Europe, 
Africa, or mainland South America. 
 A review of Nevis geographic names provides a sense of the island’s cultural 
history and legacy. For example, the legacy of piracy endures in the naming of the 
island’s prominent Gallows Bay, the location where pirates were hanged. Geologically, 
Nevis was formed from a dormant volcano and is one of the Leeward Islands in the 
Lesser Antilles island chain within the West Indies. This Eurocentric naming historically 
indicates the approach of seafaring Europeans arriving on wind-driven vessels. The 
Carib Indians called the island Oualie, or “Land of Beautiful Waters.” In modern times, 
a popular beach and tourist resort on the northwest coast retains the name of Oualie 
Beach. 
 
 
Figure 4 Nuestra Señora de las Nieves. Typical summer day in Nevis showing a 
clouded Mt. Nevis peak. (Photograph by the author) 
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In 1493, when Columbus sailed past Nevis, he named it San Martin, and later 
renamed it as Nuestra Señora de las Nieves (Figure 4). In time the island offered an 
opportunity for Europeans to explore and exploit. While it took the English more than a 
century to colonize it, the fate of the Amerindians on the island was settled with the 
arrival of the first Europeans. 
Pioneering Europeans struggled initially to establish permanent settlements. They 
battled resistant native populations while encountering tropical climates and diseases. 
Furthermore, Europeans had to compete against each other. During the sixteenth century 
Spain thwarted English attempts to gain a foothold in the Caribbean. While Columbus 
led Europeans to Nevis and named several islands in the Lesser Antilles for Europeans, 
it was the English and French who took advantage of these finds. The Spanish focused 
on Cuba, Hispaniola, and their vast territories on the American mainland. During the 
sixteenth century Spain kept firm control of precious metals in the New World. For over 
a century small islands such as Nevis were not a priority, and England grabbed whatever 
it could. 
In Newfoundland the English expanded their cod fishing, and by 1587 attempted 
to colonize Roanoke. English efforts in the New World were largely unsuccessful 
throughout the sixteenth century. Nevis started to become important to English seafarers 
in the mid-sixteenth century as they began venturing in greater numbers across the 
Atlantic Oceans. In 1585, Elizabethan sea captain Sir Francis Drake anchored off St. 
Kitts. He was part of English strategy leading a force to try to prevent the Spanish from 
replenishing their ships’ fresh water supplies. It took four more decades for permanent 
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English settlements, and until the latter half of the seventeenth century before the sugar 
monoculture became established. During this century, Nevis went from being a small 
island populated by indigenous peoples to an English colony fueling the rise and 
prosperity of the British Empire. 
Captain Bartholomew Gilbert from Plymouth, England, arrived in Nevis in June 
1603 with a crew that cut 20 tons of lignum vitae timber over two weeks.4 This resource 
extraction from Nevis reveals an early economic use of the island by European mariners. 
Gilbert’s men feasted on a giant tortoise with 500 eggs inside. These large animals were 
common before the arrival of Europeans. After resting and replenishment from the 
Atlantic crossing, Gilbert left Nevis, bound for Sir Walter Raleigh’s Roanoke failed 
colony of 1587. Upon arriving in what is today the Chesapeake Bay of Virginia, Gilbert 
and his master’s mate, ship’s doctor, and a Dutchman went ashore, where they were 
murdered by Indians. This unfortunate end still highlights Nevis’ connection into the 
development of early colonial American history. Europeans continued to stop at Nevis as 
a waypoint for fresh water before sailing to the American colonies as in 1607, when 
Captain John Smith’s Virginia-bound colonists anchored at Nevis to rest before 
journeying on toward their final destination. 
On 28 January 1624, a ship named Marmaduke delivered Robert Rich along with 
Sir Thomas Warner and his family to St. Kitts, establishing the first permanent English 
                                                
4. Samuel Purchas, Purchas His Pilgrimage (London: William Stansby, 1613), 
329-335. 
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colony in the Caribbean.5 A year later, French Captain Pierre Belain d’Esnambuc led 
survivors from a Spanish attack ashore on St. Kitts. The French vessel had been chased 
and was caught up by Spanish vessels. The ensuing fight badly damaged the French 
vessel and forced the survivors ashore for refuge. They serendipitously arrived on St. 
Kitts, and were warmly welcomed by Warner’s colonists. The English took pity on the 
French survivors, and, with Warner’s assistance, d’Esnambuc established the first 
permanent French-Caribbean colony by sharing St. Kitts with the English. In an 
arrangement that reflects English-French distrust of each other, and an attempt to prevent 
or limit conflict, they agreed to divide the island.6 The English and French jointly settled 
St. Kitts partially in an attempt to counter Spanish and Indian aggression.7 The English 
controlled the middle third of the island, which included the central high ground and 
fresh water supply of Wingfield River. The French were divided and occupied the 
northern and southern thirds of the island, controlling Capesterre and Basseterre, and 
surrounding the English. All colonists agreed to share the island’s salt ponds. 
Tensions on St. Kitts, partially fueled by Warner’s attempts to control the price 
of tobacco, and partially by a rising population caused some of the settlers to look 
                                                
5. R. Christopher Goodwin, "The Prehistoric Cultural Ecology of St. Kitts, West 
Indies: A Case Study in Island Archaeology" (Ph.D. dissertation, Arizona State 
University. Ann Arbor, Mich.: University Mircrofilms, 1979) and B. Dyde, Out of the 
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Macmillan Publishers Limited, 2005), 21. 
6. Gordon C. Merrill, The Historical Geography of St. Kitts and Nevis, the West 
Indies (Mexico City: Copilco-Universidad, 1958), 51 
7. Ibid., 49. 
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toward Nevis as a new opportunity, only four years after arriving on St. Kitts. On 22 July 
1628, Anthony Hilton and Thomas Littleton crossed the Narrows, from St. Kitts to 
Nevis, and landed with 150 settlers to begin a new colony.8 They got to work building 
shelters, clearing land, and planting crops: tobacco, cotton, indigo, and ginger. Thus 
began the first English colony on Nevis. Except for temporary invasions, the island 
remained under direct English control until independence on 19 September 1983. 
Moving to Nevis and generating wealth came with new threats to health that did 
not exist in England. Historical records and modern demographics reveal the devastation 
of European diseases on Native Americans. Yet, Europeans had to contend with 
adjusting to life in the tropics. English colonists in both St. Kitts and Nevis settled on the 
leeward sides of the islands. The western shores offered calmer waters to anchor their 
ships, but the lack of breezes meant biting gnats and mosquitos with their associated 
diseases. Indigenous populations tended to concentrate on the windward shores that 
offered fresher air from more constant Atlantic breezes. 
While planters escaped the bubonic plague and smallpox of Europe, after settling 
in Nevis they experienced such maladies as malaria, yellow fever, edema, and death 
from dysentery among other diseases carried by tainted water, mosquitoes, and other 
insects and animals.9 Settling Nevis was not easy. The first season’s crop of tobacco was 
nearly ready for harvesting when a storm wiped it out and settlers had to replant and start 
over. Despite these natural challenges, Nevis was a good island to develop. Nevisian 
                                                
 8. Dyde, Crowded Vagueness, 33. 
 
9. Dunn, Sugar and Slaves, 302. 
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planters owe part of their success to fortuitous environmental circumstances. Nevis had 
the right combination of rain and good quality soil for agriculture. Other islands such as 
Anguilla, Barbuda, and Tortola lacked the combination of naturally ideal conditions. 
Beyond adjusting to new climates and illnesses, pioneering English settlers had 
to confront human threats. The early settlements put Europeans in direct contact with 
indigenous Kittian and Nevisian Amerindians. The archaeological record suggests that 
Nevis’ precolonial indigenous people were Arawaks, while the prehistoric natives on 
Nevis at the time of European settlement have been termed Caribs in historical 
writings.10 This discrepancy may stem from an allowance in Spanish customs to enslave 
Caribs, but not Arawaks, because of their cannibalistic practices. Reclassifying Arawaks 
as Caribs offered Europeans freedom to enslave and mistreat all natives. During the 
initial European contact period, Caribs had been advancing north through the Lesser 
Antilles while Arawaks were moving south from the Greater Antilles. Evidence suggests 
that upon Europeans arriving both cultures were active and in close proximity. 
Aboriginal Nevisians had relatively small population sizes, compared to 
continental Native Americans. Undoubtedly, the island’s small size limited growth. 
Upon European contact, local inhabitants were conquered, killed, decimated by disease, 
or intermixed with colonists. Early relations with Europeans quickly became violent. In 
1626 six war canoes from St. Kitts, carrying over 400 Caribs under a chief named 
                                                
10. Samuel M. Wilson, "The Prehistoric Settlement Pattern of Nevis, West 
Indies,” Journal of Field Archaeology 16, no. 4 (1989): 427-450. 
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Tegreman, landed on Nevis to battle the European settlers.11 Soon after surviving this 
fight, French and English settlers joined forces and slaughtered Tegreman along with his 
Caribs in a night raid. English soldiers killed Tegreman as he slept in his hammock by 
running him through with rapiers.12 The Caribs could not compete militarily with the 
technological superiority of the Europeans. In this context, Nevis began a post-
Columbian cultural history that was dominated by English settlers, but with influences 
from the mixing of perhaps a few surviving Arawak Indians. Later, when the white 
English settlers became a minority, the island demographics shifted to a vast majority of 
African slave descendants, with other minor European ancestry including Sephardic 
Jews exiled from Portuguese Brazil.13 
While today sugar may be thought of as a common necessity, in the sixteenth 
century it was a luxury. This transformation took place through a cultural evolutionary 
process, as sugarcane production increased on the Caribbean islands. As early as 
Columbus’ second voyage, in 1493, the one in which he first sighted Nevis, Europeans 
began transplanting sugarcane to Hispaniola. In 1504, the Spanish conquistador Hernan 
Cortés moved to Hispaniola, and when offered a grant to land replied, “I came to get 
gold, not till the soil like a peasant.”14 While agriculture thrived in the Spanish New 
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World and remained the economic basis of the Spanish expansion, the Spanish crown 
focused on mineral extraction, a far more profitable endeavor than agriculture. The 
Spanish Empire was the most successful among the European attempts to colonize the 
Americas, both in geographical and in time span. Barred from the sources of precious 
metals, English and French settlers were forced to invest extra time and persistence in 
order to survive. 
The English had to create wealth out of the land through agriculture. While not as 
immediate, it nevertheless produced enough capital, and fed into the growing markets 
and trade system. For the English, the investment paid off and they found their niche in 
extracting wealth from Nevis. As the small European nation-state of the Netherlands 
became wealthy controlling trade in northern Europe, so too would the English succeed 
by following the Dutch example and encourage trade in the colonies. Nevisian sugar 
fueled not only the rise of England, but also the prosperity of the mainland American 
colonies through trade for items such as fish and timber. 
Historical archaeologist Marco Meniketti has identified three developmental 
periods of sugar production on Nevis: 1627 to 1655, 1655 to 1785, and 1785 to 1833 
(Figure 5).15 These phases each have distinctive cultural patterns defined by a 
combination of environmental, economic, technological, and demographic traits. This 
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model provides a framework for analyzing historical change in Nevis. In turn, 
Meniketti’s model can also be used to understand the potential shipwreck types 
associated with signature periods of change—e.g. sailing, steam, warship types, 
merchant, etc. 
 
 
Figure 5 Professor Marco Meniketti of San Jose State University recording 
archaeological ruins of colonial sugar plantation. (Photograph by the author) 
 
The first period, between 1627 and 1655, was characterized by early settlement, 
clearing land, exporting lignum vitae, small plantations, animal-powered mills, and labor 
by English and Irish indentured servants. Diseases, biting insects, Amerindian threats, 
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and generally poor living conditions with hastily constructed early shelters must have 
presented exhausting physical, mental, and emotional challenges to the first settlers. The 
first entrepreneurial English planters began cultivating tobacco, cotton, indigo, and 
ginger. They needed a saleable product to exchange for provisions, tools, and luxury 
items. 
These early settlers plantations enjoyed only limited success and rarely yielded 
significant profits or supported more than a meager existence. Moreover, getting the 
crops safely to England proved difficult. Even a decade after producing the first tobacco 
crops, colonists struggled to transport their tobacco so that it arrived in England in an 
acceptable condition. Much of the tobacco spoiled during the ocean passage and arrived 
in England with considerable less value. Competition from colonial Maryland, Virginia, 
and the Carolinas overtook the islanders’ efforts. While the colonists in the British West 
Indies, including Nevis, struggled to survive in the first half of the seventeenth century, a 
shift in fortune occurred with the introduction of sugar planting followed closely by the 
importation of slaves from Africa which began on Barbados but soon spread to most 
other Caribbean islands including Nevis. 
In 1627, Henry Powell had led English colonists in a voyage north from Guyana 
sailing toward Barbados. On his way, he invited Arawaks in canoes to join his group. 
When they arrived to settle Barbados, the Arawaks taught the Englishmen how to 
cultivate plants. In return, the English enslaved them to work the land. This often-
repeated example of enslaving the indigenous American populations by Europeans 
highlights another point. Whether in the mainland colonies or in the West Indies, the 
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initial settlers always lacked knowledgeable and skilled peasant farmers and craftsmen: 
sawyers, carpenters, coopers, blacksmiths, masons, etc. Eventually, enough skilled labor 
would arrive into the New World, particularly as trained West African slaves. The 
shortage of physicians or barber-surgeons remained a problem in the colonies. 
After enslaving and exhausting the indigenous the labor supply, the English tried 
to fill their labor vacuum with indentured servants. Scotchmen, Welshmen, and Irish 
Catholic immigrants were initially accepted to fill a labor shortage.16. Planters preferred 
healthy, unattached young men. Between 1654 and 1686, over ten-thousand registered 
servants were shipped from Bristol to America, including to the West Indies, Virginia, 
Maryland, and the Carolinas (few went to New England after 1640). Of these, 1,247 
arrived in Nevis.17 Just at the historical peak of the white population in the English 
islands, disease and climate decimated part of the population. Between 1647 and 1649, a 
combination of sickness and drought caused thousands of deaths, right at the start of the 
transition to sugar cane, a labor-intensive crop. 
The Barbadian English planted and tested a variety of crops before shifting to 
sugar in the 1640s. Sugarcane crops seem to have originated separately in New Guinea 
and in the Indian subcontinent, and were spread by Arab traders during the Middle Age. 
Portuguese and Spanish settlers brought these crops to the Atlantic Islands in the 
fifteenth century, and then to the New World, and sugar eventually made it into the 
English Caribbean in the early seventeenth century. Dutch traders introduced it and 
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provided the English planters the initial capital, taught them how to cultivate and process 
the sugar, then purchased the raw product for transport to Europe where they dominated 
sale of the sugar for several decades. Thus sugar became the key cash crop for the 
English Caribbean. 
Dutch investors sustained the English and French planters for the first three 
decades and allowed for their collective success. In the Caribbean, European colonists 
generally cooperated for business reasons that helped islands like Nevis grow. Sugar 
planting was transplanted to Nevis in 1655.18 In Barbados, as the surviving English 
planters shifted to a sugar monoculture, they started importing significant numbers of 
West African slaves. After the switching to the planting of sugar, the Kittian and 
Nevisian colonists did the same and African slaves soon supplanted European indentured 
servants as the primary human labor force of West Indian plantations. The demographic 
shift created a white minority ruling a black slave majority with one single purpose: to 
extract wealth from a monoculture of sugar. West Indies plantations produced the first 
African slave based economies by English colonizers. Constant changes in population 
sizes and demographics created constant political uncertainty and failed to generate a 
sound white society before 1650 on any English Caribbean island. Although slaves 
dominated the population, the white English successfully controlled them. 
While slaves worked the land and cut the sugarcane, the processing of sugarcane 
into muscovado, the semi-refined product that shipped abroad required a reduction 
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process of grinding powered initially by animal labor.19 The grinding extracted the juice 
that was collected in a cistern. The working staff then reduced the juice through boiling 
in large copper kettles. A boiling house may have had four or five “coppers” supervised 
by an experienced boiler. The staff member supervised the process, skimmed impurities, 
and controlled the reduction. This was more of an art than a science. When ready, 
workers transferred the dark, sticky substance into ceramic cones where it cured into 
muscovado sugar. The initial cutting and boiling took days, while the curing took weeks. 
Because of this, and the limited number of coppers, plantations grew and processed cane 
in groups, as to have a continuous rotation of muscovado sugar batches ready for export. 
If they cultivated all of the cane at the same time, it could rot before enough boiling 
coppers were available for processing. Boiling had to happen in hours from cutting and 
could not wait days or weeks. The other option was to distill the sugar into rum for 
export. Once in England the raw sugar, or muscovado, was further refined into the white 
sugar used in baking and on dinner tables. This system allowed the English to maintain a 
complete monopoly over final quality, production, distribution, and sale of the product to 
English markets.  
According to Meniketti, the second period occurred between 1655 and 1785. 
This was the period when sugar cane was introduced into Nevis and by the end 
dominated as a monoculture. This phase brought significant population growth, a 
consolidation of plantations into estates, a shift from animal to wind power, and a 
dependence on African slave labor. Water mills had popularity in Jamaica with plentiful 
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streams, but in Nevis, windmills replaced mules as the dominant source of grinding 
power. Some of these mills lasted well into the twentieth century, although steam-
powered machinery largely overtook both animal and wind power in the nineteenth 
century. Through good use of wind power and slave labor, in this period Nevis became a 
source of great wealth, therefore worth fighting over to both the British and French. This 
is also the phase during which Solebay was lost as a result of the need to defend the 
islands’ wealth. 
Although sugar could be transported with more assurance of controlling quality 
than tobacco, there still remained threats to safely shipping their product to England. 
Hurricanes seasonally disrupted or even destroyed buildings and settlements on the tiny 
island of Nevis.20 Earthquakes also affected the European stone buildings and one such 
earthquake in 1690 destroyed all of the buildings in the capital of Charlestown.21 
Hurricanes and the associated winds and rough seas lasted several days during which 
time they not only damaged buildings but also battered and destroyed ships just offshore. 
The island could not exist in the world system without access from the sea, essential for 
transport of people, supplies, and products such as rum and sugarcane. 
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In 1733 a letter from a Nevis Englishman to a gentleman in London described the 
destruction of ships, damage to windmills, uprooted trees, and loss of life.22 Ship 
destruction was not only significant for the temporarily reduced ability to transport 
people and goods, but also important before the telegraph and later modern 
communication technologies. In the pre-industrial world the only source of 
communication between islands and other countries was delivered through people and 
letters onboard sailing vessels. Any disruption in shipping delayed decisions and 
relations politically, socially, militarily, and economically. 
In 1660 Charles II established the Royal African Company to develop and trade 
with the gold fields recently discovered along the Gambia River. The fields were soon 
depleted and the company turned to transporting slaves from Africa to America, 
particularly to the Caribbean. The company held a monopoly within the English empire 
and made Nevis the entrepôt slave market into the Leeward Islands.23 For Nevisians this 
meant that their planters had the first pick of the best slaves and could keep as many as 
they needed. This gave Nevis planters a competitive advantage over those on other 
islands. Typical plantations had 100 acres in sugarcane with no more than 50 slaves, 
though some were much larger.24 The Pinney estate on Nevis is a notable exception of 
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200 acres and less than 180 slaves in the late eighteenth century. St. Kitts in the late 
eighteenth century had 360 slaves per square mile, or 2.6 square kilometers.25  
In further comparing Nevis to St. Kitts, though smaller in size (36 square miles 
versus 68 square miles), Nevis produced more sugar because of the tenuous English-
French relationship that divided St. Kitts into thirds during the sixteenth century.26 
Despite intermittent tensions, European conflicts, and Spanish raids, the divided 
arrangement on St. Kitts and complete English control over Nevis was intended to 
maintain peace and counter foreign aggression, but decreased the island’s potential 
productivity through less efficient land management than if the island had been under 
single political control. The English-French agreement lasted until the 1713 Peace of 
Utrecht. Key to Nevis history is that the French ceded all of St. Kitts to the English.27 
As time passed, and as the population and economy grew, tolerance for different 
cultures decreased and conflict increased between groups. The world system was such 
that problems in the metropole influenced events in the periphery, affecting places like 
Nevis. Imperial tensions heightening in the 1640s, 1660s, and the 1688 Glorious 
Revolution, highlighted suspicions between Catholics and Protestants on the Caribbean 
islands. Independent colonial planters became increasingly drawn into international 
imperial conflicts. British and French governments played increasingly active roles in 
the peripheral West Indian islands through governmental, military, and naval actions. 
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English Protestants treated Quakers, Irish Catholics, and Sephardic Jews with 
suspicion.28 These negative relationships were exacerbated during European conflicts 
between English Protestants and French Catholics. International relations had 
consequences on the islands, and the islands existence depended on healthy foreign 
relations for trade. 
The islands depended on the North American mainland colonies for lumber, and 
food for the slave-labored plantations. They traded for everything: hats, shoes, onions, 
corn, rice, peas, flour, wine, pork, beef, fish, and even building timber, since they had 
stripped the island of trees in clearing land for the plantations. Sugarcane became so 
abundant that a contemporary observer complained in 1664 of inadequate food being 
grown.29 Sugar became currency for everything the islanders needed, especially since 
there existed a shortage of gold and silver coins in the Leewards. By 1678, Nevis had 
become more prosperous than St. Kitts, Antigua, and Montserrat.30 
As European colonial empires grew in the Americas, their conflicts extended 
from European battlefields and seas to American and Caribbean lands and waters. 
Settlers suffered during the recurring wars as soldiers drove colonists from their homes 
and burned and destroyed the crops and buildings on the abandoned estates; these would 
be rebuilt and last until the next seemingly inevitable conflict. The first of three wars 
began only a year after Nevis’ colonization when, in 1629, during fighting in Europe 
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between Spain and England, Spanish soldiers invaded and occupied both Nevis and St. 
Kitts.  
The 1701-1714 European War of the Spanish Succession spread to North 
America in 1702, where it was later known as Queen Anne’s War, in the 1760s. During 
this conflict, Governor Christopher Codrington, Captain-General of the English Leeward 
Islands, led a siege against the French at Guadeloupe. This effort failed when French 
forces from Martinique relieved the French. Three years later, in 1706, in retaliation, 
Pierre Le Moyne d’Iberville led French soldiers on a raid that overran Nevis. Most of the 
English residents of Nevis fled into the mountains. The French burned crops, damaged 
buildings and carried off 3,200 slaves, and made the English promise to deliver 1,400 
additional slaves as soon as they could capture them.31 The raid crippled the island’s 
economy for over a decade. 
After the 1713 Peace of Utrecht, privateers continued their once-legal practices 
by becoming pirates, with loyalty only to themselves. Their exploits throughout the 
Caribbean began a short-lived period known in history as the Golden Age of Piracy. On 
27 September 1720, Pirate Captain Bartholomew Roberts, known in modern popular 
culture as “Black Bart,” raided Basseterre, St. Kitts, where they captured one ship, 
burned two others, and attempted to secure provisions. After harassing that community 
the pirates sailed south to Nevis where they threatened to burn as revenge for pirate 
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hangings.32 Roberts may be remembered as the most successful pirate in this period, but 
failed to profit from St. Kitts or Nevis. The islanders drove him away through collective 
resistance, cannon fire, and unfavorable winds pushing his ships away from shore and 
making it difficult to hold their position while fighting the islanders. 
In Nevis, captured pirates hung from gallows placed on the beaches as a warning, 
giving the modestly protected cove its modern name, Gallows Bay.33 As piracy lessened, 
European wars renewed. The 1740—1748 War of the Austrian Succession extended to 
America, where it was known as King George’s War. Though King George’s War 
affected Nevis less than earlier conflicts, stability in Europe and the Caribbean was far 
from assured. 1756 marked the beginning of the European Seven Years’ War, which 
ended with France ceding its claims to North America to Great Britain, and the general 
growth of British influence in North America and the Caribbean. 
Initially, the West Indian colonies were not much different socio-politically than 
those established on the American mainland. Geographic distances and political and 
economic variation increasingly separated the cultures in the eighteenth century. In the 
1765-1766 Stamp Act crisis, the Leeward Islands exhibited a very assertive opposition to 
England’s new policy compared to Barbados or Jamaica. Their role in the imperial 
economy depended more heavily on foreign trade and exports than their submissive 
counterparts. Decisions at the metropole squeezed the colonies to varying degrees, and 
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the smaller islands felt the pressure more greatly.34 Riots and violence like those on St. 
Kitts and Nevis did not occur in Barbados or Jamaica whose residents complied with the 
Stamp Act. 
English planters in Nevis considered themselves to be loyal English subjects, but 
developed a desire to control their island’s business affairs with more autonomy from 
England. They had a dual identity as British citizens, but were physically located in the 
Caribbean as English Nevisians. Their slaves toiled the land, and the English planters 
and their managers controlled the business decisions. In the natural and cultural 
environment of Nevis as a colony, Englishmen moved their families to the island, but 
never viewed it as a permanent home. In contrast, in the American Colonies, which 
started with Jamestown and Plymouth, settlers moved with entire families to start new 
lives. They intended to stay permanently. In Nevis, planters would return their children 
to England for school. They intended to stay in Nevis only long enough to get wealthy 
and then return to England to live out their lives in retirement. 
As the plantations evolved, the planters increasingly practiced absentee 
ownership of the plantations, whereby an onsite manager oversaw day-to-day operations 
while the owner lived in England. Nevis was a place to generate wealth. Nevisian 
colonists did not share a sense of permanence to the land that their American 
Englishmen held to the mainland American colonies. This transient identity that shaped 
Nevisian politics and loyalties had consequences when choosing sides during the 
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American Revolution. Nevisian planters never quite reconciled their desire to have 
political independence with their need to be subservient due to their dependence on the 
American Colonies and British military for provisions and security. These challenges 
created irreconcilable consequences, compounded by a growth in absenteeism, and a 
decline in sugar value, all contributed to the decline in Nevis’ prosperity and value as a 
colony. 
The planters held economic, while the governor had political power in his role as 
agent of the British monarch. The representative system fostered regular political 
conflict. Planters producing the wealth sought to control the social and political system 
to their advantages. Political tensions happening in New England prior to the American 
Revolution paralleled some of the experiences in Nevis. The plantation economic system 
shaped the political process. As the prosperity and population of Nevis grew, the British 
metropole attempted to exert greater control over the plantation economy. Nevis’ 
agricultural productivity thrived compared to the early years of the first phase, but the 
colony still depended on its economic connections to the American mainland and 
England for trade, materials, and markets. The planters yearned for independence and for 
a monopoly on political and social power, but were wholly dependent on the greater 
socioeconomic system for survival.35 
When the American Revolution began, English Nevisian loyalty to England 
eclipsed their desire to join the cause for freedom. Their dependence on England 
                                                
35. Keith C. Simmonds, "Political and Economic Factors Influencing the St. 
Kitts-Nevis Polity: An Historical Perspective,” Phylon 48, no. 4 (1987): 277-286. 
  48 
increased even more so during the American Revolution once trade with the American 
mainland was prohibited due to war. Further, the black majority slave population 
contributed to a greater need for a military presence on the islands. British soldiers 
provided security against potential rebellions. In the mainland colonies, British soldiers 
were a symbol of tyranny; in Nevis, they offered safety. Meantime the sugar islands 
depended on preferential tariffs, while the mainland colonies grew increasingly 
independent from imperial need as their populations and economies grew. As sentiment 
in the American mainland colonies drifted further from the metropole, British West 
Indian colonies such as Nevis became increasingly dependent for these reasons.36 
During the Age of Sail, the West Indies were more closely linked to England 
than the North American English colonies because prevailing winds and sailing speed 
determined the time to communicate, more than direct distance. Seasonal dependency of 
Northern colonies on trading tobacco determined shipping patterns. In addition, the 
mainland American colonies were isolated in the winter and could survive independently 
with more firewood and food, while the Caribbean islands had to depend on England 
year-round for all their supplies. This held true in the 1600s to 1730s, before other 
trading patterns could be established and remained the case until the introduction of 
steam-powered vessels that could move in direct paths between desired locations, rather 
than following dominant wind and current patterns. The Leeward Islands were unique in 
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that they were more isolated from friends, and more vulnerable to enemies, even 
compared to Barbados.37 The development of posts, papers, and mail packets helped to 
integrate isolated Atlantic communities between 1675 and 1740. In 1701, Edmund 
Drummer established the first commercial packet service to the English West Indian 
colonists.38 For a period, the English Atlantic drew together, only to be broken by the 
American Revolution. 
On the eve of the American Revolution, sugar wealth made Nevis a place worth 
fighting for, as the West Indies Sugar Islands seemed more important than the American 
Colonies.39 In 1775, at the start of the American Revolutionary War, an average 
plantation acre produced five hogsheads of sugar annually, with a total yearly island 
production of between six and seven thousand hogsheads.40 As the Caribbean colonies’ 
populations and productive values grew, so too did the investments European 
governments exercise in capturing or defending them. The British and French stationed 
increasingly larger forces in the Caribbean. Dozens of ships and thousands of soldiers 
were often deployed in one amphibious landing to take an island. Initial defense rested 
                                                
37. Ian K. Steele, The English Atlantic, 1675-1740: An Exploration of 
Communication and Community (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), 38. 
 
38. Steele, The English Atlantic, 168. 
 
39. E. Fremantle, "Sea Power and the American War of Independence,” The 
RUSI Journal 62, no. 447 (1917): 478. 
40. James Rymer, A Description of the Island of Nevis: With An Account of Its 
Principal Diseases. To Which Are Added, Some Sentiments on Reviewers; Particularly 
the Medical of the Critical Review for August 1775 (T. Evans, No. 54. Pater-Noster 
Row, 1775), 3. 
  50 
with the local militia garrisons that could resist small raids, and perhaps buy time against 
a larger enemy, but depended on imperial support for defense against greater invasions. 
Between 1778 and 1782, Great Britain and France heavily fought for control of the West 
Indian colonies, including Nevis. After 1783, Nevis lost trade with the United States.  
In the final phase of Meniketti’s model, the period between 1785 and 1833, 
production output reached an ultimate intensification before declining. After the 1790s, 
individual estates could remain profitable, but overall the industry declined. Capital 
became concentrated in the elite estates with poor freemen that replaced slave labor. 
They still used wind-powered mills, but were largely displaced by steam-powered mills 
to grind the cane in the new industrial age.41 As the industrial revolution transformed 
England, the steam engine transformed the English periphery through increased the rate 
of cane grinding. 
An enslaved African labor force developed the island into a prosperous 
plantation economy. As slaves worked to produce wealth for the English-centered 
economy, they offered resistance where possible. Malnutrition, food shortages, diseases, 
and hard labor fueled their opposition. They would steal plantation foodstuffs, butcher 
plantation livestock, chew the cane juice, reduce work efforts, and intentionally destroy 
or burn fields. Resistance did not end the institution of slavery, but did reduce profits as 
one Kittitian planter in the 1830s estimated he lost 20 percent of his yearly crop from 
slaves consuming the juice.42  
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Economic, industrial, and moral transformations brought an end to slave labor in 
the British Empire during this period. Slave trade abolition in 1807 followed by the 1833 
British Emancipation Act instituted compensation to the planter class for the loss of their 
slave property. Records for Nevis in 1833 reveal the island had 399 slaveholders and 
7,225 slaves.43 
The paradox of Victorian Britain’s policies is that they strengthened the empire, 
but at the same time planted the seeds of self-destruction. Legislative changes, 
industrialization, and liberal ideals proved ruinous. Britain’s imperial “civilizing 
mission” ended slavery and sought progress through enlightening natives.44 The 
nineteenth-century abolition movement and antislavery efforts such as the suppression of 
the slave trade by the Royal Navy were part of this process. More locally, Nevis colonial 
administrators implemented the civilizing process through “strong government ... fair 
and prompt administration of justice, and ... full and complete protection of the lives and 
properties of subjects” was “so necessary, so absolutely essential, to give confidence to 
capital enterprise.”45 This view by Governor Benjamin Pine shows both the 
acknowledgement of decline and attempts at revitalization through political praxis. The 
efforts met with resistance from planters, who were fearful of more centralized federal 
authority and a stronger police force. Invariably, reform efforts did little to change the 
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historical trajectory of Nevis in the world system, because the island was competing 
against global capital markets. 
Emancipation in 1833 gave way to an apprenticeship system, beginning in 1834. 
This system developed out of geographic pressure. A small Caribbean island like Nevis 
did not have land to spare for freed slaves. On larger islands like Jamaica, former slaves 
could move away from the plantations. In mountainous islands slaves moved up from 
the plantations to higher altitudes, or down toward coastal villages. Fishing or 
subsistence farming provided for them in their newfound independence. Planters on 
small islands owned all of the land and needed labor. The transition from slave to 
apprentice continued a de facto plantation system without full economic emancipation 
until 1 August 1838 throughout the British Caribbean. At one point, the change triggered 
a three-week work stoppage and riots.46 British soldiers and a naval force from Antigua 
enforced martial law under the leadership of Governor Evan MacGregor. While homes 
were burned, the violence ended without loss of life. 
Although the British government enforced the end of slavery, some inequities 
continued well into the twentieth century on Nevis. Planters continued to control 
property and provisions while former slaves and their descendants continued to work the 
land. Poverty increased with an economic depression in the sugar industry that lasted 
throughout the nineteenth century. The imperial system amplified social stratification 
and inequality that persisted until St. Kitts and Nevis’ gained independence from Great 
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Britain in 1983. Together they formed the Federation of Saint Christopher and Nevis 
with the national capital in Basseterre on St. Kitts. 
The nineteenth century economic shift from mercantilism to capitalism cemented 
through legislation in the British Empire. These changes compounded the challenges to 
growing foreign competition. The 1846 Sugar Duties Acts removed preferential tariff 
protections for British West Indian planters. The effect equalized competition with 
Cuban and Brazilian sugar producers. This coincided with the 1846 Importation Act that 
removed the 1815 Corn Laws that similarly moved Britain into greater international 
competition and a loss of monopolies in sugar and tariff protections. Beginning in the 
1840s sugar production decreased further with the loss of slave labor.47 The collective 
result hurt Nevis’ economy and pushed it into a precipitous decline. 
In 1853, the British abandoned Brimstone Hill Fortress on St. Kitts. New 
technology made the bastion obsolete. Key amongst the technological developments was 
the explosive shell that made such fortifications impotent against artillery or naval guns 
firing them. Defending the islands could be accomplished with new iron and later steel-
hulled, steam-powered warships, with more powerful guns and their infantry carrying 
more rapid-firing rifles, eventually machine guns, and newer artillery pieces. Either from 
sea or land, the explosive shell threatened the very premise of trying to defend 
Brimstone Hill. These changes became more dramatic and rapid during the decades prior 
to the First World War. 
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The end of Brimstone Hill symbolizes the end of an era when a West Indian 
sugar industry was exceedingly important to the British economy. More important than 
technology and changes in warfare were the changes in the British and global economy. 
As the West Indian sugar industry declined, St. Kitts and Nevis became less important to 
the British Empire. A new industrial age had diversified and transformed the British 
economy in a new era of global capitalism. 
By the mid to late nineteenth century, Nevis’ plantation economy could not 
adequately compete against larger foreign sugar producers. Despite capital investments 
to increase efficiency, such as steam machinery for processing, the introduction of rail, 
or the modernization of the factory system, the era of Nevisian sugar plantations was 
ending. Competitors such as the Spanish, and even within the British Empire itself, 
included sugar cultivation in India, Brazil, Cuba, and Puerto Rico, along with the rest of 
the West Indian sugar islands. Once a leader in the late seventeenth century, Nevis lost 
out to lower cost competition as a result of globalization and weak governance in 
Britain. The political power Nevis derived from its once thriving sugar economy 
declined in parallel. The Nevisian government went so far as to dissolve its independent 
parliament into the St. Kitts government in 1883.48 
Just as industrialization and changing world cultures transform Great Britain and 
Nevis, so too did English planters leave permanent changes on the island of Nevis. 
Between 1628, when the first settlers encountered a few hundred Amerindians, and 
1853, Nevis experienced dramatic cultural and environmental transformations from 
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colonization.49 The changes have been permanent, making it difficult to imagine Nevis 
in a pre-Columbian state. 
 
 
Figure 6 A protected historic Flamboyant tree once marked property boundaries. 
Today they are simply beautiful trees that provide shade. (Photograph by the author) 
 
Settlers cleared the island’s natural flora for agriculture, building materials, 
firewood, and exports such as Gilbert’s lignum vitae extraction. Natural flora before 
European arrival included tropical forest pines and deciduous trees, gumlin, burrwood, 
and plants important to native Carib Indians such as cabbage palm, arrowroot, coconut, 
guayaba, and papaya. English settlers imported plants such as palm trees, tobacco, 
ginger, sugar cane, and cotton (Figure 6). Palm trees are almost synonymous with a 
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modern vision of a tropical island. Yet, palms are not native. As the seventeenth century 
progressed, workers chopped and burned the dense vegetation to deforest and make way 
for sugarcane. As the populations cleared land, expanded plantations, and moved from 
the more level lowlands and up the volcanic slope of Mt. Nevis, they captured runoff 
water for drinking and irrigation. 
The introduction of foreign fauna further eroded the vegetation and consumed the 
limited water resources. Pre-contact animals included small rodents, iguanas, land crabs, 
many bird types, large sea turtles, and many fish species.50 Natural fauna covering the 
island before plantations were supplanted by imported species. Examples include camel, 
cattle, pigs, horses, donkeys, sheep, and goats. Many can still be seen on the island 
today. Through the lasting effects of the Columbian Exchange, donkeys and vervet 
monkeys freely roam the island. 
The intense deforestation, agricultural practices, and animal and human activity, 
exposed the hillsides to topsoil erosion. The loss of nutrient-rich soil not only affected 
growing new crops and vegetation, but also sent runoff into the windward reefs on the 
east side of the island. Erosion became an irreversible, destabilizing process with severe 
ecological consequences. It is estimated that around 80 percent of the reefs have been 
destroyed as a result of human-induced environmental change. This removes a natural 
seaward protective barrier and exposes the shoreline to further erosion from Atlantic 
waves and currents. Another natural transformation includes the destruction of lagoons 
from draining or filling that has occurred on the west side of the island as well. The loss 
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of reefs and lagoons increases the effects of seasonal storms and hurricanes impacting 
the island. 
Hidden behind the modern evidence of change is a deep history and buried 
archaeological past. Nevisian history in the seventeenth through nineteenth centuries was 
defined by a metropole-periphery relationship. Nevis was always dependent on foreign 
trade for supplies. Before the Revolution, the North American Colonies were key trading 
partners. After the Revolution, planters became dependent exclusively on England and 
other British colonies because of the trade restrictions imposed through the British 
Navigation Acts. Nevis existed to serve the growth and wealth of the British Empire 
within the economic model of mercantilism. The net wealth flowed to England. In this 
context, planters borrowed and financed their operations through increasing debt. The 
merchants supplying the planters became the real wealthy entrepreneurs of the system. 
In the twenty-first century, few Americans recognize Nevis’ name or can identify 
its location. Nevis’ history is a micro study into the macro changes of the world system 
that included imperial competition, indigenous genocide, environmental transformation, 
and a shift from mercantilism to capitalism through a slave-labor driven plantation 
economy. From the seventeenth through eighteenth century, however, the small island 
had a tremendous output of wealth, driven by slave labor, into the greater British 
Empire. The results produced permanent and lasting environmental changes, genocide of 
the indigenous Amerindians, and the involuntary migration of African people to form a 
new Afro-Caribbean culture in the Lesser Antilles. The island demonstrates all phases of 
development in a post-Columbian world. Pioneering colonists planted the seeds of 
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development and generations endured hardships from European wars, hurricanes, and 
economic depression to build Nevis into a thriving sugar economy. However, over time, 
the world economy and sugar market changed. Victorian Britain’s “civilizing” policies 
and the Industrial Revolution could not reverse the socioeconomic decline. The 
unremarkable volcanic island offers insightful lessons into the world system and the 
English metropole-periphery relationships.  
 
 
Figure 7 A modern wreck just off Charlestown. (Photograph by the author) 
 
The animals, sugar and other plants, settlers and slaves, along with their supplies, 
tools, and ideas all moved on European ships traveling across the oceans, or on 
indigenous watercraft between islands. As storms and accidents continue to wreck 
modern ships, the loss of such ships in seasonal storms and hurricanes throughout 
history has built an archaeological record on the seafloor surrounding St. Kitts and Nevis 
(Figure 7). The ability to study this maritime history and its associated maritime 
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archaeological record can provide a more complete understanding of past human 
behavior, and Nevisian history, in the broader context of this complex British history. 
Conducting a survey to inventory submerged cultural resources is that natural 
point to start investigating this maritime historical archaeological past. It is clear from 
this brief historical review, that there is much potential for the information shipwrecks 
may contribute, given the importance of maritime traffic to colonization, trade, human 
migrations, and naval warfare. The story of Solebay provides a case study to demonstrate 
the historical and archaeological value this one shipwreck can provide in illuminating 
this maritime history. Its loss represents the historic residue of patterned human 
behavior, culturally replicated through the centuries, as a product of British Nevisian 
history. 
Advances in European seafaring, combined with the maturation of imperial 
nation-states, catalyzed the growth of an interdependent cultural network, the Atlantic 
World. Initially, the ocean was a barrier to progress. By the end of colonization, the 
ocean had become a bridge, connecting distant lands and peoples into an intricate 
worldwide network. This history interrelates imperial economies and related conflicts 
together in what may otherwise be viewed as disconnected experiences, mostly when 
studied from a continental, landed perspective, looking seaward from each of the 
respective shorelines. Therefore, while culturally British, the story of Solebay opens a 
maritime world system perspective. This approach affords a view that necessarily leans 
Eurocentric when conveyed through Solebay, but at the same time may connect disparate 
geographies and their histories. 
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The value and importance of the Caribbean islands to British, French, Spanish, 
and Dutch empires can be appreciated through understanding the history of Nevis as an 
example. Although vast pages have been written on the topics of the British Empire and 
American Revolution, little scholarship exists regarding Nevis and its role in this history, 
less regarding the related naval battles. Nevis and the Caribbean are typically studied as 
a tangential experience to an Anglocentric or American historical perspective. The 
American Revolution overshadows Caribbean and Nevisian history, seen largely through 
the modern lens of historical hindsight and importance in the rise of the United States to 
world history. In the 1770s this was not the case. The Caribbean was as valuable, if not 
more valuable than the still developing American colonies.  
Moving forward, this research threads the human history of the British naval 
experience during the American Revolution, through events from the story of a sixth-
rate, 28-gun British frigate, HMS Solebay. From this interpretation, the American 
Revolutionary War becomes ancillary to Solebay and the history of Nevis in the 
Caribbean. Here unfolds the case study. 
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CHAPTER IV 
SOLEBAY IN THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 
 
As an anchor has the power to hold a ship fast to the seafloor in ocean currents, a 
shipwreck has the power to anchor memories of history long since past. To modern 
Nevisians, Kittians, Americans, British and French citizens, and the Royal Navy— 
Solebay holds this history in memory and modern culture. The idea of Solebay motivated 
a team of local residents to find look for the ship’s remains, the physical remains sparked 
the archaeology, and the artifacts and archives are now telling its story. 
In 1689, William and Mary became co-rulers of England, Scotland, and Ireland. 
Following Mary’s death in 1694, William ruled alone until 1702. Their co-regency 
unified these three independent countries.  After their rule, in 1707, the Acts of Union 
passed the English and Scottish Parliaments to form the United Kingdom. During this 
period of unification the process of creating modern British identity began. This meant 
understanding Britishness—language, cultural community concept, Protestant religion, 
trade growth, military success, and rapid population growth. Britons defined 
“civilization,” in their minds.1 Incremental changes and incremental successes begat 
growth and consolidation into an empire that had its roots in English imperialism that 
began as early as the fifteenth century on the islands surrounding England, then spread 
across the oceans, forming the British Empire. 
                                                
1. For a good book discussing the ideas of Britishness and the British Empire 
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(New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2004). 
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In the eighteenth century, the world had multiple power systems and partially 
integrated economies. The systems and application of power characterized the nations. 
Britain’s political economy centered on the idea of mercantilism. British leaders viewed 
wealth as finite and competition from foreign enemies as the greatest threat to 
prosperity. Britain’s foreign defense policy viewed the navy as an instrument of coercion 
to execute policy through action. In this context, 1) France was seen as the number one 
enemy, 2) Britain needed colonial trade to create an economy strong enough to sustain a 
powerful navy through a war, and 3) naval supremacy was key to security.2 For the 
British, these conditions drove leaders to planning an offensive strategy with tactical 
aggression. If Britain demonstrated naval dominance to Europe, this could incline a 
continental state to ally with Britain, helping Britain balance its power against France. 
As the British learned in the 1750s and 1760s, France had a powerful continental 
economy and posed the greatest threat to the British Empire. 
As an island nation, Britain depended on naval supremacy not just for physical 
security, but also for economic prosperity. Maritime trade was the most important aspect 
of the British economy; it built their empire.3 During the Seven Years’ War, France 
attempted to make Britain’s navy irrelevant to the outcome by focusing on 
overwhelmingly successful land campaigns. This policy failed during the war Britain 
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used its Royal Navy to capture French colonial possessions in North America, Africa, 
and India. After the war France addressed the deficiency with a reinvigorated naval 
building program. Britain maintained France as their primary enemy, and policy 
decisions revolved around the role of the navy, manning reductions, costs of ships, size 
of the force, and debates around related topics. While the size of the Royal Navy 
remained reduced during peacetime, ship plans continued to progress. 
To further British policy in England, Thomas Slade and his shipwrights designed 
and built newer and better warships, such as Solebay. Their efforts did not go unnoticed 
as the Spanish and French made similar efforts. While Slade drafted new plans, the 
French Secretary of the Navy in the 1760s, César Gabriel de Choiseul, worked to restore 
the French navy after the Seven Years War. This was a vibrant period in naval 
architecture fueled by a rivalry between Britain and France. Britain built Solebay in this 
political and economic environment. Defense against France depended on ships-of-the-
line, i.e., 74-gun third-rate vessels or larger. Although smaller rated vessels like Solebay 
could not hold a position in the line during a major battle, they complemented the fleet 
and fulfilled important niche roles and year-round missions that could not be performed 
by the larger vessels due to operational costs during peacetime. When the American 
Revolution began, ships like Solebay became tactical weapons in the strategic British 
offensive to control its colonies, and fight against French aggression. 
On 19 April 1775, American colonists and British soldiers exchanged gunfire at 
Lexington and Concord, marking the beginning of the American Revolutionary War. As 
the American crisis escalated into full war, the British began sending more military and 
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naval forces from England to the colonies. In 1774, Britain had 20,000 sailors and 
marines.4 By 1782, this number had swelled to 100,000 sailors, with 21,305 marines 
alone — more than existed in sailors and marines combined in 1774.5 This formidable, 
professional naval force became a significant obstacle to the American rebels. 
American General George Washington had to keep his army fighting, but 
understood that the war would be won or lost at sea. Benjamin Franklin thought 
similarly as he sought French naval support, “In any operations, and under all 
circumstances, a decisive naval superiority is to be considered as a fundamental 
principle, and the basis on which every hope of success must ultimately depend.”6 The 
political and military struggles on land depended on the fate of events at sea. The Royal 
Navy possessed the power to choke the American economy through a wooden wall of 
ships. While cutting supplies and trade, the Navy had the means to reinforce, redeploy, 
and support the Redcoats fighting ashore. The fate of the entire revolution would be 
determined by the naval outcome. Once the Royal Navy failed to support the British at 
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Yorktown, the American victory was virtually assured on land. But in the absence of a 
strong American navy, success depended on a French fleet, not an American fleet that 
won this victory at sea. Beyond helping the American colonists, French military and 
naval involvement had consequences throughout the British Empire, including for St. 
Kitts and Nevis. Tracing Solebay’s story brings this broader naval history together from 
a British perspective. 
When the rebellion erupted in 1775, Vice Admiral Samuel Graves was the Royal 
Navy officer responsible for the North American Station. Along the entire American 
seacoast he had 30 warships available to maintain British authority by securing British 
property and personnel as he could from the sea until reinforcements arrived.7 It took the 
British time to mobilize to a full wartime posture. One of the challenges involved in 
expanding the Royal Navy can be understood in correspondence between Philip 
Stephens, first Secretary of the British Admiralty, and Graves.8 The navy could not 
recruit enough sailors in North America so Parliament had to change a 70-year old law 
that prohibited impressment in American waters. The Admiralty also modified 
regulations concerning the employment of pilots to ensure enough with experience in 
American waters. 
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The Admiralty and Navy Board also had to plan for sending more ships—
including Solebay—along with soldiers and supplies. The Royal Navy could not depend 
on acquiring enough provisions from the rebelling colonies to sustain their men. This 
was a slow process, and sailors and ships currently on station had to hold the line while 
awaiting reinforcements currently in service, but in England, to fit out and sail as quickly 
as possible. 
In preparing ships for passage from England to North America, the Royal Navy 
had a sailor shortage to fully man its vessels. With a shortage of ships and men, British 
strategy to control the seas appeared as a formidable challenge. On 29 June 1775, 
Stephens wrote in a letter to John Pownall, an Under Secretary of State, “Lordships gave 
immediate directions for fitting out, with the utmost expedition, the five Frigats [sic] 
mentioned on the other side in order to be sent out to Boston as soon as possibly may 
be.”9 On the reverse, Stephens then lists four (despite having said five) 28-gun frigates: 
Milford (at Chatham), Solebay (at Plymouth), Lizard (at Portsmouth), and Actaeon 
(Woolwich). From the beginning, Solebay, and vessels like her, played critical roles in 
Britain’s efforts to counter the growing rebellion. 
In September 1775, Solebay in Portsmouth had 160 sailors under the command 
of Thomas Symonds.10 Solebay was rated for 200 sailors, but due to manning at a 
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peacetime complement it began the war with a shortage — all vessels sailed from 
England were undermanned.11 By 15 November 1775, an Admiralty list of ships 
suggests planning, possibly for victualing purposes, for increased manpower for all 
vessels, with Solebay listed at 180-man crew.12 Admiralty correspondence on 4 May, 
after Solebay arrived in North Carolina, lists the strength at 200 men.13 
In addition to a shortage of trained crews, the Royal Navy fleet suffered from 
rotting ships.14 Timbers needed replacing, and even ironwork had rusted enough to be of 
concern. Chain plates for deadeyes failed to secure masts, causing vessels to be 
dismasted and therefore disabled out of port. Unfortunately, by 8 July, Solebay too had 
been found to be rotten, in need of repairs that would take four months and required the 
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frigate Liverpoole to replace her in the interim.15 Solebay had been launched in 1763 and 
now, a decade later, was in need of repair. The shipyard at Plymouth worked frantically 
to prepare her for extended operations on the other side of the Atlantic.16 Despite initial 
mobilization challenges, in November 1775, Solebay was ready to sail for America with 
the “first favourable winds for Ireland from whence she will escort the vessels which 
will take the troops from this Kingdom to America.”17 
Ships sailing from England did not sail empty with just their crew, weapons, and 
own supplies. Spare room was precious when moving vitally needed supplies slowly 
across the ocean by sailing vessels. Ships carried the soldiers needed to fight the land 
war, supplies, dispatches, and any other items needed for the war effort. On 25 
November 1775, Symonds received his orders, with Solebay finally sea ready, to sail 
immediately to Cork, Ireland, where he would receive further orders.18 Solebay’s crew 
continued waiting through Christmas Eve, as they had not sailed as of 24 December 
while still “awaiting favourable winds.”19 Little did Symonds know at the time that the 
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required repairs and subsequent wind delays that kept Solebay from deploying to the 
American Theater in June set her on a path toward a fortuitous brush with fame. 
On 25 September 1775, American Colonel Ethan Allen had been captured near 
Montreal, Quebec in the Battle of Longue-Pointe. Allen’s fame came in May 1775 when 
he led his militia of Vermont’s “Green Mountain Boys” into New York and captured 
Fort Ticonderoga at the south end of Lake Champlain. Nothing significant followed that 
summer, including a failed attempt to take Fort St. John. He aspired and worked to raise 
enough men to capture Montreal. In September 1775, he led an attack against Montreal, 
across the St. Lawrence River, but the attempt failed. He and several of his men were 
captured. After his surrender at Montreal, the British shipped him and fellow prisoners to 
England and then Ireland. His popularity made him a political liability that the British 
attempted to diffuse by moving him far away from the conflict or any potential audience. 
They first imprisoned him in Pendennis Castle, located in the southwest tip of England 
near Falmouth, Cornwall. 
Allen’s poor treatment created concerns for the British of how their captured 
soldiers and officers might be treated by the American rebels. American General George 
Washington, on 18 December 1775, wrote a letter to British Major General William 
Howe that contributed to these British concerns. Washington reminded Howe that the 
Americans held Brigadier William Prescott and “assured” Howe “that whatever 
treatment Colonel Allen receives - whatever Fate he undergoes - such exactly shall be 
the treatment & fate of Brigadier Prescot now in our hands - The Law of retaliation, is 
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not only justifiable in the eyes of God & Man, but absolutely a duty which in our present 
Circumstances we owe, to our relatives, Freinds [sic], & fellow Citizens.”20 
In fear of a quid pro quo exchange, Lord George Germain, Secretary of State for 
the American colonies, decided to send Allen back to North America for imprisonment. 
There he would be treated as a prisoner of war, and potentially bartered in a future 
prisoner exchange for Prescott or other officers. Solebay received orders to transport 
Allen and 33 of his men to Boston.21 After receiving Allen and his men, Solebay was to 
join Sir Peter Parker’s fleet. This expedition of warships and transports had orders to 
America. As can be seen on a map, Pendennis Castle is only 40 nautical miles west-
southwest down the coast from Plymouth and on the way to leaving England for Ireland 
then North America. 
Within the fleet Solebay had the strategic mission, once in America, to suppress 
the rebellion by aiding in the capture of colonial ships. Orders from the Admiralty to sea 
captains serving under Parker in December 1775, stated, “The Inhabitants of several of 
His Majts Colonies and Plantations in North America … having traiterously combined 
together for the general purpose of resisting the Authority of this Kingdom, and, having 
in a hostile manner array'd themselves in Arms and committed Acts of open and actual 
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Rebellion … to seize all ships & Vessels belonging to any of the said Colonies, or 
owned by the Inhabitants thereof.”22 Their challenge was thus to cut off supplies to the 
rebels from sea. 
By 7 January, Symonds had taken the 34 American prisoners aboard Solebay at 
Falmouth and sailed for Ireland, arriving on 21 January.23 When Allen and his men 
boarded Solebay, their hand irons were removed and Symonds had the regulations read 
so they would be clear on acceptable behavior. The prisoners were then ordered below as 
the deck was considered “a place for gentlemen to walk” (meaning officers).24 Although 
Allen was an officer, he came aboard ill and did not challenge the order. He remained 
below for two days with his men while he regained his health before going topside 
again. When he did go on deck, Allen and Symonds had an exchange, according to 
Ethan Allen’s own narrative, 
“The Capt. Spoke to me in a great rage, and said, ‘Did I not order you not to 
come on deck?’ I answered him, that at the same time he said, ‘That it was the place for 
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gentlemen to walk;’ That I was Col. Allen, but had not been properly introduced to him. 
He replied, “G~d damn you, Sir, be careful not to walk the same side of the deck that I 
do.” 
This exchange aboard Solebay, sheds light on professional cultural courtesies 
between members of two warring powers. Allen asserted that as a gentleman he had the 
right to walk the deck. He also respected Captain Symonds, and if Symonds was walking 
with lieutenants, walked on the windward side while Allen as a prisoner would walk the 
leeward side. Allen did go below when ordered by the captain. According to Allen, he 
respected the order not out of obedience for Captain Symonds, but to maintain a 
professional example for the captain’s crew, “who ought to obey him.” Allen understood 
the importance of maintaining discipline aboard warships. 
Upon arrival in Cork, Allen and his men received donations from the Irish of 
clothing, teas, chocolate, wine, liquor, brown sugar, and other items. When Captain 
Symonds returned from going ashore and learned of this, he was so “full of envy 
towards the prisoners, … that the damned American rebels should not be treated at this 
rate, by the damned rebels of Ireland.” Symonds let the prisoners keep their clothes and 
Allen keep some of his alcohol, but confiscated most of the food and other items for 
redistribution to his own crew. The prisoners were divided amongst three vessels for the 
Atlantic crossing. 
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On 12 February, Solebay, with Allen aboard, sailed from Ireland for America in a 
fleet with 26 ships, under the command of Commodore Peter Parker.25 By 7 March, only 
15 vessels remained in the fleet, as the other vessels had returned to Cork largely 
because of storms and wind.26 This mission to cross the Atlantic to the American Theater 
demonstrates the utility of frigates. Solebay was transporting high value war prisoners 
while protecting other vessels in the convoy: transports, ordnance ships, victuallers, and 
a hospital ship. After the Solebay’s Atlantic crossing with Colonel Allen, and before 
even arriving in North Carolina, on 24 April, Solebay had taken a schooner.27 When 
Solebay arrived at Cape Fear, North Carolina, on 3 May, Symonds transferred Allen to 
Mercury, which took him to New York.28 In Allen’s final comment about Solebay, he 
praised the ship’s surgeon whom Allen only mentions by his last name, North, for his 
great care of the American prisoners that became sick. 
Solebay’s duties varied during the war, but reflect well the roles for which it was 
designed. In addition to ship-to-ship engagements, Solebay provided fire support for 
British soldiers ashore. As long as Solebay could take up a position so that its guns were 
in range, it made an ideal weapons platform for this role. As a ship, under the right 
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conditions, it could deliver significant firepower with easier mobility than a land-based 
artillery unit. Solebay demonstrated this utility in June, only one month after arriving in 
the American Theater in May, discharging Colonel Allen, and reorganizing and 
resupplying at Cape Fear. The British launched an attack intended to take Charleston, 
South Carolina. As an important port city for the southern American coast it was well 
defended. 
The city of Charleston is at the tip of a long inland peninsula, defined by the 
Ashley River to the west, the Cooper River to the east, and a four nautical mile channel 
connecting the tip of Charleston to the Atlantic Ocean. A natural bar inhibits movement 
past the harbor channel entrance, particularly for large warships like the ones the British 
employed. Crossing the bar would have required the British, as much as possible, to 
remove heavy guns and other supplies, heave the vessels over the bar, then reload the 
guns, all while potentially under fire from American guns. 
The American militia enhanced these natural defensive barriers with 
fortifications. Inside Charleston they stockpiled supplies, positioned a hundred guns, and 
readied 6,000 soldiers. 29 They also fortified the islands on either side of the harbor 
entrance, James Island to the south and Sullivan’s Island to the north. The deepest 
channel into Charleston Harbor ran along Sullivan’s Island so Colonel William 
Moultrie’s soldiers constructed their largest fortification there, three miles east of 
Charleston, to guard the northern entrance to the harbor. They built, parallel palmetto log 
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walls 16 feet apart and filled the area between the walls with sandy soil. They then 
emplaced three dozen guns, primarily on the south and east walls. 
The British planned a combined attack from land and sea with Parker leading the 
Royal Navy from his flagship Bristol, and General Henry Clinton leading the British 
Army. Clinton landed on Long Island, immediately to the northeast of Sullivan, and 
began the attack. He planned to march across “The Breach,” the water separating Long 
Island from Sullivan, but failed. The army used naval sounding charts, which recorded 
the shallowest, rather than deepest positions as 18 inches. In reality they encountered 
impassable, seven-foot deep holes of water.30 Clinton requested small boats from Parker 
to ferry his troops. When Parker failed to send the boats, Clinton’s entire assault force 
sat contained on Long Island. 
On 28 June, Parker aboard Bristol led an attack against Sullivan’s Island, 
thinking he could defeat the fort with naval guns alone.31 Solebay was one of nine 
warships involved. From 10:30 in the morning until 7:00 that evening, Solebay and the 
                                                
30. Ibid., 150. 
 
31. Captain Symonds’ journal describes Solebay’s actions at Sullivan’s Island. 
See Captain Thomas Symonds, Journal of H.M.S. Solebay, Captain Thomas Symonds, 
28 June 1776, in Naval Documents of the American Revolution, vol. 5, AMERICAN 
THEATRE: May 9, 1776–July 31, 1776, edited by William James Morgan, et al. 
(Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1970), 797-798. 
[henceforth NDAR 5] In addition to Captain Symonds’ account, in NDAR 5, pages 797-
906, 997-1004, there are copies of many primary sources that document the attack on 
Sullivan’s Island. For example, Major General Henry Clinton’s narrative is printed on 
Morgan, NDAR 5, pages 801-802. The pages include accounts of other officers involved, 
some with detailed day-by-day actions. Accounts include both American and British 
accountings, Peter Parker’s correspondence to Philip Stephens, and Bristol’s surgeon. 
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other warships took turns pounding the fortifications on Sullivan’s Island.32 Solebay’s 
draft of only 15 feet made it safely comfortable in the 6 1/2 fathoms of seawater, yet able 
to effectively use her anchors to hold a position and pivot. The ships delivered a heavy 
fire, swinging on their anchors to alternate starboard and port broadsides. Inside the fort, 
Moultrie directed four-hundred Americans in returning fire. As the action progressed, 
some of the British ships became entangled, grounded a distance away on sand bars, or 
fired shots that proved ineffective. Despite the sailors’ best efforts at destroying the 
defenses and forcing a surrender, the American rebels successfully held their position. 
As the day turned to night, the fire slackened after 7:00 in the evening, ceased 
after 9:00, and the ships withdrew at 11:00. After a day of heavy fire on both sides, the 
British lost 91 sailors killed and 170 wounded. Of these, Solebay suffered one killed and 
eight wounded. Americans losses included 10 killed and 22 wounded, with plenty of 
soldiers left to defend against a potential landward attack. The next morning the seven 
British regiments recognized they were in no position to attempt an effective assault and 
withdrew from Long Island. The renamed Fort Moultrie and Charleston remained in 
American hands until the siege of 1780. 
The failure of the British combined forces at Sullivan’s was a collective failure 
that included communication and coordination problems between the land and naval 
forces and incapacity to match a well-disciplined American force that returned heavy 
fire. Tight spaces for maneuvering constrained by the shore and sand bars helped the 
                                                
32. Journal of H.M.S. Solebay, Captain Thomas Symonds, 28 June 1776, in 
NDAR 5, 797-798. 
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American forces, as well as the capacity of the spongy palmetto trees that composed the 
fort to absorb the impact of British cannonballs. Solebay still proved effective as a 
frigate, in its ability to engage close to shore and provide fire support to the operations. 
By August 1776, as the war escalated, Britain had assembled a 350-ship fleet in 
North American waters. This fleet included many unrated vessels such as armed sloops, 
bombs, and fireships. Ambrose Serle, private secretary to British General William 
Howe, while aboard HMS Eagle recorded in his official journal the rated ships by 
name.33  In gloating over Britain’s present naval might, Serle notably included Solebay 
as a key warship among twenty names:  
Eagle 64 
Asia 64 
Chatham  50 
Centurion  50 
Renown  50 
Preston  50 
Bristol  50 
Experiment  50 
Roebuck  44 
Rainbow  44 
                                                
33. Ambrose Serle, Journal of Ambrose Serle, 14 August 1776, in Naval 
Documents of the American Revolution, vol. 6, AMERICAN THEATRE: Aug. 1, 1776–
Oct. 31, 1776, EUROPEAN THEATRE: May 26, 1776–Oct. 5, 1776, edited by William 
Bell Clark, et al. (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1972), 
184. [henceforth NDAR 6] 
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Phoenix  44 
Orpheus  32 
Emerald  32 
Niger  32 
Repulse  32 
Brune  32 
Solebay  28 
Rose  28 
Greyhound  28 
Syren  28 
In August, Solebay began escorting transport vessels that had been passed up the 
coast by other escorts. They were carrying soldiers from Jamaica to South Carolina and 
further onto where needed. Solebay was better suited for such a mission than any ship-
of-the-line. These first through third-rate ships performed well in fleet engagements, but 
their behemoth size and manning requirements made them less ideal for daily escort and 
patrol tasks. 
One of the primary roles Solebay performed well as a sixth-rate vessel was in 
coastal blockades and patrols, in and around smaller bays and islands. Outside of fleet 
engagements or escorts, Solebay’s time along the American seacoast consisted of routine 
patrols with limited action. Foreign vessels, such as French merchantmen, sought to both 
profit and support the Americans by running past British warships. When a navy warship 
closed with a merchantman, the vessel would often fire a shot or two in an attempt to 
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deter the British long enough to evade capture and run on the open seas, or reach a safe 
anchorage. In some engagements, Solebay lost a man or two and had several wounded, 
but otherwise suffered minimal damage as a superior fighting vessel. 
As early in the war as 31 August 1776, Solebay had already captured an 
American sloop, Hoope.34 A passage from Solebay’s Captain Thomas Symonds’ journal 
records this event. Though typical in its brevity, this entry provides a lot of detail as to 
the date, time, conditions, and engagement:35 
 
Journal of H. M. S. Solebay, Captain Thomas Symonds 
August 1776 Sandy Hook N74: l0Wt 305 Lgs 
Saturday 31  Mod: & Cloudy with Showers of Rain 
 1/2 past 1 p m saw a S1 ahead fired 2 3prs Shotted at the 
 Chace a Sloop from Philadelphia to Surinam laden with 
 flour, T a r & Lumber 
  Latt: in 35'40' N Long: in: 19:49 Et 
 
                                                
34. James Hartley to Secretary of the Admiralty Philip Stephens, 3 January 1778, 
including a "A List of Captures condemned in His Majesty's Court of Vice Admiralty in 
Saint Vincent," in Naval Documents of the American Revolution, vol. 11, AMERICAN 
THEATRE: Jan. 1, 1778–Mar. 31, 1778, EUROPEAN THEATRE: Jan. 1, 1778–Mar. 
31, 1778, edited by Michael J. Crawford, et al. (Washington, D.C.: United States 
Government Printing Office, 2005), 27-28. [henceforth NDAR 11] 
35. Journal of H.M.S. Solebay, Captain Thomas Symonds, 31 April 1776, in 
NDAR 6, 377. 
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In September 1776, Symonds and Solebay sailed to the Caribbean with orders to 
convoy troop transports transferring the 6th Regiment of Foot from St. Vincent’s and 
Barbados, to New York.36 In this capacity, Solebay served as an armed escort for safe 
passage of the troop transports. During this period, when Solebay sailed to Bermuda, her 
crew had another encounter with a historically significant figure, John Paul Jones, 
“Father of the United States Navy.” Jones had sailed from Delaware to Rhode Island, 
and onto Bermuda at the same time as Solebay. Aboard the sloop Providence, with 
seventy men, Jones encountered the 28-gunned frigate Solebay and her battle-hardened 
crew on 7 October 1776. To the Americans this was a warship in the Continental Navy; 
to the Royal Navy it was a privateer that needed to be stopped. As Jones recalled in his 
narrative, he “had a very narrow escape.”37 Solebay chased Jones for six hours within 
cannon range and at one point pistol-shot range, before Providence successfully outran 
it. Jones continued to capture prizes and burn and destroy British shipping. Had the 
circumstances been slightly different, Solebay might have been Jones’ victim for his 
famous quote, “I have not begun to fight!”, which made him famous during the 1779 
Battle of Flamborough Head, between Bonhomme Richard and HMS Serapis. However, 
considering that Providence only had four 12-pounders, and not the 50 guns of his later 
Bonhomme Richard, it is most likely that Solebay would have won any engagement, had 
                                                
36. Vice Admiral Richard Lord Howe to Philip Stephens, "Disposition of His 
Majesty's Ships & Vessels Employed in North America Under the Command of Vice 
Admiral the Viscount Howe," [18 September 1776], in NDAR 6, 892; Continental 
Journal, Thursday, September 26, 1776, in NDAR 6, 1002. 
37. "Narrative of Captain John Paul Jones," [21 August to 7 October, 1776], in 
NDAR 6, 1148-1149. 
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it succeeded in overtaking Providence. For the crew of Solebay, they were just chasing 
one more American privateer during the course of the war. 
In June of 1777, Solebay arrived at Kingston, Jamaica, one of Britain’s major 
naval bases. There Solebay underwent needed maintenance, including careening to have 
its hull cleaned.38 The frigate thereafter returned to duty, escorting ships and chasing 
enemy vessels. During this period, Vice Admiral Richard Lord Howe ordered Captain 
Hyde Parker, Jr., aboard HMS Phoenix, and vessels Emerald, Solebay, Otter, and 
Senegal, to intercept supplies and military stores attempting to reach the colonial rebels 
through ports and rivers, generally prevent trade, and destroy any armed American 
vessels.39 By creating this mission-oriented cruising force, the British hoped to suppress 
the American tobacco trade. The colonial vessels moved their cargoes into Europe 
through French ports, and used the profits to acquire arms and related military supplies, 
which they took back to America. 
In the winter of 1778, a British squadron under Captain Richard Onslow 
blockaded the Chesapeake Bay. Under the command of Captain Symonds, Solebay 
convoyed two victualler ships to the Chesapeake Bay and remained with Onslow’s 
                                                
38. Vice Admiral Clark Gayton to Philip Stephens, 15 June 1777, in Naval 
Documents of the American Revolution, vol. 9, AMERICAN THEATRE: Jun. 1, 1777–
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39. Vice Admiral Richard Lord Howe to Captain Hyde Parker, Jr., H.M.S. 
Phoenix, 22 September 1777, in NDAR 9, 951-953. 
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blockading force.40 Solebay was one of six warships under Onslow’s command, along 
with logistics vessels. During this operation, Solebay contributed to the capturing or 
destruction of vessels attempting to run the blockade. Her combination of speed and 
weaponry challenged schooners and sloops attempting to slip up a river. She often 
exchanged shots as galleys attempted to deter their capture and captured several prizes 
by firing shots that forced them to run aground. In one notable prize, on 23 February, 
Symonds and Solebay captured the 600-ton, 24-gun letter-of-marque Viscount De Veaux, 
carrying woolens, and other cargo intended to supply Washington’s army.41  
In addition to escort and blockade duties, Solebay relayed messages to army 
commanders. On 15 January 1778, Solebay was ordered to sail up the freezing Delaware 
River and deliver dispatches intended to British army Commander-in-Chief Sir William 
Howe.42 Solebay’s size, relatively shallow draft, and firepower proved ideal for 
maneuvering in a riverine environment, while providing adequate speed and security for 
the mission. 
As the war progressed, a series of events pulled Solebay to its fate off Nevis. As 
the British naval and army forces converged on the New World, they started having 
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some success in driving back the Revolution. At the end of 1778, Savannah, Georgia, 
fell to the British Army. The following spring, the Royal Navy helped the British 
regulars capture Charleston, South Carolina. This gave Britain control of both large port 
cities that they held until 1782. In the autumn of 1777, American success in the Saratoga 
Campaign had convinced the French to back the American Revolution with financial, 
military, and naval support. In 1778, France formally allied with the Continental 
Congress and entered the war. 
From July through September 1780, Solebay underwent a final refitting at 
Plymouth, after four years of wartime service since it has been last refitted in 1776.43 On 
re-commissioning, on 13 September 1780, it was assigned to Captain Charles Holmes 
Everitt, with orders to patrol English coastal waters.44 In December 1780, Solebay 
captured the 20-gun French vessel La Comtesse Bezançois in the English Channel. On 
12 March 1781, Everitt led Solebay back to North America, where it took two American 
privateers Dan and Resource, and the sloop Savage. Solebay continued to serve along 
the American seacoast until the Battle of the Chesapeake, after which it went to the West 
Indies.45 
The political, economic, and military struggles for the American colonies rippled 
throughout the British and French Atlantic World. French competition with the British in 
                                                
43. ADM 106/1260/112, Plymouth Dockyard 'Officers' to the Navy Board, 14 
March 1780 (National Archives, UK). 
44. ADM 36/9836 Solebay’s Muster, 13 September 1780 (National Archives, 
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45. Winfield, British Warships, 231-232. 
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the New World, defined their roles in aiding the American Colonists in North America 
and attacking the British Caribbean colonies. In the Caribbean, sympathies for one side 
or the other amplified inter-island tensions and created political threats. Island planters’ 
loyalties to Britain required respecting the Navigation Acts, and ending trade with the 
mainland American colonies. Interdicting shipping along the American seacoasts further 
reduced trade with Caribbean colonies. While Britain fought to maintain control of its 
American and Caribbean colonies, the French sought to exploit the situation. 
Throughout the war, the British and French fought over the valuable sugar 
islands. The British attempted to gain an advantage in the Caribbean by taking St. Lucia 
(December 1778), St. Eustatius, St. Martin, and Saba (February 1780). France’s navy 
generally bested the British, and afforded French soldiers the opportunity to capture or 
recapture several islands, beginning in September 1778 with Dominica and following 
with Grenada (May 1779), St. Vincent (June 1779), and retaking St. Eustatius 
(November 1781). The two powers also fought naval battles off Martinique. From 
Martinique, their main naval base in the West Indies, the French launched attacks that 
resulted in the capture of St. Kitts. France’s ultimate Caribbean prize would have been to 
capture Jamaica. Despite French success on taking some islands, this strategic goal 
always became thwarted. A new opportunity arose after a number of British defeats in 
the North American colonies, in September and October of 1781. 
In September 1781, American Continental Army forces under General George 
Washington and their French allies led by Comte de Rochambeau laid siege to Lord 
Charles Cornwallis’ army at Yorktown, Virginia. There he intended to link up with Rear 
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Admiral Sir Thomas Graves’ fleet. Unfortunately for the British, the French intervened 
at sea. French naval forces under the Comte de Grasse had sailed north, from the 
Caribbean to Virginia. There, at the Chesapeake, they anchored and waited for the 
British. Finally, on 5 September 1781, they engaged Graves’ fleet before it could reach 
Cornwallis. Solebay participated in the ill-fated British endeavor to relieve General 
Cornwallis’ army. The ensuing battle became known as the Battle of the Chesapeake, or 
Second Battle of the (Virginia) Capes. The fleets met for a two-hour fight that ended 
with the British defeat and return to New York. In the subsequent month, unsupported 
by sea and under siege by American and French soldiers, Cornwallis surrendered on 17 
October before the British could muster a second naval effort to save his army. 
In 1780, Symonds had been promoted to command of the 44-gun, fifth-rate HMS 
Charon and in 1781 was the senior Royal Navy officer present when the British 
surrendered. Cornwallis and Symonds signed the Articles of Capitulation with 
Washington and Rochambeau on 19 October 1781. After six years of fighting, Symonds 
became a prisoner. Cornwallis’ surrender signaled the end of the war for the British in 
North America. While the war was over for Symonds, a major battle awaited Solebay. 
After Yorktown, de Grasse returned with his fleet to the Caribbean, arriving at 
Martinique on 26 November. There he began planning operations against British islands, 
focusing first on capturing Barbados with the ultimate goal of taking Jamaica. British 
naval forces followed the French from the Chesapeake south, in an effort to defend their 
island colonies. 
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In the Age of Sail, communications moved slowly with dispatches carried aboard 
ships such as those Solebay had delivered along the American seacoast in the previous 
years. A fast vessel could often deliver intelligence, notifying defending forces of a 
pending attack quicker than the offensive forces could execute their plan. Word of a 
significant French naval fleet moving north spread amongst the British Leeward 
islanders. Though not knowing the target island, they trembled in anticipation of a 
pending attack.46 While the British commander-in-chief of the Leeward Islands, Admiral 
Sir George Rodney, was in England, the French left Martinique. In Rodney’s absence, 
his second, Rear-Admiral Sir Samuel Hood, prepared to face the French fleet. After 
several days of strong winds impeding progress, de Grasse called off the Barbados plan 
and directed his fleet onto St. Kitts and Nevis. This reprieve for Barbados meant a battle 
for St. Kitts. 
On 9 January 1781, Nevis Council President John Richardson Herbert warned 
Thomas Shirley, Governor General of the Leeward Islands and the commander of 
Brimstone Hill, of 74 vessels sighted including an estimated 21 ships of the line.47 
Brimstone Hill Fortress was the largest fortification in the English Americas and the 
focal point of the French offensive on St. Kitts. Leading the French fleet was de Grasse 
aboard his formidable, 104-gun Ville de Paris. The ships of the line escorted vessels 
transporting soldiers and supplies for an amphibious invasion. On 11-12 January, 
                                                
46. Minutes of the Saint Christopher Assembly, 22 December 1781 (National 
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47. Vincent K. Hubbard, "Lost and Found: The Discovery of HMS Solebay at 
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Marquis de Bouillé landed 8,000 French soldiers at Basseterre. From there, the French 
marched toward Sandy Point, St. Kitts, to begin a siege of Brimstone Hill. Colonel 
Arthur Dillon led De Bouillé’s lead division against Brimstone, defended by 600 British 
men, under the command of General Thomas Fraser.48 The British defenders, including 
local militia and armed slaves, faced a significant challenge. The initial defense of the 
southern end of Sandy Point, before Brimstone, was set at Charles Fort, where the 
British troops fired guns against the advancing French column. French artillery and 
musket fire on Sandy Point destroyed the town, securing the position as French 
headquarters for the Brimstone siege. On 20 January, Nevis surrendered and the captain 
of Glorieux, the Viscount d’Escars took possession without a fight.49 During the 
invasion, the Nevisian President convinced islanders to announce that they would remain 
neutral in the Anglo-French conflict. Though desiring to remain British, they essentially 
avoided a fight by respecting whomever raised a flag at Fort Charles. 
While events quickly evolved for the worst on St. Kitts, at sea Solebay took 
another prize, capturing an American privateer on 18 January.50 Learning the attack had 
shifted from Barbados to St. Kitts, Solebay, sailing with Hood, left Carlisle Bay, 
Barbados, for the Royal Navy base at English Harbour, Antigua, with 22 ships of the 
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line.51 There, Hood’s fleet took on provisions and soldiers intended to reinforce 
Brimstone Hill — under General Robert Prescott. The British soldiers numbered far less 
than the French force, but were all that were available at the time: two marine battalions 
and the 69th Regiment of Foot. With provisions and soldiers aboard, Hood sailed from 
Antigua on the evening of 23 January 1782 destined for St. Kitts, with Solebay in his 
fleet. Antigua lies approximately 37 nautical miles directly east of Nevis. Reaching 
Brimstone on St. Kitts requires sailing from English Harbour on the southern coast of 
Antigua, rounding the southern coast of Nevis at another ten nautical miles, then turning 
north along Nevis west coast, past Charlestown, across the Narrows, and on toward 
Basseterre. The French fleet awaited the British, anchored just south of Basseterre in a 
modestly sheltered cove now known as Frigate Bay. 
The short distance between the two islands made the crossing brief and action 
imminent. Both sides used fast scouting vessels to gather intelligence. The French sent 
Iris to Antigua, which returned to St. Kitts and passed signals to de Grasse, before 
returning to Antigua to seek additional intelligence.52 On 24 January, Hood ordered his 
fleet to form the line of battle, but two of his vessels, Alfred and Nymph, ran afoul of 
each other during the night. This cost him one day while Alfred was repaired at sea. This 
also deprived Hood use of the Nymph that had to return to Antigua to repair greater 
damage suffered in the collision with Alfred. During this wait at sea, Hood’s frigates 
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captured the 16-gun French cutter Espion, attempting to deliver shells to the French 
army besieging Brimstone. 
On the morning of the 25th, the two fleets first observed each other directly after 
Hood’s sailed round the southwest coast of Nevis. Expecting the pending engagement 
with Hood, De Grasse moved his fleet from the Frigate Bay anchorage at 3:00 on the 
afternoon of the 24th, seeking to gain the initiative of greater firepower at sea.53 Then, 
Hood saw for himself the error of Governor Shirley’s earlier report. Hood faced not 21, 
but 31 French ships of the line. 
De Grasse left Frigate Bay, seeking to gain the most advantageous position. He 
reasoned that with a superior number of ships and guns, as with the largest flagship in 
the battle, he could win if properly positioned for an attack. In the Age of Sail the best 
position to start a battle was windward from the enemy fleet, called the weather gage. By 
controlling its position relative to the wind, a fleet controlled the tactical initiative in 
battle by setting its distance from the enemy and choosing when to force action. When 
ready, the ideal attack involved the windward fleet bearing down on the leeward fleet, 
and sailing in a line perpendicular and through the enemy line of ships. As the two fleets 
intersected, they would exchange gunfire from their broadsides of cannons. The 
windward fleet crossing the line would have the advantage of maintaining fleet integrity. 
The leeward fleet would become divided, reducing its fighting capability. As this 
windward fleet passed through the enemy line, the windward fleet’s ships could fire 
devastating broadsides from both port and starboard guns, raking the enemy ships down 
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their long axes, bow-to-stern, or stern-to-bow. The leeward fleet would be virtually 
defenseless against such a successful attack and would be forced to surrender. In a 
textbook execution, the windward fleet should win the battle. As De Grasse’s fleet 
weighed anchor, he intended to execute just such a maneuver. 
French warships and ratings:54 
Ville de Paris 104 French Flagship 
L’Auguste 80 
Duc de Bourgoyne 80 
La Couronne 80 
Languedoc 80 
Triomphante 80 
Magnanime 74 
Northumberland 74 
Pluton 74 
Glorieux 74 
Caesar 74 
Hercule 74 
Zelé 74 
Palmier 74 
Hector 74 
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Souverain 74 
Conquerant 74 
Sceptre 74 
Citoyen 74 
Destin 74 
Neptune 74 
Bourgoyne 74 
Dauphine 74 
Marseillois 74 
Diadem 74 
Brave 74 
Eveillé 64 
Refleché 64 
Jason 64 
Ardent 64 
Caton 64 
British warships and ratings listed by intended order in the line:55 
VAN commanded by Rear Admiral Francis Samuel Drake 
St. Albans  64 
Alcide 74 
Intrepid 64 
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Torbay 74 
Princessa 70 Van Flagship 
Prince George 98 
Ajax 74 
CENTER commanded by Rear Admiral Hood 
Prince William 64 
Shrewsbury 74 
Invincible 74 
Barfleur 98 Center Flagship 
Monarch 74 
Belliqueux 64 
Centaur 74 
Alfred 74 
REAR commanded by Commodore Edmund Affleck 
Russel 74 
Resolution 74 
Bedford 74 Rear Flagship 
Canada 74 
Prudent 64 
Montague 74 
America 64 
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In addition to the line, Hood had nine frigates: 
Attached to VAN 
Eurydice 20 
Attached to CENTER 
Pegasus 28 
Fortunée 28 
Lizard 28 
Champion 20 Repeater 
Convert 32 
Triton 28 
Attached to the REAR 
Sybil 28 
Solebay 28 
At ten o’clock in the morning, Hood sent the ships in his Van ahead before 
recalling them back into line with the rest of his fleet.56 As the British fleet rounded the 
southern seacoast of Nevis and pressed northward, St. Albans fell to fourth position and 
vessels in the Rear gained greater ground, reordering the fleet. Upon seeing the French, 
Hood determined his only chance for saving Brimstone was to take de Grasse’s 
anchorage.57 Hood pressed his fleet onward to present the appearance of intending to 
engage the French fleet. Instead, his Van and Center swept past the French with only 
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limited fighting, heading for the anchorage. It was Hood’s Rear, commanded by 
Commodore Affleck, which took the brunt of the fighting, holding the French as the rest 
of the British fleet drove forward. Affleck’s fire effectively shifted the French leeward, 
or further west and away from shore, while Hood’s fleet sailed toward Basseterre and 
Frigate Bay, avoiding becoming mired in an open sea, ship-to-ship battle. All nine 
frigates sailed windward of the fleet, with the Nevis seacoast on their starboard, and the 
British line off their port, with the French to the west, further leeward of the British 
line.58 
In this action, Solebay acted on station as a repeater vessel to the Rear Division. 
This meant she sailed out away from the line, necessary to be visible to pass signals from 
Hood’s flagship to the rest of the fleet. This was an important and essential task before 
the invention of wireless radios. Ships used signaling flags to coordinate their 
movements, working together to maximize their firepower against an enemy fleet, while 
minimizing individual weaknesses by providing a collective defense. Line of sight 
limited the use of flags. Each vessel in the fleet needed to see the flagship in order to 
correctly follow Hood’s commands. Sails, rigging, masts, and especially smoke from 
cannon fire could obstruct visibility with the flagship. Solebay served to fill this gap by 
relaying signals. There was no standard system for signaling at this time, so each 
commander chose his own.  Regardless of which colors, numbers, position an admiral 
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selected, repeater vessels were needed to convey signals to all ships in a squadron or 
fleet.59  
Rounding the southern coast of Nevis, moving north, and with a French fleet 
responding by leaving its anchorage and moving south to meet the British fleet, Solebay 
was away from the protection of the battle line, exposed and vulnerable. In this position, 
a French ship of the line chased Solebay, pressing her ever closer to shore. Following the 
British line of frigates north along Nevis’ southwestern seacoast, Solebay moved ever 
closer to shore, in the heaviest of the initial fighting between the fleets. 
At 2:20 in the afternoon, Solebay’s Captain Charles Holmes Everitt received a 
warning that the depth of water was dangerously shallow and ordered his helmsman hard 
to starboard, but it was too late.60 Solebay grounded off the southwest coast of Nevis. At 
about the same time that Solebay grounded, the Ville de Paris fired three shots to begin 
ranging her guns prior to the main opening broadsides.61 At three o’clock, the French 
began the fight with the Ville de Paris opening the exchange by firing on Hood’s Rear 
Division, initiating the firing of a dozen more French ships. The British Rear returned 
fire and the Battle of Frigate Bay had begun. 
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With Solebay aground, Hood’s fleet continued toward its their objective on St. 
Kitts. The British Rear Division passed, leaving Solebay alone and exposed to the Rear 
of the enemy fleet. As they sailed by, French ships directed broadsides at Solebay.62 
Everitt kept his colors flying, determined to save Solebay and get back in the fight. At 
first, his crew kept firing their port guns toward the leeward French vessels.63 The sailors 
jettisoned the ship’s starboard guns, lightening the weight of the vessel in an effort to 
free her.64 They manned the pumps as well, to remove excess bilge water, but were also 
fighting a falling tide. In the meantime, two French frigates off Solebay’s leeward, or 
port side, fired their broadsides into the stranded Solebay.65 Without alternative options, 
under heavy enemy fire, and fearing capture or death, Everitt consulted his officers and 
determined to order his crew to abandon ship and seek protection ashore on Nevis where 
the British flag still flew at Fort Charles. At around seven o’clock in the evening, Everitt 
ordered the Solebay set afire to prevent its capture by the French. 
While Solebay burned, Hood’s fleet pushed north, and began anchoring in line 
ahead at Frigate Bay, bypassing a battle with the French navy in open seas. De Grasse, 
having originally held Frigate Bay, having chosen to meet the British in an open water 
fleet battle, now faced having to drive into an anchored enemy at the exact defensive 
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position the French had just held that morning. By taking the French position Hood 
separated de Grasse’s fleet from the French soldiers ashore. De Grasse attacked the 
British hoping to prevent them from cutting his communication with the troops ashore at 
Brimstone Hill Fortress, but was driven off by intense fire from the British Rear under 
Commodore Edmund Affleck.66 Up to fourteen French ships concentrated their fire on 
the last three ships in the British line.67 Affleck’s Rear Division held fast. Hood’s Center 
engaged to help the Rear while Hood’s Van added sail to reach Frigate Bay. This hour-
and-a-half action held back the French, and allowed Hood’s fleet time to station in a 
strong, defensive position before sundown. De Grasse, recognizing the futility of the 
situation withdrew to deep water for the night. 
As the battle between Hood and de Grasse continued, the fire aboard Solebay 
spread. At eight o’clock it reached and ignited the 160 barrels of gunpowder in Solebay’s 
hold, causing an explosion that reverberated like thunder off Nevis Peak.68 Solebay 
exploded on the shoal, but Everitt and his men made it safely ashore. Wasting no time, 
Everitt marched his men north to Fort Charles where he lowered and raised the British 
flag to signal recapture of the island.69 Everitt, determined to rejoin the sea fight for St. 
Kitts, commandeered two vessels, boarded his crew, and set off across the Narrows for 
the English fleet at Basseterre. Everitt’s last official action on Nevis was to send a letter 
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demanding the islanders surrender to the British. Thus ended the first full day of fighting 
between the fleets. 
At eight o’clock the next morning, de Grasse led his entire fleet in another 
determined attack that lasted two hours.70 Hood’s Rear became the focus of French 
efforts, determined by the winds relative to the British Van. Recognizing the threat, 
Hood re-positioned his ships to reinforce the Rear. The British held their defensive 
anchorage at Frigate Bay, as the French fleet passed, both sides exchanging broadsides. 
The French again withdrew to sea, and Hood used the pause to adjust his line by moving 
the exposed seven ships in the Rear. His fleet now formed a better defensive position, in 
an obtuse-angled line that stretched from the saltpans by Frigate Bay all the way to 
Basseterre. With the British ships on spring anchors, they could deliver a broadside, and 
pivot to deliver the alternate broadside while reloading the first.71 It was a strong 
defensive position. In the afternoon, de Grasse reengaged, focusing his efforts on Hood’s 
Center and Rear. The British repulsed him, inflicting even greater damage, including 
shot holes in the Ville de Paris, which was seen heeled for hours on the morning of the 
27th. The sea battle was over; the French withdrew. The British suffered 72 killed, 244 
wounded, and the French reportedly delivered over 1,000 wounded to St. Eustatius.72 
Hood secured a tactical naval victory. 
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While the naval battle ended, the struggle ashore continued. On the 28th, General 
Prescott landed 700 soldiers to relieve the besieged British soldiers holding Brimstone.73 
As Prescott and his men approached Brimstone Hill, the French blocked their advance 
forcing them to retreat to Basseterre. Marquis de Bouillé led 400 French troops from 
Sandy Point to drive off Prescott. Fortunately for the British, despite Prescott’s initial 
defeat, he had established a strong defense on a hill commanding Basseterre. With 
Bouillé not being able to attack Prescott at Basseterre, and Prescott not being able to 
attack Bouillé and his 8,000 soldiers at Brimstone, Bouillé withdrew his soldiers to 
continue his attack on Brimstone and Prescott’s soldiers re-embarked onto Hood’s fleet. 
Bouillé had successfully cut off both relief and communications between Hood and 
Fraser inside Brimstone. 
Despite losing the naval battle, the French continued the siege with ferocity and 
unrelenting determination. The garrison, reduced in strength to 500 men, capitulated on 
13 February. Once in possession of Brimstone Hill Fortress, the French soldiers began to 
position mortars and guns on the surrounding hills to bombard the British fleet at anchor 
below. Hood recognized the danger of holding his position, with the soldiers on high 
ground ashore, and the French fleet waiting at sea like sharks circling. At 11:00 on the 
night of 14 February, under orders that had quietly been passed ship-to-ship and without 
flags, his ships cut their anchors loose and the fleet slipped out to sea. St. Kitts had 
fallen, followed soon after by Nevis and Montserrat.74 On 19 February, Hood anchored 
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once again in English Harbour, Antigua, where he met Rodney, who had returned from 
England with additional warships. While it was too late to save St. Kitts and Nevis, this 
combined fleet had another battle with the French, and a destiny with history looming. 
Three months after the Battle of Frigate Bay, the French made one final push to 
invade Jamaica. On 12 April 1782, Comte de Grasse, aboard his flagship Ville de Paris, 
led his fleet against a British fleet that included many of the veteran vessels from Frigate 
Bay. This time the British, under the command of Admiral Sir George Rodney and with 
Hood as his second, defeated the French. Three dozen warships on each side engaged 
south of a tiny group of islands known as the Saintes, located between Guadeloupe and 
Dominica, 100 nautical miles southeast of Nevis. During the Battle of the Saintes, the 
British fleet broke the French line, raking them with devastating fire. The French were 
defeated. De Grasse surrendered his flagship, thus ending French hopes of capturing 
Jamaica anytime soon. The Treaty of Paris was signed just over a year later, on 3 
September 1783. By its terms, France returned St. Kitts and Nevis to Britain. Great 
Britain had lost America, but regained St. Kitts and Nevis. 
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CHAPTER V 
INTERPRETING SOLEBAY 
 
British naval architectural history and many individual ship histories are well 
documented in theory. This documentation continued after the launching of a vessel, one 
that may have served for decades. Solebay sailed for almost two decades. Lines drawings 
and associated design books and treatises provide a basis for understanding these 
vessels. However, modifications, upgrades, or real use can only be understood through 
their archaeological remains, complemented with historical service records. The 
archaeological remains of Solebay are sparse, but they offer clues and prompt historical 
research. Teasing the story of Solebay focuses one’s attention on understanding late 
eighteenth-century naval science, and the role of frigates in combat, as well as peacetime 
service. 
In the late seventeenth century, long wars involving the United Provinces, Spain, 
England, and France necessitated the building of powerful navies, involving hundreds of 
ships. States tested a variety of new vessel types with multiple decks, guns, and sail 
configurations. This formative era prompted the maturing nation-state to institutionalize 
battle fleet organization into a rating system. This served administrative as well as 
tactical purposes. Into the eighteenth century, ships ratings standardized which improved 
the construction, outfitting, and deployment processes. For the British Royal Navy, the 
1719 Establishment set formal design and construction guidelines, just prior to 
channeling all work through the Surveyor of the Navy with the 1745 Establishment. 
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Ships were rated first through sixth rate. On the most powerful end, a first-rated 
warship was the largest, had the most decks, and mounted the most guns. On the lower 
end, a sixth-rated vessel was smallest in size, with the fewest decks, and had the least 
number of guns. The remaining ratings fell in between these two extremes. In the 
seventeenth and eighteenth century, classification of ratings by number of guns and 
number of gun decks evolved depending on the exact period, but followed these general 
guidelines. For example, in the eighteenth century, fourth-rate warships became third-
rates, or operated as flagships in smaller fleets. And, the line between sixth-rates and 
unrated vessels could be negotiable. 
Together, first, second, and third-rate warships formed ships-of-the-line, 
designed to serve cohesively as a fleet for a large battle. Such a fleet was built around 
several 74-gun, third-rate warships—ideal for their size and firepower. These could then 
be augmented with a few second-rate vessels. An admiral led them aboard a first-rate 
ship that carried 100 or more guns. This warship served as the fleet’s flagship, and 
would fight enemy flagships. Together, a fleet carried a tremendous amount of firepower 
and could only be effectively opposed by an enemy fleet of similar size and firepower. 
In practice, governments could only afford to operate such ships during major wars. 
While powerful, the size, maneuverability, manning, and victualing requirements of first 
through third-rate ships limited their use to planned battles in major wars. Otherwise, 
these ships laid in ordinary, as a reserve until needed for a future war. 
In contrast, on the lower spectrum of the rating system, were the fourth, fifth, and 
sixth-rate warships that could be used year round. These carried as many 64 guns, while 
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the smallest sixth rates carried 24 to 28 guns on a single deck, augmented with swivel 
guns and later carronades. Though lesser in size and strength, these ships conducted 
essential functions for the success of the greater fleet and state. They could assist the 
larger fleets in a major battle, or operate independently or in small groups for missions 
other than fleet-on-fleet combat. The array of tasks assigned to these vessels included 
reconnaissance, blockading, convoy escorts, delivering essential persons and dispatches, 
general cruising, and standing as repeaters, outlying the main fleet during battles 
amongst first through third rate vessels. 
In the eighteenth century, more tightly defined ratings came with advances in 
naval architecture. British designs borrowed heavily from lines taken off captured 
French warships, which were generally considered to be better than British designs. 
British naval architects studied the designs and drafted new models, outfitted with the 
latest weapons and technology. Thomas Slades’ Mermaid-class Solebay represents this 
initial generation of better-designed British warships built in the 1760s based on new 
designs. It also underwent technological upgrades during its service lifetime. These 
included the addition of carronades and copper-sheathed hull, which extended its 
performance and fleet value. 
Solebay’s destruction and subsequent site formation conditions do not provide 
the circumstances to study the hull at present, but remaining metal artifacts may answer 
questions regarding its outfitting. Moreover, analysis of the vessel class serves to 
understand its purpose, as a warship with a specific fleet role. Vessels were designed to 
serve naval missions, with performance considerations in mind. These objectives 
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ultimately exist to fulfill naval and diplomatic goals of a nation-state. In the macro 
picture, it becomes of insightful importance to understand how a lower echelon vessel 
works as an instrument of the state. 
England's navy and military matured in step with its role in European politics, in 
the early eighteenth century. Maintaining an influential position required a navy capable 
of controlling the English Channel by successfully defending against potential Spanish, 
Dutch, or French fleet attacks. While the British Navy built a sufficient quantity of ships, 
they lacked the performance capabilities of their competitors' designs. French Master 
Shipwright Blaise Ollivier's two-decked Medée, built in 1741, represented an archetypal 
frigate, leading the British in design. Beginning in the 1740s, the English sought to 
capitalize on captured enemy vessels--such as Jacques-Luc Coulomb's Panthére in 1745, 
Embuscade in 1746, and Medée's sister ship Renommée in 1747--by operating them 
against the French. 
The 1745 Establishment provided the Royal Navy greater centralized control 
over the design of warships, leading to a rigid standardization that catalyzed efforts to 
replicate captured French warships, beginning in earnest during this decade. British 
shipwrights accomplished this by lifting the lines of the French vessels and reverse 
engineering their plans to create new vessels for the Royal Navy. Ultimately, the British 
shipwrights improved and scaled the designs from lesser Sixth Rates to line-capable 74-
gun third rates. This turning point started working in the late-1740s when the British 
Navy constructed new warships based on taking lines off the French privateer Tygre in 
1747. 
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As these efforts grew and continued, the Royal Navy was gifted in 1755, with a 
new Surveyor of the Navy, Thomas Slade. He exploited the French prizes and led British 
naval architecture into a flourishing phase by improving British ship design. Slade’s 
plans served through the Napoleonic Wars and into the nineteenth century, including his 
most famous design, HMS Victory, famous for its role at the 1805 Battle of Trafalgar. 
From these efforts the British eventually built great ships to complement their well-
trained and disciplined sailors. The second half of the eighteenth century was a period of 
rapid technological innovation and overall improved quality for the British Navy and the 
supporting bureaucracy. 
In 1757, during the middle of the 1754-1763 Seven Years War, the British 
captured a French prize, the 950-ton L'Abenakise. Rechristened HMS Aurora, its lines 
contributed greatly toward collecting naval architecture intelligence. The scaled lines 
served as a model of Thomas Slade's designs from third-rate, 74-gun vessels, to sloops. 
A sixth rate design taken from L'Abenakise’s lines became the Mermaid class.1 Six 
vessels with L'Abenakise’s lines were built between 1760 and 1775, in two separate 
batches of three vessels each (Table 1). These vessels were similar, except for some 
minor differences in the second batch including a slightly longer keel by 8 5/8 inches. 
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Vessel Completed End of Service 
First Batch 
Mermaid 1761 1778 
Hussar 1763 1779 
Solebay 1763 1782 
Second Batch 
Greyhound 1775 1781 
Triton 1773 1796 
Boreas 1774 1802 
Table 1 Mermaid-class vessels and their service years. 
 
 Triton and Boreas were scrapped in 1796 and 1802, respectively. Mermaid, 
Hussar, Greyhound, and Solebay, were lost at sea. Hussar has the distinction of 
wrecking in the waters of Hell Gate, traversing between Manhattan Island and Long 
Island, New York. This area had been known as a navigation hazard for dangerously low 
rocks and the confluence of the East River currents around Wards Island, which made 
navigation by sail precipitous. Since Hussar’s sinking, treasure hunters have sought the 
wreck, driven by popular folklore claiming millions of dollars in gold aboard. This is 
likely legend more than fact, and the area has since been heavily modified the U.S. 
Army Corps of Engineers to improve safe navigation. Admiral Horatio Nelson 
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commanded Solebay’s sister ship, Boreas in 1784. In this duty, he grew as an officer as 
he enforced the Navigation Acts in the West Indies near Antigua. It was during this 
assignment that Nelson spent eight months on Nevis, where he met his wife, Frances 
“Fanny” Nisbet. Of all these ships, Solebay had the longest life, and saw the greatest 
amount of wartime service. 
The prototype, Mermaid, was ordered on 24 April 1760 and commissioned in 
April 1761.2 Orders for Hussar and Solebay followed on 30 January 1762. Thomas 
Airey & Company built Solebay in Newcastle beginning on 10 May 1762 with the 
laying of her keel. Her keel length was 102-feet 8 1/2-inches, with a 33-foot 8-inch 
beam, 11-foot 0-inch hold. On the gun deck it measured 124-feet 0-inches. It was named 
on 30 April 1763, as the fourth “Solebay” in the line, after the Battle of Solebay on 7 
June 1672 during the Third Anglo-Dutch War. It was partially fitted at Newcastle, 
including sails, rigging, ballasting, after launching on 9 September 1763 at 619 72/94 bm 
(tons burden, builder’s measurement).3 While being outfitted, on 1 December 1763, her 
career almost ended before it even began. There was a major storm around Newcastle 
during which Solebay and twenty other vessels broke their moorings and drifted free 
before being safely secured in the harbor.4 
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Solebay completed fitting and commissioning for Channel service at Sheerness 
between 2 January and 15 March 1764.5 For this duty, it was stationed in Cork, Ireland, 
starting in 1765 until 1772, and rotated four captains during this period. Her captains 
included William Hay6 (1763-1766), James Bremer7 (1767), Lucius O’Brien8 (1767-
1770), and George Vandeput9 (1770-1772). From 1772 to 1775, Solebay was put in 
ordinary for general refitting and repairing some decay that had begun after a decade of 
service life.10 It needed repairs to the hull, and replacement of masts, yards, rigging, and 
stores.11 Solebay reentered service for the start of the American Revolutionary War. For 
a brief period from June to August 1775, before Symonds took command, Henry Bellew 
captained Solebay upon its return to duty.12 
As sixth rate, 28-gun frigates that combined a balance of speed and firepower, 
Slade designed all the Mermaid-class vessels with twenty-four 9-pounder guns as their 
                                                
5. Winfield, British Warships, 231-232; ADM 354/172/205 ‘Philip Stephens. 
Proposal that the Solebay is ordered to Sheerness to be fitted for the Channel service,’ 
Navy Board Bound Out-Letters, 19 August 1763 (National Archives, UK). 
6. Winfield, British Warships, 231-232; Hay, William, ADM 36/7498, Solebay 
Muster 25 August 1763 - 30 December 1766 (National Archives, UK). 
 
7. ADM 106 Navy Board: Records (National Archives, UK). 
8. Ibid. 
9. Ibid. 
10. ADM 354/186/261 Survey of the Solebay by the Plymouth Officers, 28 July 
1772 (National Archives, UK). 
11. ADM 180/8 f304 Progress and Dimension Book (National Archives, UK). 
12. Winfield, British Warships, 231-232. 
  109 
main broadside weapons, fired from the upper deck. On the quarterdeck the frigates 
carried four 3-pounder guns initially, later upgraded to 6 or 18-pounder carronades as 
they became available, with the later addition of two 18-pounder carronades on the 
forecastle. After the pivotal Second Battle of the Capes, Solebay docked in Charlestown 
for a refit. While taking on ballast, bread, butter, cheese, beer, and water, Captain 
Everitt, along with Captain Montagu of Juno, had requested additional guns to increase 
their ships' firepower.13 Up to this point, Solebay's primary guns consisted of twenty-four 
9-pounders and four 6-pounders.14 As originally built, Solebay had twenty-four 9-
pounders and four 3-pounders. By 1780 the 3-pounders had been upgraded to 6-
pounders. The addition of another four 6-pounders or even carronades represents an 
escalation demonstrating both changes in available technology, but also changes in 
practice. Naval captains simply wanted and needed more firepower to outgun their 
enemies. By 1793, 28-gun frigates, with their 9-pound guns, were being outgunned and 
no more were introduced.15 Frigates continued to exist, but with more numbers of guns, 
in larger calibers, and with carronades. Despite the evolving naval rates, frigates like 
Solebay, with an unarmed lower deck, did have advantages over ships with multiple gun 
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decks. Frigates could heel into heavy seas with a lot of sail, performing well where ships 
with multiple gun decks would have to ease back. 
Carronades represented new weaponry for the period with many advantages: 
shorter, lighter, reduced windage, and very potent. Founded in 1759, the Carron Iron 
Company had a bit of ironic failure that led them to become the largest European iron 
works by 1814. In 1773, the Board of Ordnance forbid the company from casting long 
guns after too many had burst during the proofing, or initial test firing. The Royal Navy 
could not trust their product. This prohibition, which lasted until 1795, forced Carron to 
shift its efforts toward producing short, stubby guns that famously became known by the 
portmanteau “carronade.” While their calibers ranged from 6 to 68-pounders, the same 
as conventional long guns, their overall sizes mattered more. They could be operated 
more easily by crews of 2-3 men, three times less than a typical long gun, and took less 
deck space for their smaller dimensions. These characteristics appealed to merchant 
ships with small crews that purchased them as defensive weapons. Further, their lighter 
weight and smaller footprint meant more available space for cargo. Moving more goods, 
more efficiently, meant more profit – their raison d’étre. 
In comparison to merchantmen focused on defense, naval warfare was much 
more complex and naval fleets had different requirements. In the eighteenth-century 
naval warfare had evolved and the need for long-range guns changed. In the preceding 
centuries, naval battles throughout history were fought as mêlées, where vessels closed 
range and battled by sending marines to fight on an enemy ship. When gunpowder and 
cannon were introduced in the Age of Sail, fleets attempted to win battles by blasting an 
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enemy ship into submission, or at least attempted to gain a destructive advantage before 
sending marines to capture the ship. Long guns were ideal for such battles initially, but 
near engagements inevitably resulted as ships closed their distances to better target and 
capture ships. Close-ranged tactics persisted. Since range mattered less than the amount 
of firepower delivered, navies adopted carronades on both small and large vessels. 
Despite their short length that reduced a projectile’s range, carronades advantages 
became apparent in ship-to-ship tactics. These engagements depended on rates of fire 
more than distance. On frigates like Solebay, adding carronades could greatly increase 
the ship’s firepower for less weight than long guns, without increasing crew sizes, or 
upsetting the structural integrity of the vessel. These worked initially well on 
quarterdecks, to replace the lighter long guns. 
In July 1779, the first carronade establishment officially began arming Royal 
Naval vessels with carronades.16 The Navy started adding carronades to quarterdecks, 
forecastles, and poops as captains requested. Within three years, 167 ships had adopted 
the new weapons, reflecting a swift change of technology throughout the fleet.17 When 
carronades proved unavailable in port, Everitt requested four additional six-pounders for 
the quarterdeck.18 In a discussion regarding the original armaments of USS Constitution, 
John Jennings notes the "great latitude" afforded to officers in deciding the sizes, 
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numbers, and types of guns. These reflected a combination of securing guns from 
available options, and choosing guns that would most meet the commanding officer's 
fighting theories.19 
A response from the Navy Board to the fleet captains by means of the Admiralty, 
addressing Secretary Philip Stephens, dated 12 October 1780, denied the approval of 
long guns. In the letter, the Board authors, instead recommended carronades and 
commented on the general positive reports from other officers fielding carronades.20 
When the Navy Board denied Everitt's request for additional long guns in October 1780, 
it did not dismiss his intention. Instead, it acknowledged the need for additional 
firepower by recommending carronades. The Board based its decision on the fact that 
the combination of size and firepower meant carronades would not interfere with 
rigging, take any significant additional space, weaken the ship's frames, or require 
anything additional crew.21 The bureaucratic irony must have frustrated Everitt and his 
crew. An ocean away from home, in a theater of war with limited resources, he 
requested long guns to replace carronades that he could not procure, and got a response 
that denied him long guns, while telling him to obtain carronades. 
In addition to carronades, another new technological innovation made its way to 
Solebay: that of coppering ship hulls. This process involved covering a vessel’s hull 
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below the water line in copper sheathing, with cupreous-alloyed tacks, to prevent the 
destruction of ship timbers from wood-boring teredo worms, and slower performance 
from biofouling. The Royal Navy began experimenting with coppering hulls in the 
1760s. This research accelerated with the start of the American Revolution, and the navy 
soon learned how to mitigate the galvanic relationship effect between the copper 
sheathing used to protect the hull, and its corrosive effect on the iron fasteners holding 
the hull together. By 1778, the navy solved these problems and began a program for 
sheathing their fleet in May 1779, starting with vessels of 32 guns or less.22 The navy 
soon extended this effort to 44-gun warships, then cutters, then 74s, then the whole fleet. 
They recognized the performance differences between coppered and uncovered vessels, 
and the ability of a fleet to sail only as well and as fast as the slowest vessel. Copper 
sheathing made British warships faster and more maneuverable, affording them an 
opportunity to counter the French advantages in superior numbers of vessels.23 Copper-
hulled ships proved decisive at the 1780 Battle of Cape St. Vincent in which British 
ships successfully ran down fleeing Spanish vessels to secure a victory. 
In Solebay’s 1775 refit, it received wooden sheathing for the first time in its 
career, in an effort to protect the hull.24 From its launching in 1763 to it being laid in 
ordinary in 1772, Solebay had a ship’s lifetime of bioturbation on its hull that required 
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repairs. The initial wood sheathing created a sacrificial layer, an attempt to protract the 
hull by hindering the effects from shipworms. By 1780, this protective wooden 
sheathing had become badly eaten by worms.25 Wood sheathing was a temporary fix. 
Based on historical experiences, it lasted between eighteen months and seven years, 
depending on the environment a vessel sailed.26 Teredo worms thrived in warm waters, 
such as those of the Caribbean, and ships operating in these areas for extended periods 
needed much sooner attention. Solebay, operating mostly in the colder climates around 
England and the northern American colonies, benefited with a longer life from its 
wooden sheathing. In its refitting at Plymouth, between February and November 1780, 
Solebay received copper sheathing for the first time.27 The wood sheathing was 
completely removed at the graving dock, and replaced with copper. 
By 1900, the relatively small island nation of England had become the metropole 
of a global empire through control of overseas colonies. This vast maritime network 
survived through seaborne commerce, defended by a flexible and strong navy. This 
phenomenon did not happen overnight, but rather through centuries of growth. Solebay’s 
history and the Battle of Frigate Bay capture the nascent rise of the First British Empire, 
examining the tools and conflicts that made it possible. Further, it does so by study of a 
lesser-known vessel operating in a lesser-known battle on along a lesser-known seacoast, 
such as that of Nevis, a bottom-up approach. 
                                                
25. Plymouth Dockyard, 14 March 1780. 
26. Lavery, Arming and Fitting of English Ships of War, 60. 
27. ADM 180/8. 
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The archaeological remains, archival evidence, and site location currently 
support the site as HMS Solebay based on a best fit of evidence. Since Solebay grounded 
and scuttled without any loss of life, this site should not be considered a war grave, but it 
still warrants documentation for historical significance. Additionally, the artifacts that 
have survived offer clues not only to Solebay’s life, but may suggest adaptive human 
behavior during wartime. The materials consist of copper (brass) and lead artifacts. 
These include items such as a trigger guard for a sea service musket, musket balls, 
coaks, chain, and copper keel staples. Therefore, site interpretations may be based on 
relating four primary sources: the court-martial transcripts, the 1808 Arrowsmith chart, 
the sailing performance records, and a few key artifacts, including the site identification 
of six shipboard cannon, or guns in naval parlance. 
Historical archaeology benefits from the trove of written records to better 
understand not just the material culture associated with a particular site, but the historical 
context of the site itself. Moreover, documents need to be considered as part of the 
complete material cultural record. Shipwrecks lost in naval battles may be considered 
catastrophic sites, sinking in a few hours, sometimes in a few minutes. The rapid 
deposition fosters a greater opportunity to materially record a single event, as opposed to 
a site that may form over years of occupation and deposition, such as midden deposits. 
By exploring documents produced because of a single event, archaeologists can both 
plan excavations and interpret findings with a richer context. The site of HMS Solebay 
provides an example of written historical accounts complementing the archaeological 
study of a naval shipwreck. 
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Although Solebay sank as a casualty of war, the British nevertheless required an 
official investigation and account by the captain responsible. Whenever Royal Naval 
ships were lost, a court-martial convened to document the incident and officially 
conclude justifications. Captains may have performed exceptionally well despite losing 
to the effects of inclement weather or combat. On 21 February 1782, less than a month 
after Solebay ran aground, Rear-Admiral Samuel Drake presided over a court-martial 
aboard HMS Princessa, at St. John's Road, Antigua.28 The purpose was to question the 
line of evidence surrounding Solebay’s loss and judge the captain's decisions. This 
record survives in the official minutes of the court-martial and reveals clues to the loss. 
The transcription begins with a record of officers present. The next paragraph 
introduces the loss with a general description that includes action, date, and location. In 
this section Solebay’s position in the fleet is described as a “Repeater” (to pass signals 
from the flagship to the rest of the fleet). The next paragraph acquits the captain of any 
wrongdoings and acknowledges his honorable service. This is followed by a series of 
signatures. A transcriber can note the different penmanship styles. This section clearly 
distinguishes between individual signatures compared to the list of officers in the 
previous section, all written by the same person. 
Generally, the court-martial questions focused around probing for any sign of 
poor leadership or judgment during the final actions of Solebay’s crew. The officers 
testified that every man did his job honorably, that they worked to do their best under the 
circumstances. Captain Everitt testified that no man was aware of the danger of 
                                                
28. Solebay/Everitt Court-martial. 
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grounding. Solebay sailed on station, exactly as ordered, but unfortunately hit shallow 
water and grounded. Furthermore, the officers and crew attempted to free Solebay, and 
only set it on fire as a last resort. The British feared leaving the ship to fall into French 
control as a war prize. The fire and subsequent explosion served to destroy Solebay 
where it remains as a battle wreck on the seafloor. 
Despite a violently destructive end, archaeology has demonstrated that 
significant archaeological materials remain after such processes. While the original 
structure of an object such as a vessel may completely disarticulate in an explosion, and 
disintegration from burning destroys organics such as wood, rope, and leather, there may 
still exist timbers below the waterline and shipboard metals that would be scattered 
across a seafloor. Even for Solebay, one would expect to find such artifacts shortly after 
the wrecking event. However, specific site conditions may provide other clues as to the 
fate of the wreck. The hard, volcanic substrate in Solebay’s particular location likely 
limited any timbers becoming buried and protected in a sandy depositional process. Two 
centuries in warm Caribbean waters suggest ample opportunity for teredo worms to 
destroy most ship timbers. Further, seasonal storms and hurricanes, along with daily 
ocean surge and currents, likely accelerated erosion. In this context, the environment has 
continued to degrade and scatter both the organic and metal remains. 
In addition to natural oceanic and biological factors, human interaction likely 
transformed site. The 1808 Arrowsmith chart marks “Solabay” with surprising accuracy 
to the site in question as that of Solebay. This fostered its 2010 discovery and suggests a 
few possibilities that become important in understanding site formation processes and 
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site interpretation. The wreck may simply have been marked for its historic significance, 
nothing more than a symbolic notation reflecting social memory of a then recent event. 
Given the accuracy of the position, another alternative may be implied, that the site was 
well known. If it was a navigation warning to sailors, this suggests that the wreckage 
existed in a significant form for at least a quarter-century after the battle, preserved well-
enough to warrant its documentation. With enough remaining material, and a known 
location only 500 yards offshore, opportunistic salvors could have recovered cannon, 
lead ballast, and other valuable metals for recycling. Environmental degradation, human 
salvaging, or a combination of both must be considered. What ultimately became of the 
remaining guns, with only six located form a 28-gun warship, remains a mystery. 
Though, additional materials may be found in future research surveys. 
The Arrowsmith chart includes bearings to key geographically distinguishable 
features for mariner navigation, and latitude and longitude coordinates. As will be 
discussed in Chapter 5, this chart has been scanned into a high-resolution digital format 
and imported into a Graphical Information System (GIS) software package. This allows 
a test of the cartographic accuracy, comparing historic coastlines, towns, and other key 
features against a modern georeferenced map layer. The Arrowsmith map marks historic 
forts, towns, and anchorages. It also includes soundings in close proximity to the word 
“Solabay,” and these may be contrasted to modern bathymetric charts and layered 
against remote sensing data, as well as compared to the recorded vessel draft for analysis 
of the wrecked location. 
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A document from 1772, “Observations of the Qualities of His Majesty’s Ship the 
Solebay,” provides performance characteristics.29 This documents is a half-typed, 
preprinted form on the left side, with hand-written notes on the right side. This proves 
useful for a number of reasons. A duplicate form was recorded again for the same 
purposes in 1780, during its refitting at Plymouth.30 The existence of a preprinted form 
suggests many more of these may exist for other Royal Naval vessels of the period. This 
encourages a search for other vessels’ characteristics and allows for somewhat consistent 
qualitative comparisons.  
Specifically regarding Solebay, it served for two decades, having being designed 
in 1760 and launched in 1763. The 1772 observations exist from the middle of its life, 
after almost a decade of sea service. By this period, Solebay would have been well tested 
and this record likely represents typical characteristics during its life. Overall, the crew 
would likely have solved repairs and adjustments to rigging, mast positions, hull repairs, 
or other modifications to achieve the maximum desired performance. Wood and copper 
sheathing represent a significant modification not accounted for in the performance 
characteristics. Copper did not become widely used until the end of the decade, about 
eight years after this record. 
The sailing qualities offer insight into the grounding and archaeological 
interpretation. Solebay's draft of fifteen feet in 1772 and sixteen feet when recorded 
                                                
29. Geo Vandeput and Wm Burians, ADM 95/32/36 Ships' Sailing Qualities, 22 
August 1772 (National Archives, UK). 
30. Thomas Symonds, ADM 95/32/30 Ships' Sailing Qualities, 2 March 1780 
(National Archives UK). 
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again in 1780, more contemporary to the 1782 battle, supports the field research that 
recorded the wreck's debris in depths mostly between fifteen to twenty feet.31 By 
reviewing seafloor bathymetry, rising contours, accounting for small tidal changes, an 
archaeologist can use the draft as an approximate depth benchmark from which to search 
for the vessel. Inversely, artifacts found from a survey in the approximate depth and 
location may allow an inference to identifying the material as having come from 
Solebay. This suggests that Solebay may have grounded in the shallower depths toward 
shore, and then drifted in the subsequent burning and explosion to slightly deeper seas. It 
is possible that more artifacts, including guns, may be discovered there in a future 
survey. However, it appears that the debris field has been largely delineated, and key 
artifacts warrant discussion.  
 
 
  
Figure 8 Sea Service Musket examples showing trigger guard details.32 
                                                
31. Vandeput and Burians, Ships' Sailing Qualities; Symonds, Ships' Sailing 
Qualities. 
32. Top image, Howard L. Blackmore, British Military Firearms, 1650-1850 
(New York: Arco Publishing Co., 1961), 100; bottom left image, Anthony D. Darling, 
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For about a century, from the 1730s through the end of the Napoleonic wars, 
British infantry carried a smoothbore musket, popularly known today as Brown Bess. 
While the etymology of the name has been lost, the term serves discussions of a weapon 
that changed little during this period through minor technical design modifications. This 
musket type standardized ordnance for British soldiers. Shipboard marines carried the 
same fundamental musket for their primary weapon, only in a sea service variant (Figure 
8). In total, four major types existed: the Long Land pattern, the Short Land pattern, the 
India pattern, and the Sea Service version. 
 
 
Figure 9 Artifact no. 10, trigger guard. Scale in centimeters. (Photograph by the 
author) 
 
As mentioned, there existed slight variations of all these patterns that evolved 
over time, but key characteristics remained largely consistent and allow for pattern 
                                                                                                                                           
Red Coat and Brown Bess, Historical Arms Series (Alexandria Bay, N.Y.: Museum 
Restoration Service, 1993), 28; bottom right image, De Witt Bailey, Pattern Dates for 
British Ordnance Small Arms, 1718-1783 (Gettysburg, Pa.: Thomas Publications, 1997), 
73. 
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typing. Musket metal locks, sideplates, and trigger guards exhibit distinct attributes. 
Once the specific firearm is identified, this can contribute to a better site identification. 
A brass trigger guard has been identified amongst the artifacts recovered, metal artifact 
number 10 (Figure 9). Upon accepting this analysis, it immediately informs on the 
function, and can by typed for a date of production, and nation of origin. The function is 
self-explanatory, as a trigger guard to a shoulder fired, gunpowder musket. More 
specifically, it distinguishes itself as having come from a British Sea Service Musket, as 
opposed to the Long, Short, or India patterns of the Brown Bess musket series. This 
artifact suggests a terminus post quem to the middle of the eighteenth century, and fits 
well with Solebay’s service period 1763-1782. 
 
  
Figure 10 Artifact no. 15 coak with Broad Arrow in upper left corner, second 
image close-up, and third image illustration of Broad Arrow observed in second image. 
Scale in centimeters. (Photographs and illustration by the author) 
 
Despite not having an entire musket, a single component of a musket proves very 
useful. The trigger guard provides cultural origin and date supporting the wreck as 
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Solebay. However, relying on one artifact can produce a false ruling theory. Examining 
associated artifacts can support or refute the interpretation greatly. In this case, three 
other copper-alloy artifacts offer direct support: artifacts numbers 15, 34, and 2. Artifact 
number 15 appears as a coak to a block (Figure 10). The striking observable attribute of 
concern is a Broad Arrow stamped onto a corner. 
 
 
Figure 11 Artifact no. 34 with four, clearly visible Broad Arrows, two on each 
side highlighted by the author in white. Scale in centimeters. (Photographs by the author) 
 
Artifact number 34 has yet to be identified (Figure 11). Initial observations by 
divers considered its purpose as a chain roller, perhaps off a modern yacht’s bowsprit to 
assist in lowering an anchor. No distinguishable attributes could be seen at first. After 
conservation, the function has yet to be answered, but this artifact has proven highly 
informative in another way. There are two Broad Arrows stamped onto both flat sides, 
for a total of four on this one artifact. 
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Artifact number 2 has yet to be identified (Figure 12). It at first appeared similar 
to a bent keel staple. Close examination reveals a Broad Arrow on the apex of the 
exterior bend. 
 
 
Figure 12 Artifact no. 2 showing a clearly visible Broad Arrow, highlighted in 
white in third image. Scale in centimeters. (Photographs by the author) 
 
Each of these four completely different artifacts--a trigger guard, a coak, an 
unidentified roller and copper fastener suggests a British origin. Artifacts 10 and 15 both 
support a shipboard function. The coak once fitted into a block would have served the 
rigging of vessel. The trigger guard from not just a musket, but specifically a Sea Service 
Brown Bess, connects the site to a British Royal Marine. The roller artifact, while 
puzzling and requiring further study, offers credence to British origin through the four 
Broad Arrows. Taken individually, any one of these artifacts is not particularly unique. 
Together, they support the discovered wreckage identity as the lost warship Solebay’s 
final resting place. Like in all good archaeology, the artifacts themselves may be either 
interesting or not, but the stories they tell together prove to be the ultimate value. 
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While the diagnostic artifacts support the identity of the wreck as Solebay, 
questions remain surrounding the guns recorded on the site (Figure 13). Providing more 
than conjecture regarding the guns would require full recovery and documentation, after 
de-concreting them in a conservation process. Such an effort could reveal details on 
precise dimensions and maker’s marks. These clues could provide an ability to date and 
track the guns through the historic records, determining their procurement for Solebay. 
While this may be possible in a future field season with better funding and resources, 
currently it is still worth hypothesizing in regard to the related historical, anthropological 
implications. 
 
 
Figure 13 Scientific Diver recording a long gun on Solebay. (Photograph by the 
author) 
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Influential scholars such as Lewis Binford in the 1960s built upon their 
predecessors work to usher in the spirit of New Archaeology.33 This approach developed 
further in the 1970s, as seminally applied in historical archaeology by James Deetz.34 
Thousands of scholars have built upon the notion that archaeology’s ultimate goal is to 
explain laws of cultural processes, recognize patterns, and explain phenomena. The Post-
Processual approaches have stretched interpretations to extreme limits of subjective 
possibilities. Regardless of theoretical paradigms, all sites deserve a fair analysis to tease 
out the data and shed light on any new understandings. Recognizing broader historical 
processes creates context for understanding the particular, archaeological, micro 
perspective from site artifacts, which can then be extrapolated back to a macro historical 
explanation. 
On the Solebay site, a total of four long guns and two carronades have been 
identified. After accounting for concretions, all appear to have characteristics that fit 
within specifications for a sixth-rate, 28-gun, British frigate, specifically the Mermaid 
Class 1760.35 The long guns fit within acceptable dimensions for historic long guns, 7 to 
9 feet for 9-pounder guns. The long guns all measured 8.2 feet. The two carronades are 
each of a different type (Figure 14). 
 
                                                
33. Lewis R. Binford, "Archaeology As Anthropology," American Antiquity 28, 
no. 2 (1962): 217-225. 
34. James Deetz, In Small Things Forgotten: An Archaeology of Early American 
Life (Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor Press / Doubleday, 1977). 
35. Lyon, The Sailing Navy, 86. 
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Figure 14 Carronades: Gun F on left with trunnions; Gun C on right with lug and 
lacking trunnions. (Photographs by the author) 
 
Gun C, as observed through the concretions, has typical fat body of carronades, 
possibly an encrusted lug and elevation screw, with smooth exterior sides and lacking 
trunnions. The second carronade, Gun F, appears more as a gunnade with a cascabel and 
trunnions. Although this is likely an early carronade, since gunnades did not come into 
use until the nineteenth century, early carronades had trunnions. This could be a very 
early example. Quite possibly, however, this is a different type of gun, and may even 
belong to another shipwreck. It could perhaps be a perrier or possibly howitzer, for 
example. Although its lines appear to resemble a carronade, it is difficult to determine its 
type without further study and excavation. While no other guns have been found, the 
ones that exist do more than identify the site. The carronades pose questions as to their 
origin. Trying to answer how they may have arrived on the site poses interesting 
questions that may only be answered with their recovery, but are worth asking 
nevertheless. 
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Explaining how the guns may have arrived on site requires understanding how 
Captain Everitt may have acquired the guns, recalling that in 1780 he requested more 
long guns, and was denied by the Navy Board, who told him to obtain carronades. 
During the Age of Sail, armaments flowed through the colonies and were sold to both 
naval and merchant vessels alike. Everitt may have obtained the carronades from private 
vessels, rather than through an official naval supply chain. This would have been 
possible considering that merchantmen required guns to protect themselves from pirates 
and formal enemies. Therefore, guns were available throughout the British colonies, 
including those in the Caribbean. 
Initially, the procurement of guns and personal weapons by private owners was 
possible through legislation and regulations, or a lack of it. The state did not prohibit 
merchant ships from buying guns. Arms dealers that sold to navies also sold guns to 
merchant ship owners without distinction. Chandlers served as ordnance intermediaries 
between the manufacturer and ship, like with any other ship supply. In England, 
competition for munitions between commercial and military contracts became a greater 
concern during wartime by a state that wanted to insure adequate arms supplies.  
While merchant sea captains regularly endeavored to run from other sailing 
vessels, fighting was often an inevitable experience. Antipersonnel weapons included 
muskets, pikes, and other metal probing or cutting weapons. Large ships, like those of 
the East India Companies, carried dozens of guns. The English and Dutch East India 
Companies, for example, operated large vessels with dozens of guns for defense. 
Archaeological research has suggested that a 1727 Dutch Indiaman ship, Aagtekerke, 
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carried thirty-six main guns and an unknown number of swivel guns. This quantity of 
armament appears typical for an Indiaman of the period. Smaller vessels used smaller 
guns that were more easily managed by smaller crews. When Captain Everitt could not 
receive the carronades he had sought through official naval supply chains, it is possible 
that he received them from a private merchant. If the site is indeed Solebay, an 
explanation of how the carronades came to be is warranted, and revealing of adaptive 
wartime behavior. 
In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, before diplomatic agreements and 
later laws limited armed merchantmen, buying guns from a foundry may have been as 
simple as obtaining sundries from a chandlery. In the late 1700s the Carron Company 
produced a booklet promoting their famous carronades and the importance of armed 
vessels for national defense.36 Their business was booming as the American Revolution 
exploded on the seas. By the company’s own count they had produced fourteen-thousand 
guns between 1775 and 1779.37 
This booklet discusses means for defending vessels with boarding nets, using one 
gun caliber to limit confusion in battle, recommends shot types for merchant ships, and 
ultimately promotes its carronade gun.38 It was a reasonable appeal; a carronade 
provided equivalent firepower to a standard gun with less weight — preferable for 
                                                
36. An Attempt to Improve the Method of Arming Trading Vessels. With a 
Description of the Carronade, and Some Hints Concerning Shot (Falkirk, UK, 1779), 6. 
37. Ibid., 7. 
38. Ibid., 9-10, 23-24. 
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merchant vessels not built as strong as dedicated warships.39 Fewer sailors could operate 
a carronade — as few as two men for a 12-pounder, and three men for 18 and 24-
pounders.40 The booklet contends that mercantile gentlemen desired the carronades for 
the security of their commerce.41 With a bit of imagination, one could almost envision an 
equivalent television advertisement for a new automobile. 
From reading this booklet it becomes clear that in 1779 private vessels could 
purchase large guns and were encouraged to do so. After manufacture and before selling 
a gun, carronades were test fired to ensure quality. This was called a “proof test.” Guns 
that passed testing would then be marked with a stamp impressed into the metal. These 
stamps are unique numbers. When guns are recovered from archaeological sites, the 
numbers can be traced in the archival record to historically track provenance. Should 
Solebay’s guns be recovered in a future archaeological project, these proof marks may 
aid in understanding this history. 
The booklet’s appendix includes examples of proof records as a way to show 
their appeal to a broad range of customers for further marketing purposes. These buyers 
include a Spanish 74-gun ship, the British Ordnance Board, and several private 
gentlemen. It appears that the company served the Royal Navy and private merchants 
with equal care and quality of service.42 Specifically purchasing and outfitting a 
                                                
39. Ibid., 10. 
40. Ibid., 18. 
41. Ibid., 13. 
42. Ibid., 27-32. 
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merchant vessel with a gun directly from a foundry might prove difficult and expensive. 
A more common method may have been buying used guns from another vessel directly, 
or through an auction in a seaport. In 1747, an advertisement in the Pennsylvania 
Gazette announced the pending auction of the privateer Marlborough.43 The owners 
separated the vessel, and the vessel’s guns, small arms, and gunpowder into separate 
sales. Historical local laws may have limited eligibility to purchase such arms. 
Otherwise, one might assume that a “going out of business” liquidation of this type 
allowed any merchant owner with enough capital to buy the guns and arm their own 
vessel. For Captain Everitt, Carron’s guns were becoming available in significant 
numbers, and could have been obtained from a private vessel. More research would be 
needed to accurately quantify the number of guns available to Everitt during the height 
of the American Revolution. However, he may have had great opportunity with access to 
purchasing directly from merchant vessels or chandlers that both bought and sold guns. 
By July 1782, six months after the loss of Solebay, Secretary of the Admiralty 
Stephens had a record prepared of all ships armed with carronades.44 All rates were well 
represented, from the 100-gun Victory, to sloops, cutters, and even a hospital ship. This 
record lists eleven vessels in the middle ratings, at 28-guns. Solebay is not included in 
this list of eleven vessels. Though, it should be noted, the 36-gun Juno, whose captain 
                                                
43. Carl E. Swanson, Predators and Prizes: American Privateering and Imperial 
Warfare, 1739-1748 (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1991), 133. 
44. "Navy Office, 22nd July 1782. A List of All the Ships and Vessels Which 
Have Been Supplied with Carronades, Prepared Pursuant to An Orderd From the Rt Hon 
Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, Signified by Mr Stephens Letter of the 16th 
Inst.," in Lavery, Arming and Fitting of English Ships of War, 275-276. 
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had requested carronades with Captain Everitt in October 1780, did receive two 18-
pound carronades. This appears typical in the range with almost all vessels, including 
Victory, having from two to six carronades in each of the quarterdeck, forecastle, 
roundhouse, and/or upper deck. 
 
 
 Table 2 Vessels supplied with carronades as of 22 July 1782. 
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This transition period of ships procuring carronades includes some vessels that 
received significant numbers. Notable examples include Rainbow with 44 carronades, 
Swan with 18 carronades, and more heavily armed transports with carronades as well, 
such as an armed storeship, fireships, and cutters; plus the ordered 28 carronades for the 
74 Egmont, and 32 carronades for the 32 Proselyte. For the remaining line ships, 
carronades were added as augmented firepower with the long guns still functioning as a 
primary battery. 
As of October 1780, Solebay lacked carronades. If the site in question is indeed 
Solebay’s, then the archaeological record suggests that carronades were acquired 
between October 1780 and the ship’s loss on 25 January 1782, a period of less than 
sixteen months. In the three years after the first carronade establishment of 1779, 
carronade use within the Royal Navy had spread rapidly. In this period they were not yet 
the primary weapons, but becoming widely adopted. That Juno received two guns may 
suggest that Solebay did as well. Though this is merely conjecture, it reflects a strong 
possibility, but is not in the official records. 
The artifacts recovered fit within acceptable material culture for the site to be 
HMS Solebay. Further, the map and historic sail performance documents support the 
location in conjunction with Everitt’s court-martial record. Solebay’s design and 
construction came at the beginning of Slade’s contributions to Royal Naval vessel 
designs. Its service during the American Revolution allowed it to be upgraded with a 
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copper hull and likely carronades. The naval history and archaeological study of Solebay 
highlight this period well, and it serves as an example for nautical archaeology in Nevis. 
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CHAPTER VI 
MARITIME HERITAGE PRESERVATION IN NEVIS 
 
As discussed in Chapter 1, this research began with a desire to inventory 
maritime archaeological resources off Nevis. To protect known shipwrecks and identify 
specific ones for further investigation, the first step must be to assess what exists. 
Remote sensing surveys combined with diver verification of locally known or suspected 
sites served as the standard archaeological process for beginning an investigation in a 
new area. Solebay’s discovery shifted attention, energy, and resources to its study, 
delaying the survey and inventory of other possible shipwreck sites. Nevertheless, the 
Solebay shipwreck site has proven to be a good example for addressing heritage 
management questions and policy. 
In preparation for a remote sensing survey, an early question asked was, “in 
anticipation of finding undocumented shipwrecks around Nevis, what legislation exists 
that would protect such finds from immediate looting or decimation by treasure 
hunters?” An ethically professional research proposal must consider the physical 
security of the resources. If artifacts are excavated, then this includes their immediate 
conservation, along with long-term preservation financing and planning. Materials not 
recovered require a plan for proper site protection. Such a plan may be nothing more 
than allowing only official government stewards to disclose site coordinates to vetted 
researchers. As an alternative, the steward may work with a local dive shop to create a 
recreational dive permit, or an access plan to the public and the tourist community. 
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For the archaeologist preparing a research plan, this includes following existing 
permits and policy. If none exist to protect underwater archaeological resources, as none 
exist in the Federation of St. Kitts and Nevis, an archaeologist’s ethics recommend the 
establishment of such regulations to the government. Professional guidance accelerates 
site protection, rather then expecting a country to learn this through its own mistakes. 
Decades of experience and lessons-learned from archaeologists working in other 
countries can help. Recreational looting and treasure hunting have been a problem 
throughout the world, with national and international legislation built after decades of 
court battles. These regulations must consider local cultural practices, the availability of 
realistic means, and whether the political will to implement such measures exists. 
While shipwrecks remain a vital physical connection to our past, protecting them 
is difficult, although not impossible. When trying to craft a maritime heritage 
preservation plan for Nevis, the obstacles that must be overcome, in terms of limited 
financial resources, a lack of local training, and reluctant political will to act, quickly 
become apparent. There will never be one final plan, but a dynamic process that evolves 
over time. As a foreign advisor, it is more important to foster a mindset toward 
responsible management; that is, how to think, not what to think. One of the primary 
reasons for preserving historic colonial buildings may be to make them usable by 
modern society, perhaps as apartment homes, business or government offices, cultural 
centers, or even shops. This provides an innate, practical incentive. It is an unfortunate 
truth that ships can almost never be reused in the same manner. Their value lies 
elsewhere. They may be used as tourist sites, aiding an economy, lending memories to a 
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landscape, serving as education tools for what they can teach us about our past. These 
are their main uses. 
In Nevis ruined sugar plantations in the rainforest are regularly robbed of cut 
stones, which are then sold for new, modern construction. This may be seen as “dead 
white man’s history” — garbage left behind that should rightly be reused by the new 
landlords, largely descendants of black African slaves. Convincing them to give concern 
for a lost British warship, which they cannot even see on a daily basis, compounds the 
indifferent attitudes that must be overcome. One advantage with a shipwreck may be an 
adventurous perception associated with exploring and diving on a sunken wreck. 
Enthusiasm with the archaeological process itself may be enough to attract positive 
attention that can then be directed toward preserving the sites. 
Exploring Solebay contributes to materially connecting Nevisians with their 
seafaring past. Publications, lectures, and the exhibiting materials in museums on both 
Saint Kitts and Nevis creates educational opportunities, not just on history, but also as 
themes of archaeology and site protection. The rewards for successful outreach may 
encourage historical appreciation for material patrimony and discourage an acceptance 
of cultural theft from looting or treasure salvors. This sets a precedent, a public dialogue, 
to achieve a sound maritime heritage plan. Solebay’s team cannot solve these problems. 
Durable and meaningful protective measures must be enacted by the people of St. Kitts 
and Nevis through legislation with teeth, followed by enforcement. What the Solebay 
research project can provide is a set of suggestions and examples of beneficial 
archaeological experiences that can encourage positive management action. A first 
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priority in managing sites, beyond identification and documentation of known resources, 
is ensuring adequate legislation and enforcement resources exist to protect sites.  
In December 2009, the Federation of St. Kitts and Nevis deposited their 
instrument of full ratification for the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural 
Organization (UNESCO) 2001 Convention on the Protection of the Underwater Cultural 
Heritage (UCH). This international agreement provides basic principles with cooperative 
mechanisms to support member countries in managing their underwater cultural 
resources. Key amongst the support mechanisms are the relationships of the UCH 
Convention to five other UNESCO Conventions: 1954 Convention on the Protection of 
Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, 1970 Convention on the Means of 
Prohibiting the Illicit, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property, the 1972 
Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage, and 
the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention regarding maritime zones. These five conventions 
work to encourage stable international cooperation for all stakeholders by protecting 
from chance with explicitly forbidden activities. 
More than just a legal framework, the conventions generate respect between 
member states through appreciating the cultural, national, and emotional value an artifact 
may evoke. Should an artifact be stolen from one country, member countries are 
encouraged to cooperate toward repatriating the artifact out of empathy. Following the 
conventions, it becomes difficult for unauthorized persons to sell looted artifacts in 
convention countries. Should an artifact, such as a cannon, be exported from one 
member country to another member country, the two countries will work together to 
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repatriate the artifact. The goal is both to discourage the illegal sale of artifacts, while 
mitigating problems that have occurred. 
The core principles focus on means to protection, preservation, and cooperation. 
The basic principles outlined in the Convention Annex provide ethical guidelines such as 
promoting scientific research with sound research designs, supporting public access, and 
encouraging training and publications. The Convention has generated some controversy 
among professional archaeologists. Although all support its merits, some view it as a 
possible problem to the future of archaeology, because it discourages archaeological 
excavations. It fosters a vision that argues to always prefer conservation in situ of all 
archaeological sites, and sustains that archaeologists should only excavate when 
necessary, when a really good research design has been prepared, and a substantive 
advancement in knowledge is expected from the excavation. The main idea is to save the 
sites for future generations, which may have better technologies to excavate and 
conserve archaeological materials. This is a sound argument to a degree, considering the 
destructive nature of archaeology, and the finite number of cultural sites available. 
However, if archaeologists do not excavate, do not study new materials, and above all if 
young archaeologists do not excavate to learn these skills, then how will archaeologist 
exist other than as stewards of some mythical future time, when these subjective 
inflection points have been reached? There will always be a better time, a better future, 
with better technology… 
Added to this, a key point of contention in the Annex revolves around a dogmatic 
push towards in situ preservation as a first option, without really providing the material 
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resources for countries to execute proper protection.1 Without adequate management 
resources, or permission to excavate, wrecks may continue to be destroyed by looters 
and treasure hunters, lost naturally to environmental degradation, or lost culturally from 
trawling. It is a sound advice that archaeologists should never undertake any excavation 
without a sound research design and both finances and plans for long-term responsibility 
or stewardship of the resources. Acknowledging that argument, there still exist countless 
opportunities and resources for professional archaeological excavations. 
Furthermore, countries with established maritime heritage legislation and greater 
resources might view participation in the Convention as diminishing sovereign control, 
and unnecessary legislation, which is redundant with existing laws. The United States, 
for example, has numerous laws at both the state and federal level protecting cultural 
resources. Notable legislation includes: the 1906 Antiquities Act, the 1916 National Park 
Service (NPS), the 1935 Historic Sites Act, and include the 1960s National Historic 
Preservation Act (NHPA) and National Environmental Policy Acts, the 1974 
Archeological and Historic Preservation Act, and the 1979 Archaeological Resources 
Protection Act. 
The 1916 NPS legislation begat the NPS Submerged Resources Center in 1976, 
which manages underwater material culture in all the national parks, including such 
famous examples as the battleship BB-39 USS Arizona in Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. In 
                                                
1. Thijs Maarleveld, Ulrike Guérin, and Barbara Egger, eds., Manual for 
Activities Directed at Underwater Cultural Heritage: Guidelines to the Annex of the 
UNESCO 2001 Convention, (United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural 
Organization, 2013). 
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2006, one-hundred years after the Antiquities Act was signed into law, President George 
W. Bush used it to designate an area of around 140,000 square miles in Hawaii, as the 
Papahānaumokuākea Marine National Monument. The President chose this legal 
instrument because it allowed him to swiftly bypass the lengthy U.S. Congressional 
process required for a new NOAA sanctuary, and delineate the area for protection. The 
result was the same, the site became protected, only much sooner. The surviving tall ship 
USS Constitution, “Old Ironsides,” falls under this protection as well. 
In addition to existing legislation, in 1972 the Marine Protection, Research and 
Sanctuaries Act created the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration’s 
(NOAA) Marine Protect Areas (MPA). As of 2014, there are fourteen national 
sanctuaries tightly controlled by the federal government. However, only two sanctuaries 
have been created that protect cultural heritage specifically. The first is the USS Monitor 
National Marine Sanctuary (MNMS). This sanctuary protects the Civil War ironclad 
USS Monitor, which foundered in rough seas 16 miles off Cape Hatteras on 31 
December 1862. Rediscovered in 1973, the sanctuary was established in 1975, and is 
only one nautical mile wide. Nearly thirty years later the most recent sanctuary was 
designated as Thunder Bay National Marine Sanctuary (TBNMS) in Alpena, Michigan. 
Thunder Bay protects hundreds of nineteenth century shipwrecks of all types. 
Section 308 of the Act allows the Sanctuaries to issue regulations and determine 
what types of activities can and cannot occur in their protected waters. The sanctuaries 
use this act to create regulations that will protect their resources. According to Sections 
306, 307, and 312, the Sanctuaries also have the authority to issue severe fines to those 
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who violate the National Marine Sanctuary Act. In some cases the fine can be as much 
as $130,000 dollars per day per violation. These severe consequences are essential to 
deter unauthorized activity.  
I believe that similar measures should be legislated in Nevis to protect Solebay 
and other wrecks. In the event that another Federal Agency chooses to pursue a course of 
action that may adversely affect a sanctuary resource, the Federal Agency must consult 
the sanctuary manager first. The manager is then required to recommend alternative 
options that do not threaten sanctuary resources (Section 304d). 
Outside these limited parks and zones, vast expanses of territorial waters remain 
with jurisdictions divided between state and federal authorities. The 1980s a legal battle 
between the State of Florida and the famous treasure hunter Mel Fisher, over his 
discovery and claim to the Spanish galleon Nuestra Señora de Atocha, prompted the 
U.S. Congress to pass the 1987 Abandoned Shipwrecks Act (ASA). The U.S. Supreme 
Court favored for Mel Fisher since no laws existed to otherwise deny his claim. The 
1987 ASA legislation protects historic wrecks found within state waters automatically by 
transferring title to the respective state. Each state through their own legislative and 
enforcement process, together with the NHPA’s creation of State Historic Preservation 
Officers (SHPOs) and the Sections 106 & 110 mitigation processes, have the authority 
and responsibility to manage such wrecks. Through these numerous nuanced layers of 
state and federal laws, the United States has sophisticated legal mechanisms and 
resources to manage wrecks within American jurisdiction. 
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Though the Federation of St. Kitts and Nevis is a sovereign state, it exists as a 
Commonwealth nation under the United Kingdom, with the English monarch as the 
official head of state. Given its British history, and in this continued context, it may be 
preferable to model English heritage laws in what pertains to the protection of the 
archaeology of submerged cultural heritage. The 1974 Protection of Wrecks Act is a 
British example that explicitly protects a list of enumerated wrecks. Famous examples 
include on the list include the Cattlewater Wreck, Mary Rose, and Grace Dieu. Scientists 
or anyone seeking activity on these wrecks must first obtain a license. Similar to 
protected access in the United States, the permitting process provides a mechanism by 
which governments can monitor a site, and allow police to suspend unlicensed 
behaviors. Fines and even jail time with enough severity may act to deter criminal 
damage, such as the unauthorized removal of artifacts. 
Outside of United States or United Kingdom models, UNESCO provides a 
balanced and internationally supported approach. The move toward protecting shipwreck 
sites is positive, particularly for a country that does have well-established maritime 
heritage laws as the United States or United Kingdom. The UNESCO Convention for the 
Protection of the UCH may be viewed as superfluous or even detrimental to national 
sovereignty. However, for countries like St. Kitts and Nevis, without the laws, resources, 
or experience of many archaeologists and examples, it may be argued that this 
convention should not be viewed as an all-or-none solution, but rather for what it is—a 
step toward protecting shipwrecks and other cultural resources on an international level. 
Solebay was located in March 2010, three months after the Federation ratified the UCH. 
  144 
For proper implementation, signatory countries need to adapt national laws that have 
serious consequences to deter unauthorized destruction and follow through with 
prosecution when necessary and possible. Countries such as St. Kitts and Nevis are 
encouraged to join such conventions to aid in filling a void with existing legislation. 
Their same lack of experience with such matters may benefit from assistance in drafting 
legislation. 
On 25–27 June 2013, UNESCO held a three-day workshop to directly help, Sub-
Regional Workshop On Underwater Cultural Heritage Protection Laws for The 
Caribbean Small Island States. This meeting was held on the island of St. Kitts was led 
by Dr. Craig Forrest, a University of Queensland law professor with experience 
prosecuting treasure hunters internationally, and Dr. Ulrike Guerin, UNESCO’s UCH 
Convention Secretary. Participating states included St. Kitts and Nevis and their island 
neighbors: Anguilla, Antigua and Barbuda, Aruba, British Virgin Islands, Sint Maarten, 
and St. Lucia. Participants spent the first day discussing the history of the UCH 
Convention, and how the related five UNESCO conventions work together. Participants 
then reviewed a template legislation to modify and adapt it to their respective country’s 
legal codes and needs. The next two days were spent scrutinizing, editing, and finalizing 
the details to carry draft legislation home to their parliaments. Legislation should be 
clear, consistent, simple, efficient, and enforceable. Once passed, this important first step 
will aid Nevis in protecting Solebay and contributing to its management plan. 
In addition to national legislation and international support from UNESCO, 
Solebay has one more legal advantage for protection— Solebay was a Royal Navy 
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warship. Like the United States, Great Britain implicitly retains title over all its wrecked 
warships and aircraft, unless explicitly abandoned. This sovereign immunity approach 
serves nations with significant resources to enforce, respect, and support each other’s 
rights to lost naval wrecks. Many wrecks are war graves and associated with significant 
national emotional value. While Solebay did not suffer any human losses, the Royal 
Navy retains ultimate rights. Upon discovery and initial investigation, Mr. Dan 
Carruthers flew in from the British High Commission in Barbados for a meeting in 
Nevis. Through him, Peter MacDonald at Britain’s Navy Command in the Ministry of 
Defence was notified. In the end, if any of Solebay’s guns or artifacts are stolen, the 
British government may choose to investigate with international legal authority. 
Otherwise, scientific, scholarly research is not explicitly prohibited, and sovereign 
immunity has an added layer of legal protection if needed. 
Legislation is only as effective as the resources available and the will to enforce 
it. In the absence of legislative efficiency, archaeologists and the supportive public must 
consider other options until such legal efforts become more viable. Even then, a 
combination of factors should always work together for the best outcome. A key 
advantage to physically protect Solebay over Nevis’ terrestrial sites is its environmental 
location—a third of a mile offshore—underwater. The site is easily accessible by divers, 
even snorkelers, and a person could potentially swim from shore to the site. However, in 
general, it is out of visible sight on a daily basis, and requires knowing the exact position 
and usually a boat to access it. Maritime archaeological sites require great effort and 
resources to study, but also require the same effort to visit with intent to pilfer. 
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Looting of wrecks in the Federation has already begun. In 1997 a hurricane 
exposed a wreck of St. Kitts, known as the White House Bay wreck. This site exists in 
three meters of water, and only 34 meters from a popular recreational beach. Its 
vulnerable location exposed it to looting and needed professional recording before 
everything was lost. Between 2003 and 2008, Dr. Simon Q. Spooner with an 
Anglo~Dutch Maritime Archaeological Team (ADMAT) documented the wreck. They 
recorded the timbers and guns in situ, and only recovered small artifacts such as 
regimental soldier buttons.2 
Dr. Spooner planned to use the White House wreck as an example, a starting 
point investigating and managing underwater cultural heritage in St. Kitts.3 His work 
involved the government on various levels from higher administrative sanctioning to 
more fundamental camp policing by the St. Kitts and Nevis Coast Guard. As well, he 
gained support from local businesses to purchase supplies and fuel, and involved local 
school children with initial camp setup and sharing of the project once going through 
live closed-circuit television.4 The goal, by reaching multiple audiences and levels of 
participation, was to instill local cultural ownership of the underwater heritage and 
                                                
2. Simon Q. Spooner, St. Kitts Maritime Archaeological Project 2003--2008. 
Phase 1: White House Bay Wreck, ADMAT Interim Report (2003). 
3. Simon Q. Spooner, "How Tourism Benefits From the "ADMAT Model" for 
the Preservation of Underwater Cultural Heritage" (Paper Submitted to the 5th Annual 
Caribbean Conference on Sustainable Tourism Development, St. Kitts: September, 
2003). 
4. Spooner, St. Kitts Maritime Archaeological Project. 
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protect the site. Despite his best efforts, since ADMAT’s work end in 2008, the five 
guns on the wreck have been looted. 
Site protection would also benefit wrecks of more recent, but highly emotional 
value. On the afternoon of 1 August 1970, in what was just another day in St. Kitts and 
Nevis, disaster struck. MV Christena, a 1,160-foot island ferryboat, had left Basseterre, 
St. Kitts, bound for Charlestown, Nevis. As this was the final run of the day, it had 
double the passengers of its 155 capacity. Overloaded, it entered the Narrows between 
the two islands when rougher seas overtook the vessel and sank it. Only 91 survivors 
made it out to be rescued. Divers attempted to recover bodies trapped in the wreckage, 
but the depths, conditions, and shark infested waters made it too difficult. The 
government ended the recovery efforts and Christena has remained a memorial site. For 
Kittians and Nevisians, almost everyone on the island knew someone affected either 
directly or indirectly. This wreck remains on the seafloor in depths accessible by 
recreational divers. This legacy could both contribute to enacting underwater cultural 
protection laws, and benefit from their passage. 
While both St. Kitts and Nevis have museums on their islands, they lack any 
conservation labs for treating waterlogged artifacts recovered from the seafloor. Smaller 
artifacts may leave the country for treatment before returning for exhibit in island 
museums. However, transporting artifacts internationally, while keeping them wet until 
treatment, creates challenges. Larger artifacts, such as cannon, will be much easier to 
treat locally. In the short term, artifacts may be stored ashore by submerging them in 
tanks with fresh rainwater rinses. Since the ability to desalinate and properly conserve 
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artifacts is not yet a reality, recovering artifacts for storage without conservation in place 
may be ethically questionable. To move toward conservation requires building a lab, as 
Dr. Spooner has suggested. It is relatively reasonable to introduce and teach the skills 
required for iron conservation using electrolytic reduction with a chemical catalyst. 
Organic ship timbers using polyethylene glycol or silicone would require more 
substantial funding and training. Regardless, establishing a sustainable conservation 
program will require a skilled technical staff dedicated to overseeing each artifact to 
completion. Western archaeologists from Great Britain or the United States, for 
example, can assist in training and practice, but there needs to be a permanent person 
entrusted to artifact curation. 
The seventy-two artifacts recovered during the 2011 field project have become 
part of an ongoing investigation that may warrant future field research. The analysis of a 
limited sample from the site can test the identification of the shipwreck when 
complemented with historical documents. To conserve these artifacts, they were brought 
to Texas A&M University’s Conservation Research Laboratory (CRL), as no trained 
personnel or facilities exist in Nevis. When exhibited in the island’s museum, they may 
serve to promote awareness and greater support toward heritage preservation by 
Nevisians. 
With proper legal protection, and conservation plans in place, identifying what 
shipwrecks exist is a crucial first step in managing any cultural resources before further 
work may continue. Typically, this would require a remote sensing plan using such 
instruments as a side-scan sonar and a magnetometer. Conducting a survey off the island 
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of Nevis is not without similar precedent. Between 1979 and 1980 a Texas A&M 
University alumnus, Roger Smith, directed a maritime survey for the Cayman Islands’ 
Government in cooperation with the Cayman Heritage Trust.5 He used remote sensing 
equipment, positioning systems, and visual searches to locate wrecks. These were aided 
by information from local inhabitants obtained through extensive oral histories. Dr. 
Smith also conducted extensive archival investigations throughout Europe, the United 
States, and the Caribbean, to provide context for the data. 
The survey team plotted wrecks with precise locations on a master sea chart. 
They recorded their observations of characteristics such as cannon, anchors, or ship 
timbers and rigging. Limited excavation sampling provided diagnostic artifacts to date, 
type, and identify nationality of the wrecks, as possible. Given the fragile nature of 
submerged materials, as previously discussed, Dr. Smith chose to examine, take notes, 
and photograph the artifacts, then return the majority to the wrecks. Very few items kept 
were of historical significance or for further analysis. In the end Dr. Smith’s team 
recorded at least seventy-seven shipwrecks. Since 1980 the database has expanded to 
over 140 sites, which represent four centuries of seafaring and at least fifteen 
nationalities. Additionally, Dr. Smith tied the maritime resource to a greater context of 
the islands, and examined numerous coastal fortifications, homesteads, and other 
structures. Roger Smith’s work established the foundation for the Cayman Islands 
underwater heritage. This data set gave the government the ability to protect their 
                                                
5. Roger C. Smith, The Maritime Heritage of the Cayman Islands (Gainesville: 
University Press of Florida, 2000). 
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heritage from recreational looters, and more serious treasure hunters. A similar effort in 
Nevis should achieve the same lasting effects. 
In a similar study in Malta, beginning in 1999, Ayse Devrim Atauz began the 
first of three seasons surveying the seafloor around the Island.6 The topography from 
shore has several steep drop-offs that exceed safe diving limits. Wrecks detected in these 
areas by remote sensing equipment had to be investigated using remotely operated 
vehicles (ROVs). These robots can descend to depths beyond the ability of humans. 
They are like mini-submarines tethered to the surface with cables that provide electricity 
and wired controls. They also have cameras that send images to the user at the surface 
and can be observed on a television or computer monitor. 
The island of Nevis allows more gradual approaches. There was once a thriving 
coral reef surrounding the island, mostly long gone and historically decimated by 
colonists mining for lime in construction. Protective measures for any remaining coral 
are in place. Historically, the reefs and rocky bottoms could trap and tear ships apart. 
Solebay was victim to running aground not far off Charlestown. Further from the coast it 
may be worth a future deeper survey. Such a study may require ROVs, but for now this 
is not a concern. The positive outcome of this project showed that Nevis’ wrecks are 
within reach of the scientific community and responsible sport divers. The less positive 
consideration means that the government will have to remain diligent in guarding against 
illegal operations aimed at plundering the shipwrecks. This is particularly worrisome in a 
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troubled economy. Bronze guns for example can be sold on the black market to 
collectors, or to scrap metal dealers for their metallic value. For Nevis, fostering public 
ownership, through educational materials at the museum and partnership with the local 
dive shop, will be the best strategy to combat treasure hunters. Museums provide one 
avenue to deliver this message and involve the community. 
Wrecks in Nevis may also be officially recorded after being located by fishermen 
and recreational divers. Both the White House Bay wreck and Solebay serve as initial 
examples that may be built into a database. This can be aided by the use of a 
geographical information system (GIS), software designed specifically to relate data to 
geographic features in the search for patterns. As maritime archaeology celebrated its 
50th anniversary in the summer of 2010, the field has since evolved rapidly and finally 
matured as a proven historical social science. GIS in many ways has reached a 
maturation process in a similar period over the past few decades, both theoretically, and 
through better computer software.  
The benefits of visualizing remote sensing data in GIS are well proven. Air and 
space vehicles routinely capture large amounts of data that can then be manipulated in 
GIS software packages such as ESRI’s ArcGIS. In American archaeology, GIS is used 
more by government initiated projects such as the MPAs and shipwreck surveys, and 
less so by academic-based maritime research. The momentum of change is underway as 
a newer generation of researchers and professors becomes more familiar with GIS 
concepts and tools such as ESRI’s ArcGIS. Archaeologists increasingly recognize the 
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benefits of using GIS for its strong tools of spatial analysis — fundamental to 
archaeological interpretations.  
Archaeology was one of the first disciplines to take advantage of remote sensing 
with early aerial photography.7 This is an important discussion in that while GIS has 
been increasingly used in archaeology since the 1990s, it remains a science that requires 
dedication to learning software, typically an easier endeavor for a newer generation of 
archaeologists. The relationship between GIS and remote sensing in maritime 
archaeology is less mature but may benefit from a similarly rigorous practice. The 
problem may stem from a lack of understanding or training by maritime archaeologists. 
The challenge is the complexity of three specialties: archaeology, remote sensing 
technologies, and GIS.8 
There exist good examples of using GIS in maritime heritage management. 
Efforts to manage maritime archaeological materials in Scotland have successfully 
implemented GIS over the past decade.9 Surveys along rivers or similar coastal 
waterfronts may be carried out both on land and underwater, defining a holistic maritime 
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approach.10 A recent trend has been to use GIS as a spatial analysis tool for maritime 
landscape studies.11 It is well suited for reviewing broad landscape patterns. In another 
area, archaeologists are more sensitive to descendant communities of the indigenous 
cultures they are studying.12 While indigenous Caribs have long been assimilated into 
modern Afro-European decedents on Nevis, terrestrial sites remain. Along the southern 
coast, near Indian Castle, vast amounts of Indian pottery may be regularly observed 
washing into the sea through coastal erosion (Figure 15). 
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Figure 15 Southern Nevis seacoast scattered with prehistoric potsherds. 
(Photograph by the author) 
 
Documenting such sites in the same GIS database may protect and relate them to 
historic terrestrial and underwater sites. Importing the processed data into a GIS software 
could allow users to examine spatial patterns in relation to each other, in relation to 
modern fishing or economic zones, in relation to historic charts, or predictive modeling 
at infinite scales.13 
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Maritime archaeologists have often studied a single site in isolation from other 
sites. Famous shipwrecks or sunken cities require a lifetime of work to interpret. GIS 
may be an appropriate tool that can address both site-specific patterns and broader 
patterns. For example, GIS may aid archaeologists examining a wreck spread across 
miles of ocean floor. Currents, waves, natural geology, dredging, and other historic 
cultural behaviors can influence site formation processes. More broadly, GIS may now 
be able to synthesize and analyze historic charts, shipwrecks, historic data in attribute 
tables, coastal communities, oceanographic data, economic patterns, and other data to 
search for broad patterns that can then be used to ask broader questions. The ease with 
which historic charts can be digitized and georeferenced with GIS software provides a 
new tool to the analysis of cartography previously unavailable to the archaeologist.14 The 
micro examination of single sites may fuel the macro study by relating vast amounts of 
data together to foster new understandings. GIS is a powerful tool that can aid in this 
quest for new knowledge. 
Building a database will be done using both computer software and traditional 
files in a vertical cabinet. Software has longevity problems that cannot be trusted with 
such valuable information. While computer data may be useful for interpretations, 
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analysis, organization, and search queries, all data should have a paper copy and each 
wreck should have its own file. This provides a balance between longevity and 
accessibility. The computer data can be used and maintained, but as a safety, the paper 
will always exist. 
The database system used is not as important as the fact that one exists and is 
usable. With this in mind, it may prove beneficial to follow the model in the United 
Kingdom, a Sites and Monuments Record (SMR). These are records of archaeological 
sites. When applied to a list of shipwrecks, the list should contain as much information 
as known: location, type of vessel, nationality, period or date, and identity. This can be 
done digitally and printed as paper lists. One advantage to the software would allow a 
user to query by characteristics and look for patterns or similar wrecks. 
For Nevis, the author has begun the process of collecting, digitizing, and layering 
historic charts of Nevis into ESRI’s ArcGIS software. This tool allows for interpretation 
of historical cartographic changes, assists with understanding the location and loss of 
Solebay, and may help in future research toward locating and documenting additional 
shipwrecks. Once an archaeological site is located, the GIS software may be used to 
identify wrecking patterns such as ship traps, where multiple vessels fell victim to 
unknown hazards due to poor charts, or perhaps risk-taking behavior of cutting too close 
to shore, for example. 
The Nevis Historical and Conservation Society (NHCS), the British High 
Commission, and the local dive shop Scuba Safaris can use a shared database to 
implement resource management plans. The use of GIS will provide a medium to 
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communicate and visually share ideas regarding the spatially-based data. Scholars, such 
as university research-oriented professors and students, may use the data to form 
historical interpretations and plan excavations. Additionally, the public may be allowed 
access to portions of the data through an internet version of the GIS database. 
At the core of the best maritime heritage plan, with laws, conservation resources, 
and GIS databases, success ultimately depends on people. The political relationship 
between St. Kitts and Nevis remains challenging and affects the way shipwrecks such as 
Solebay are protected. The federation is officially represented in the international 
community at the United Nations through the government in St. Kitts, the national 
government of both islands. However, on practical, daily matters, Nevis has its own 
autonomy and government, the Nevis Island Administration. Navigating this relationship 
as a foreign archaeological advisor can be difficult in that the two islands often compete 
for opportunities, and fail to support each other in more local matters, despite forming a 
single country. In the case of Solebay, Mr. Carruthers has expressed that the British 
government would offer support if the national parliament in St. Kitts legislates to 
protect the site. St. Kitts has not done this, seeing it as a Nevisian matter, despite being a 
British warship. This creates the perpetual conundrum of failure to act. 
To overcome this problem, given the challenges to funding underwater 
archaeology and limited resources in Nevis, a well-developed group of interested 
participants, with the will to work toward managing the resources will be the key. 
Western scholars can share experience and provide guidance. In Nevis, there needs to be 
continued presence and efforts to educate and enforce protection. Mr. McClean Hobson, 
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Director of Maritime Affairs for St. Kitts and Nevis, remains a point of contact at the 
national level that supports efforts to document and protect shipwrecks. Mr. Cameron 
Gill, General Manager, Brimstone Hill Fortress National Park, serves as a supportive 
connection between the two islands. He maintains empathy with Nevis as he is originally 
from there. As a historian, he understands Solebay’s role in the Battle of Frigate Bay and 
the relationship with the siege of Brimstone Hill Fortress. Mr. Gill’s work managing 
Brimstone also provides him with excellent experience and credentials to understand 
heritage preservation, whether applied to a fortress or a shipwreck. His continued 
support will help to open dialogues between the two islands and potentially resolve 
eventual disagreements. 
 
 
Figure 16 Alexander Hamilton Museum and offices of NHCS along Charlestown 
waterfront. Notice two-story colonial design. (Photograph by the author) 
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In Nevis, the NHCS serves by providing the channel through which preservation 
initiatives and dialogue are conducted (Figure 16). The National Conservation and 
Environment Protection Act of 1987 delegated historic protection to the NHCS. It 
coordinates efforts of the government, private business, and private citizens to 
responsibly care for Nevis’ natural and historic resources. NHCS oversees the Museum 
of Nevis History, the Alexander Hamilton Museum, Field Study Center, and historic 
archives. Further, the members provide educational resources and programs for schools 
and the public. A key member of the NHCS has been Mr. Arthur “Brother” Anslyn. He 
is listed as the conservation chair. He too is valuable to the organization. Mr. Anslyn is a 
member of Nevis’ parliament and strong supporter of underwater archaeology. He 
provides a respectable link between NHCS and the higher authorities within the 
government of Nevis, including the Premier.  
Through the NHCS, a preservation mindset already exists in Nevis (Figure 17). 
The government established laws regulating building architecture in the capital, 
Charlestown. This town maintains a historic colonial appearance. All new construction 
must be approved and be sympathetic to the existing theme. This improves the quality of 
life for residents and tourists by preventing corporations from building modern structures 
that detract from the overall experience. Buildings may have modern features inside, 
including computers for businesses and air conditioners, but must maintain the 
characteristics that make Charlestown charming. This approach has proven successful 
and strikes a delicate balance between appealing to historic aesthetics and modern 
business technologies. 
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Figure 17 The preservation mindset: Heritage Trail signs maintained by the 
NHCS around the island educate tourists of historic places. (Photographs by the author) 
 
At a higher level, the Deputy Premier of the Nevis Island Government, the 
Honorable Mark A. G. Brantley’s continued support remains important. In October 2008 
Hurricane Oscar destroyed one of the islands major resorts, the Four Seasons. This 
business generated income for over half of the population. Due to financial constraints 
from the world recession and debt, the resort took more than two years to be renovated 
and reopened. The financial hardship on the local economy could be seen. Brantley 
understands the importance of heritage tourism to the economy, and the need to offer as 
many opportunities as possible. Protecting the archaeological resources and supporting 
research that produces museum materials can indirectly help the economy by attracting 
tourists even from cruise ships docking in St. Kitts. 
There are other individuals that contribute to the collective goal of promoting and 
supporting maritime archaeology. At a more basic level, working with Ellis Chaderton, 
owner of Nevis’ only dive shop, Scuba Safaris, will help monitor the site on a more 
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immediate basis, while working with tourist divers. The opportunities and people exist, 
convincing them to follow through with action and work together proves challenging.  
 
 
Figure 18 Chart showing the results of Bob Foster’s Seabed Survey. (Image 
provided by Bob Foster-Smith, Envision Mapping) 
 
Externally, Bob Foster-Smith’s pro bono biological seafloor surveys may provide 
additional impetus to make management decisions (Figure 18). Starting in 2005, Mr. 
Foster-Smith, from a company called Envision, began a series of surveys to chart the 
seafloor. The result is a chart showing bottom composition, e.g. seagrass, rock, coral, or 
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sand. A poster has been created, showing the results thus far. His work could help enact 
protective legislation, possibly with a movement toward creating an MPA around 
Solebay, as part of a broader effort to protecting maritime resources. This could be 
similar to a NOAA MPA or more site-specific protection such as the Monitor National 
Marine Sanctuary that protects the American Civil War ironclad USS Monitor, 
shipwrecked in 1862. 
For Solebay, as for all wrecks, site management options exist in a spectrum of 
choices, with limits based on available resources and environmental conditions. The case 
for full excavation would be difficult to justify. As a wreck site Solebay appears 
extraordinarily obliterated, compared to shipwrecks that more simply took on water and 
sunk more or less intact. In Solebay’s case, the explosion and subsequent scattering 
pattern across a mostly hard, volcanic seafloor, leaves little archaeological material to 
recover. Organics, including wooden hull timbers, or the possibility of surviving 
organics is unlikely given the shipwreck’s location and lack of places for materials to 
have become buried. Items that have survived the centuries are limited to metals, 
including the cannon and ballast remains. Iron remains are all encrusted. If these 
encrustations were recovered, there may only be hollows left in the shape of what was 
once an iron artifact. In this case, to extract any data, the artifact would require x-rays, 
followed by an experienced conservator creating epoxy molds to recreate the shape of 
the iron artifact that each concretion once enclosed. Such iron pieces would come from a 
disarticulated hull, twisted, broken, with bent fragments of a ship, potentially without 
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showing great diagnostic significance. For the time and cost, the potential return on 
knowledge does not warrant recommending action at this time. 
In situ preservation remains the best option, as a heritage tourist resource for 
divers. In this capacity, the wreck will have greater value to educate both tourists and 
Nevisian islanders of the value of protecting such wrecks. One other option 
recommended is a continued partial excavation as resources allow. The artifacts 
recovered thus far represent a respectable sample. These artifacts include weapon parts 
(trigger guard, musket balls, and gun apron), rigging components (coaks), and hull parts 
(staples, fasteners, tacks, nail, chain). 
 
 
Figure 19 Exhibit displaying conserved Solebay artifacts at the Alexander 
Hamilton Museum, Charlestown, Nevis. (Photograph by the author) 
 
These items have served to support the wreck’s identity, but also are serving a 
more important aspect to the broader resource. As part of a museum exhibit, their 
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educational value is helping to teach visitors about protecting wrecks, the science, 
conservation process, and laws (Figure 19). In this context, future site visits that find 
unique artifacts most vulnerable to looting may be recovered, conserved at little cost, 
and added to the exhibit. These would include very diagnostic items such as the trigger 
guard, gun apron, or coaks. 
In a future project, the argument may be strongly made for recovering some of 
the guns. In particular, conserving the two carronades and one long gun may answer 
many questions about the shipwreck raised within this research. One long gun may serve 
as a representative sample from the four known long guns. Through conservation, 
maker’s marks may help source the gun and document its journey to the seafloor. The 
two carronades may similarly be recorded, clarifying how they came to Solebay and 
resolving the unanswered questions surrounding their existence: their type, 
manufacturer, and procurement to Solebay. 
The Lighthouse Archaeological Maritime Program (LAMP), based out of St. 
Augustine, Florida, has been studying a shipwreck contemporary to Solebay, with an 
archaeological code name of the Storm Wreck. Since 2010, LAMP Director Chuck 
Meide has led the excavation of this wreck, believed to have sunk in December 1782, as 
part of a Loyalist fleet retreating from the further northern port cities of Charleston and 
Savannah. Guns recovered in the excavation include two early carronades, with one 
believed to be the oldest, or perhaps second oldest surviving carronade in the world. 
Solebay sunk over eleven months before the Storm Wreck, implying the possibility that 
Solebay contains even older carronades. If not older, they are certainly early examples. 
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Throughout the Caribbean and around the world such guns are littered as historic relics, 
particularly near historic colonial coastal fortifications. Despite their prevalence, often 
these guns have lost their provenience. Guns may be displayed at fortress museums to 
enhance the ambience for visitors. A particular gun can inform and educate visitor about 
cannons in general, but lack an associated history without a provenience. Whether 
Solebay’s guns are the oldest in the world or not, they do exist in an archaeological 
context. Recovering three of them could answer some questions, would make excellent 
museum pieces, and leave three on site to help mark the wrecks location and provide an 
appealing dive for tourists. 
Educational outreach as a protection strategy is the best approach given limited 
resources for policing.15 Creating future stewards as a strategy may reduce or eliminate 
harmful behaviors to limited archaeological resources. In addition to the physical 
museum and underwater dive site, a virtual museum has been created online to address a 
wider audience. The internet has the ability to use Solebay as a mechanism for 
contributing to greater educational efforts within the archaeological community. The 
Museum of Underwater Archaeology (MUA) is a nonprofit organization that shares, 
promotes, and advocates maritime archaeological projects. This approach serves as an 
excellent portal whose only intention is ethically promoting education about the science 
                                                
15. Della A. Scott-Ireton, "Preserves, Parks, and Trails: Strategy and Response in 
Maritime Cultural Resource Management" (Dissertation, Florida State University, 
2005); John H. Jameson and Della A. Scott-Ireton, Out of the Blue: Public Interpretation 
of Maritime Cultural Resources (New York: Springer, 2007). 
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and resources. For the MUA, a Project Journal has been created that briefly documented 
the 2011 fieldwork, and some of the subsequent conservation topics (Figure 20). 
 
 
Figure 20 Computer screen image capture showing MUA Solebay website. 
 
In the end, historic preservation in Nevis is a battle against environmental actions 
and cultural behaviors. Building site inventories should be a priority. Wrecks will have 
to be carefully monitored to assess destruction by natural forces. Hurricanes are one of 
the most destructive forces on Nevis. The winds can move sediments and expose 
shipwrecks to altered ecosystems. The changing environment can speed the process of 
deterioration. Humans can also have the same effect. Destructive processes can result 
from placing permanent mooring lines through a wreck. Divers may recover souvenirs 
and unknowingly remove a piece of history. Without proper conservation, an artifact 
would quickly deteriorate and be lost forever. Sites that have survived decades or 
centuries can quickly be lost to humans, as was the case of the White House Bay wreck. 
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In Nevis, the storms will continue, but the greatest initial challenge is human, mobilizing 
the political will toward legislative protection and enforcement.  
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CHAPTER VII 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
This dissertation used a case study to document the beginnings of an active 
underwater archaeological research program in Nevis. Investigating Solebay presented 
challenges that turned into opportunities for guiding maritime heritage policy. For the 
NHCS, this process modeled professional, ethical, scientific nautical archaeology in 
Nevis. Studying Nevisian history and archaeology provides an opportunity for 
examining the rise and decline of the British Empire in a microcosm — from a wealthy 
and prosperous sugar colony to post-colonial tourist-driven economy. Nevisian fate is 
inseparable from its seafaring history. Developing underwater archaeology in Nevis will 
provide cultural information important to the island’s history. 
The research developed within the scope of this dissertation has also shed new 
light on a specific wreck and British naval history from a new perspective. Naval history 
is replete with tales of significant battles that altered the course of history and of famous 
fighting men and ships, such as Admiral Horatio Nelson aboard Victory at Trafalgar. In 
contrast, studying a minor war vessel such as Solebay offers an opportunity to 
investigate lesser-known engagements at a micro level, involving thousands of soldiers 
and sailors. Such an examination begs an understanding of the macro experience 
between the French and British struggles for control of the sugar islands, and the islands’ 
socioeconomic context within the American Revolutionary War. 
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In many aspects, the Royal Navy evolved significantly during the American 
Revolution in training, scale of men and ships, better-designed ships, improvements in 
technical features such as coppered hulls, and carronades. The greatest challenge that the 
British forces faced was the impossibility of locking the French at their homeports such 
as Brest. Once the French were free to operate off the American seacoast and throughout 
the Caribbean, the British found themselves spread too thin to achieve their objectives.1 
From their base in Martinique, the French concentrated their fleet to win decisive 
victories against the British in North America at Chesapeake, and in the West Indies. 
This kept the British reacting to American and French initiatives. Nevis, the Battle of 
Frigate Bay and the Siege of Brimstone Hill demonstrate a British defensive reaction to 
French aggression. 
 Since being observed by Columbus in 1493, Nevis has held a position in the 
European history of the Americas. One hundred and thirty five years later, the island 
began a dramatic ecological and cultural transformation through British colonization. 
Ancestral Europeans and enslaved-Africans completely displaced the indigenous Carib 
Indians. Non-native flora and fauna were introduced, including West African palm trees, 
African vervet monkeys, donkeys, and horses.  
Creating a permanent museum exhibit for a general public that speaks to rich, 
conflicted, and multicultural Nevisian identities has been challenging, but solved with a 
series of thematic presentations. Given that the Nevisian economy is driven by tourism, 
the products must appeal across ages and cultures. Solebay can easily be related to the 
                                                
1. Fremantle, Sea Power, 471-505. 
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island’s material legacy of colonial plantations controlled by white men. Transcending 
culturally racial identities requires a broader approach. Nautical archaeology may offer a 
homocentric means to attract the African descendants into a different appreciation for 
science, and thereby encourage an appreciation to explore their contemporary histories. 
Topics for these histories may include research into slave ships or less conflicted history 
of maritime trade with Saint Kitts and more distant islands. 
Over two-hundred years ago, the battle to control Nevis helped define a course of 
history for the Caribbean. Despite the strong presence of British colonists in the 
Caribbean, their security in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries depended heavily 
on naval deterrence, even with fortresses such as Brimstone Hill. While seemingly 
formidable, such defenses were sometimes captured relatively quickly, as in 1782. 
Larger islands such as British Jamaica or Antigua, with better protected coves, sheltered 
naval forces that could be sent to defend the smaller islands such as Nevis. That legacy 
remains today, and the material to understand the historical journey partially rests on the 
seafloor. Investigating Solebay begins an effort to discover, document, and share this 
cultural history. This dissertation intersects historical problems while opening new data 
sources from underwater archaeology. Solebay yields meaningful implications across 
space, time, and scale. 
 Solebay's size, speed, and flexibility support the importance of studying lesser 
vessels in naval history. The Mermaid-class frigate illustrates a vessel built to fulfill a 
variety of roles and needs. American Revolution soldier and British prisoner Ethan Allen 
recalled how upon their arrival in Cape Fear, North Carolina, Solebay sailed into the 
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harbor, while Commodore Peter Parker’s 50-gun flagship Bristol and the deeper draft 
vessels had to anchor further out because they could not clear a sand bar.2 During the 
time at Cape Fear, Commodore Parker transferred his flag to Solebay.3 In a variety of 
roles throughout the war, Solebay could aid fleets during ship-to-ship actions as a 
repeater or skirmish vessel, provide the speed and firepower needed for an escort 
protecting transports from privateers, bombard shore fortifications like Sullivan’s Island 
in 1776, and operate independently to interdict blockade runners or deliver dispatches. 
Nine-pounder frigates became a standard size for similar vessel classes during 
this period: 1956 Lowestoffe, 1757-1785 Coventry, 1761-1774 Mermaid, and 1774-1787 
Enterprise. Solebay served Britain’s needs and firepower during war, and remained 
useful during peacetime, while higher rated vessels were laid up in ordinary. While not 
able to fight in line, frigates could combat privateers and operate at speeds that higher 
rates could not match. During the 1790s, the United States Navy built six frigates: 
United States, Constellation, Constitution, Chesapeake, Congress, and President.4 
Although these were heavy, or “super frigates,” they nevertheless reflect the desirable 
qualities of frigates: economy, independence, multi-mission capabilities, and adequate or 
                                                
2. Allen, Narrative of Colonel Ethan Allen's Captivity, 19. 
3. Journal of H.M.S. Bristol, Captain John Morris, 30-31 May 1776, in NDAR 5, 
324; South-Carolina and American General Gazette, Friday, May 31, 1776 to Friday, 
August 2, 1776, in NDAR 5, 373. 
 
4. In direct relation to Nevis’ history, on 9 February 1799, during the Quasi-War 
with France, USS Constellation defeated and captured the French warship L’Insurgent. 
This battle occurred off Nevis and signified the US Navy’s first ever victory at sea. 
Secretary of the Navy Benjamin Stoddert then commissioned L’Insurgent into the US 
Navy as USS Insurgent, serving for one year before being lost in a storm. 
  172 
even great firepower, in the case of the American frigates. The 1763 Mermaid design 
proved successful enough to justify the order of three more vessels in 1773. Of the six 
total frigates, Solebay’s wrecked remains constitute the only direct physical evidence of 
this vessel class. 
Studying vessel classes, specific vessels, and technical specifications should 
never be done without consideration for the most important aspect, the human story. 
Solebay was designed and built by shipwrights, outfitted by specialized men, managed 
by administrators and politicians that sent it to sea and to war, and crewed by officers 
and sailors all with their own stories. Their decisions affected the lives of the enemy, and 
the fate of the British colonists they were sent to protect. 
The underwater archaeology promotes archival research for historical context 
and understanding of a minor historical ship. Before being promoted to larger vessels 
and higher commands, all officers began their careers at the lower navy echelons. Sixth 
rate ships such as Solebay taught officers the essential skills of command at sea, 
leadership, seamanship, sailing from following a flagship as part of a fleet in battle, or 
independently operating on missions suited only for such a vessel class. Nelson honed 
his command skills aboard the Mermaid-class Boreas in 1784. Great officers did not 
appear suddenly, but rather took years of experience to grow into the leaders they 
became. Lesser-rated vessels performed important missions for the navy, but also served 
to grow such officers. It was aboard these vessels that they learned the leadership skills 
necessary to become future admirals, such as Nelson. 
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This research represents the intersection between limited archaeological data and 
historical questions. A wide range of other nautical archaeology sites such as Kizilburun, 
the Pepper Wreck, Batavia, Westfield, and other examples too numerous to mention all 
represent shipwrecks, archaeologically studied from across centuries, exhibiting limited 
surviving material, but each is of historic and scientific value. Solebay’s limited remains 
contribute to the archaeological database. The underwater archaeology promotes 
maritime heritage enthusiasm and the need for protective laws, and proposes new 
questions that may only be addressed through further research. Solebay reveals human 
adaptation to a maritime environment, but also human adaptation to the human endeavor 
of warfare. 
Consequences of human behavior have been patterned as an archaeological 
signature of conflict. Interpretation of the artifacts offers an understanding into the 
process of human adaptation during wartime. This research asked anthropological 
questions surrounding the behavior of Solebay’s captain, based on the archaeological 
evidence, regarding the meaning of the smaller carronade guns on the site. The 
interpretations hypothesize human behaviors that fit within the site formation model. 
The site suggests potential archaeological signatures for resourceful behavior in 
acquiring the guns, achieved while maintaining cultural identity across great distances, 
and combined with the stresses of conflict. In a future excavation, the guns may be 
raised to test these hypotheses, and allow empirical evaluation of technological 
modifications understood within a theoretical context of human adaptation during war. 
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Studying the nuanced details of the ship is important, but the greater context 
places Solebay as a feature within the battlefield as the site. Scaling and interpreting 
Solebay more broadly across space and time serves to understand how Solebay and her 
crew transported cultural values and technology across the global landscape. The navy 
was a product of British culture, which executed goals to support its mercantilist 
economy. 
The Battle of Frigate Bay and the Siege of Brimstone Hill Fortress are mere 
footnotes in naval history. But for a brief period, they were important as thousands of 
British and French sailors and soldiers fought for control of the island. This struggle 
represents a chapter in the greater fight for control of the Caribbean economy. Capturing 
or raiding and destroying sugar plantations in the eighteenth century became a means for 
imperial European powers to damage a rival empire’s economy.5 Plantation slavery 
contributed to the economic growth of the British Empire. The battles on and off St. 
Kitts and Nevis demonstrated the intricacy of the imperial geopolitical networks. French 
soldiers attacking St. Kitts saved Barbados and Jamaica. While the French succeeded in 
taking Brimstone, the 1783 Peace restored the island to British control. 
The fortress today is a St. Kitts National Park and UNESCO World Heritage Site. 
Its history, architecture, and scenic views draw thousands of tourists every year. Its 
formidable appearance scars the landscape and reminds people of the purpose it once 
served. Again, the fortress and island would not exist without the maritime history and 
Solebay serves as a physical link, connecting Brimstone to the sea in a tangible 
                                                
5. Meniketti, Sugar Mills, 53-80. 
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relationship. Solebay represents a tool in this imperial effort to control strategic 
resources through the stress of war, while oppressing a defined people for labor. This 
historical knowledge and archaeological site empowers local communities through a 
material cultural resource that enhances heritage tourism. 
While an inanimate object, Solebay is as much a character influencing historical 
events as any person, with a birth, a life, and a death. Solebay existed from 1763 until 
wrecking during the Battle of Frigate Bay in 1782 and its existence continues as a 
shipwreck. Interactions amongst her crew and between her and enemy ships contributed 
to shaping the fate of empires. The crew encountered Ethan Allen and John Paul Jones, 
commanding the ship educated and developed Captain Symonds for promotion, a 
captain who later surrendered to the American colonists at Yorktown, and contributed to 
the fate of Brimstone. While Solebay has metaphorically died, she has also 
metaphorically been resurrected. Through archaeology, Solebay catalyzed the study of 
maritime archaeology in Nevis, serving as an example for heritage policy — as a 
measurable starting point. Together, the physical museum exhibit, the virtual MUA 
museum exhibit, and the site remains provide opportunities to educate. 
Future research in Nevis should target a broad remote sensing survey, the 
original intention of this dissertation research. This should include scientific diver 
investigations of promising targets, along with diver investigations of sites as suggested 
by Nevisian fishermen and divers. This effort would help the NHCS build a working 
database of sites for management and further studies. 
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It is expected that any shipwrecks discovered in future research are most likely of 
European construction. Indigenous seacraft before European arrival would include 
variations on the Carib Indian canoes. While their archaeological existence cannot be 
ruled out, locating them would prove more difficult and serendipitous. Their smaller 
sizes and absence of large iron artifacts such as anchors and cannon found on European 
vessels would prove more challenging to observe in a side-scan sonar or magnetometer 
signature from a remote sensing survey. Any such vessel would likely need to have been 
quickly buried in sand on the seafloor from a storm, lest risk exposure to environmental 
destruction primarily from shipworms. 
A larger local vessel that may be found in an archaeological survey would be a 
Nevis lighter. These vessels were used for years as workhorse ferryboats between St. 
Kitts and Nevis until the last retired in 2001.6 Modern diesel powered vessels capable of 
carrying cars, people, and cargo have replaced them. Despite the lighter’s significance as 
a backbone to Nevisian transportation, no known vessels survive today. Maritime 
archaeological investigations may uncover a wrecked lighter, underwater or along a 
shoreline. 
                                                
6. Marco Meniketti, "And Now They Are Gone: Documenting the Last Sailing 
Lighter of Nevis, West Indies", International Journal of Nautical Archaeology 41, no. 1 
(2012): 134-147. 
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Figure 21 Postcard showing Nevis lighter. (Scanned from a postcard by the 
author) 
 
As previously discussed, research on the Solebay site may continue as resources 
allow. Recovering and conserving the guns could help to answer questions about 
Solebay and human behavior during war, but also help to generate higher visibility in 
protecting and studying other wrecks. This will foster awareness necessary to raise 
public funds to study wrecks while winning the battle against treasure hunters. The 
threat to Solebay is real, as the missing guns from the White House Bay wreck 
demonstrate.  
In the 21st century Nevis may be viewed as a West Indian paradise, a tropical 
location to vacation at a posh resort complete with beach umbrellas, restaurants, scuba 
diving in warm blue waters, and a slow relaxing lifestyle. Long before the Nevisian 
economy catered primarily to tourists, the economy was based on plantations worked 
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primarily by enslaved Africans. Added to this dark history were centuries of intermittent 
warfare that involved thousands of soldiers and sailors. Nevisian archaeology on 
terrestrial sites has been important in studying these experiences. Adding nautical 
archaeology provides new historical resources in completing an understanding of how 
the sea shaped the terrestrial heritage. In the critical early months of the American 
Revolution, Solebay and her crew filled an urgent and immediate need for the British 
crown, while ships were built and sailors recruited to fight the growing revolution. 
Today, Solebay is fulfilling a need to develop policy that protects wrecks, but allows for 
the continued scientific study of shipwrecks in Nevis. 
As Spanish, Dutch, French, and British forces competed for geographic control 
of New World resources, the Caribbean became an additional battlefield for seemingly 
endless continental European wars. The British and French repeatedly sent dozens of 
ships and thousands of sailors and soldiers to seize or defend their treasured islands. On 
the tiny island of Nevis, and its sister island of Saint Christopher, the French and British 
fought in multiple conflicts. The Nevis’ western seacoast once had a wall with over one-
hundred cannon to provide at least an illusion of a strong defense from a seaborne attack. 
While some limited traces of this wall and island fortifications remain archaeologically, 
much of this past has been lost to modern development and erosion through time. 
Nautical archaeology is an important discipline for constructing Nevis’ maritime history. 
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